

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THE LINCOLN FAMILY

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THE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN

LETTERS AND TELEGRAMS
MESSAGES TO CONGRESS
MILITARY ORDERS
MEMORANDA, Etc.

Introductions and Special Articles by

THEODORE ROOSEVELT
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And Others

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VOLUME VIII

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THE CORRESPONDENCE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN

(After March 4, 1861)

[*Continued*]

CORRESPONDENCE

(After March 4, 1861)

[*Continued.*]

Henry W. Halleck.[1]

On December 2, 1861, the President authorized General Halleck, of the Department of Missouri, to suspend therein the writ of habeas corpus and to exercise martial law in his discretion.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., December 31, 1861.

General H. W. Halleck, St. Louis, Missouri.

General McClellan is sick. Are General Buell and yourself in concert? When he moves on Bowling Green, what hinders it being reinforced from Columbus? A simultaneous movement by you on Columbus might prevent it.

A. Lincoln.

[Similar despatch to Buell same date.]

Executive Mansion, January 1, 1862.

My dear General Halleck: General McClellan is not dangerously ill, as I hope, but would better not be disturbed with business. I am very anx-

[1] At the outbreak of the war General Halleck rivalled General George B. McClellan in reputation as a military authority. A graduate of West Point in 1839, he published in 1846 a book, *The Elements of Military Art and Science*, which was regarded as a classic. He was prominent in military and political movements in California from 1846 to 1854. The President appointed him commander of the Department of Missouri in November, 1861.

ious that, in case of General Buell's moving toward Nashville, the enemy shall not be greatly reinforced, and I think there is danger he will be from Columbus. It seems to me that a real or feigned attack on Columbus from up-river at the same time would either prevent this or compensate for it by throwing Columbus into our hands. I wrote General Buell a letter similar to this, meaning that he and you shall communicate and act in concert, unless it be your judgment and his that there is no necessity for it. You and he will understand much better than I how to do it. Please do not lose time in this matter.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

See letter to Don Carlos Buell, on January 1, 1862; on January 7, 1862; on January 13, 1862; and on March 8, 1862.

On January 6, 1862, General Halleck wrote the President, describing the helpless condition of his department, and stating the impossibility of his aiding Buell in Kentucky. He said:

Some of the brigadier-generals assigned to this department are entirely ignorant of their duties and unfit for any command. I assure you, Mr. President, it is very difficult to accomplish much with such means. I am in the condition of a carpenter who is required to build a bridge with a dull ax, a broken saw, and rotten timber. It is true that I have some very good green timber, which will answer the purpose as soon as I can get it into shape and season it a little. . . .

General Buell's army and the forces at Paducah occupy precisely the same position in relation to each other and to the enemy as did the armies of McDowell and Patterson before the battle of Bull Run.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. Halleck, Major-General.

On this letter the President wrote the following indorsement:

[*Indorsement.*]

The within is a copy of a letter just received from General Halleck. It is exceedingly discouraging. As everywhere else, nothing can be done. A. Lincoln.

January 10, 1862.

Washington, D. C., January 15, 1862.

Major-General Halleck.

My dear Sir: This will introduce Governor G. Koerner, of Illinois, who is my personal friend, and who calls on you at my particular request. Please open the sealed letter he will hand you before he leaves you and confer with him as to its contents. Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Inclosure.*]

Executive Mansion, January 15, 1862.

Major-General Halleck.

My dear Sir: The Germans are true and patriotic, and so far as they have got cross in Missouri it is upon mistake and misunderstanding. Without a knowledge of its contents, Governor Koerner, of Illinois, will hand you this letter. He is an educated and talented German gentleman, as true a man as lives. With his assistance you can set everything right with the Germans. I write this without his knowledge, asking him at the same time, by letter, to deliver it. My clear judgment is that, with reference to the German element in your command, you should have Governor Koerner with you; and if agreeable to you and him, I will make him a brigadier-general, so that he can afford to so give his time. He does

not wish to command in the field, though he has more military knowledge than many who do. If he goes into the place he will simply be an efficient, zealous, and unselfish assistant to you. I say all this upon intimate personal acquaintance with Governor Koerner.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, February 16, 1862.

Major-General Halleck, St. Louis, Missouri.

You have Fort Donelson safe, unless Grant shall be overwhelmed from outside; to prevent which latter will, I think, require all the vigilance, energy, and skill of yourself and Buell, acting in full coöperation. Columbus will not get at Grant, but the force from Bowling Green will. They hold the railroad from Bowling Green to within a few miles of Fort Donelson, with the bridge at Clarksville undisturbed. It is unsafe to rely that they will not dare to expose Nashville to Buell. A small part of their force can retire slowly toward Nashville, breaking up the railroad as they go, and keep Buell out of that city twenty days. Meanwhile Nashville will be abundantly defended by forces from all South and perhaps from here at Manassas. Could not a cavalry force from General Thomas on the Upper Cumberland dash across, almost unresisted, and cut the railroad at or near Knoxville, Tennessee? In the midst of a bombardment at Fort Donelson, why could not a gunboat run up and destroy the bridge at Clarksville? Our success or failure at Fort Donelson is vastly important, and I beg you to put your soul in the effort. I send a copy of this to Buell. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, April 23, 1862.

Major-General Halleck, Pittsburg Landing.

The President desires to know why you have made no official report to this department respecting the late battle at Pittsburg Landing, and whether any neglect or misconduct of General Grant or any other officer contributed to the sad casualties that befell our forces on Sunday.[1]

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, May 1, 1862.

Major-General Halleck,

Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee.

I am pressed by the Missouri members of Congress to give General Schofield independent command in Missouri. They insist that for want of this their local troubles gradually grow worse. I have forborne, so far, for fear of interfering with and embarrassing your operations. Please answer, telling me whether anything, and what, I can do for them without injuriously interfering with you.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, May 24, 1862.

Major-General Halleck,

Near Corinth, Mississippi.

Several despatches from Assistant Secretary Scott and one from Governor Morton asking

[1] April 6, 1862. It was unofficially charged that Grant was drunk during the battle. Lincoln replied to the charge by inquiring the name of the brand of Grant's whiskey, saying he should like to send some of it to certain other generals.

reinforcements for you have been received. I beg you to be assured we do the best we can. I mean to cast no blame when I tell you each of our commanders along our line from Richmond to Corinth supposes himself to be confronted by numbers superior to his own. Under this pressure we thinned the line on the upper Potomac, until yesterday it was broken at heavy loss to us, and General Banks [1] put in great peril, out of which he is not yet extricated, and may be actually captured. We need men to repair this breach, and have them not at hand. My dear general, I feel justified to rely very much on you. I believe you and the brave officers and men with you can and will get the victory at Corinth.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, June 8, 1862.

Major-General Halleck, Corinth, Mississippi.

We are changing one of the departmental lines, so as to give you all of Kentucky and Tennessee. In your movement upon Chattanooga I think it probable that you include some combination of the force near Cumberland Gap under General Morgan. Do you? A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, June 18, 1862.

Major-General Halleck, Corinth, Mississippi.

It would be of both interest and value to us here to know how the expedition toward East Tennessee is progressing, if in your judgment you can give us the information with safety.

A. Lincoln.

[1] See correspondence with N. P. Banks and with John C. Frémont.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, June 28, 1862.

Major-General Halleck.

The enemy have concentrated in such force at Richmond as to render it absolutely necessary, in the opinion of the President, for you immediately to detach 25,000 of your force and forward it by the nearest and quickest route by way of Baltimore and Washington to Richmond. It is believed that the quickest route would be by way of Columbus, Ky., and up the Ohio River. But in detaching your force the President directs that it be done in such a way as to enable you to hold your ground and not interfere with the movement against Chattanooga and East Tennessee. This condition being observed, the forces to be detached and the routes they are to be sent are left to your own judgment.

The direction to send these forces immediately is rendered imperative by a serious reverse suffered by General McClellan before Richmond yesterday. . . .

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

Washington, D. C., June 30, 1862.

Major-General Halleck, Corinth, Mississippi.

Would be very glad of 25,000 infantry; no artillery or cavalry; but please do not send a man if it endangers any place you deem important to hold, or if it forces you to give up or weaken or delay the expedition against Chattanooga. To take and hold the railroad at or east of Cleveland, in East Tennessee, I think fully as important as the taking and holding of Richmond.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, June 30, 1862. 3 p. m.
Major-General Halleck, Corinth.

Your telegram of this date just received. The Chattanooga expedition must not on any account be given up. The President regards that and the movement against East Tennessee as one of the most important movements of the war, and its occupation nearly as important as the capture of Richmond. He is not pleased with the tardiness of the movement toward Chattanooga, and directs that no force be sent here if you cannot do it without breaking up the operations against that point and East Tennessee. Infantry only are needed; our cavalry and artillery are strong enough. The first reports from Richmond were more discouraging than the truth warranted. If the advantage is not on our side, it is balanced. General McClellan has moved his whole force on the line of the James River, and is supported there by our gunboats; but he must be largely strengthened before advancing, and hence the call on you, which I am glad you answered so promptly. Let me know to what point on the river you will send your forces, so as to provide immediately for transportation.

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., July 2, 1862.
Major-General Halleck, Corinth, Mississippi.

Your several despatches of yesterday to Secretary of War and myself received. I did say, and now repeat, I would be exceedingly glad for some reinforcements from you. Still do not send

a man if in your judgment it will endanger any point you deem important to hold, or will force you to give up or weaken or delay the Chattanooga expedition.

Please tell me could you not make me a flying visit for consultation without endangering the service in your department. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, July 4, 1862.

Major-General Halleck, Corinth, Mississippi.

You do not know how much you would oblige us if, without abandoning any of your positions or plans, you could promptly send us even 10,000 infantry. Can you not? Some part of the Corinth army is certainly fighting McClellan in front of Richmond. Prisoners are in our hands from the late Corinth army. A. Lincoln.

War Department, July 6, 1862.

Major-General Halleck, Corinth, Mississippi.

My dear Sir: This introduces Governor William Sprague, of Rhode Island. He is now governor for the third time, and senator-elect of the United States.

I know the object of his visit to you. He has my cheerful consent to go, but not my direction. He wishes to get you and part of your force, one or both, to come here. You already know I should be exceedingly glad of this if, in your judgment, it could be without endangering positions and operations in the southwest; and I now repeat what I have more than once said by telegraph, "Do not come or send a man if, in your judgment, it will endanger any point you deem

important to hold, or endangers or delays the Chattanooga expedition."

Still, please give my friend, Governor Sprague, a full and fair hearing.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Order.*]

Executive Mansion, July 11, 1862.

Ordered, That Major-General Henry W. Halleck be assigned to command the whole land forces of the United States, as general-in-chief, and that he repair to this capital so soon as he can with safety to the positions and operations within the department now under his charge.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, July 11, 1862.

Major-General Halleck, Corinth.

Governor Johnson, at Nashville, is in great trouble and anxiety about a raid into Kentucky. The Governor is a true and a valuable man—indispensable to us in Tennessee. Will you please get in communication with him, and have a full conference with him before you leave for here? I have telegraphed him on the subject.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, July 13, 1862.

Major-General Halleck, Corinth, Mississippi.

They are having a stampede in Kentucky. Please look to it. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, July 14, 1862.
Major-General Halleck, Corinth, Mississippi.

I am very anxious—almost impatient—to have you here. Have due regard to what you leave behind. When can you reach here?

A. Lincoln.

[*Order.*]

Washington, D. C., September 3, 1862.

Ordered, That the general-in-chief, Major-General Halleck, immediately commence, and proceed with all possible despatch, to organize an army, for active operations, from all the material within and coming within his control, independent of the forces he may deem necessary for the defense of Washington when such active army shall take the field.

By order of the President:

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

McClellan's Headquarters, October 3, 1862.
Major-General Halleck.

General Stuart, of the rebel army, has sent in a few of our prisoners under a flag of truce, paroled with terms to prevent their fighting the Indians, and evidently seeking to commit us to their right to parole our prisoners in that way. My inclination is to send the prisoners back with a distinct notice that we will recognize no paroles given to our prisoners by rebels as extending beyond the prohibition against fighting them, yet I wish your opinion upon it based both upon the general law and our cartel. I wish to avoid violations of law and bad faith. Answer as quickly

as possible, as the thing if done at all should be done at once. A. Lincoln, President.

Steamer Baltimore, off Aquia Creek,
Virginia, November 27, 1862.

Major-General Halleck.

Sir: I have just had a long conference with General Burnside. He believes that General Lee's whole army, or nearly the whole of it, is in front of him, at and near Fredericksburg. General Burnside says he could take into battle now any day about 110,000 men; that his army is in good spirit, good condition, good morale, and that in all respects he is satisfied with officers and men; that he does not want more men with him, because he could not handle them to advantage; that he thinks he can cross the river in face of the enemy and drive him away; but that, to use his own expression, it is somewhat risky. I wish the case to stand more favorably than this in two respects: First, I wish his crossing of the river to be nearly free from risk; and, secondly, I wish the enemy to be prevented from falling back, accumulating strength as he goes, into his intrenchments at Richmond. I therefore propose that General Burnside shall not move immediately; that we accumulate a force on the south bank of the Rappahannock—at, say, Port Royal—under protection of one or two gunboats, as nearly up to 25,000 strong as we can; at the same time another force of about the same strength as high up the Pamunkey as can be protected by gunboats. These being ready, let all three forces move simultaneously: General Burnside's force in its attempt to cross the river, the Rappahannock force moving directly up the

south side of the river to his assistance, and ready, if found admissible, to deflect off to the turnpike bridge over the Mattapony in the direction of Richmond; the Pamunkey force to move as rapidly as possible up the north side of the Pamunkey, holding all the bridges, and especially the turnpike bridge immediately north of Hanover Court House; hurry north and seize and hold the Mattapony bridge before mentioned, and also, if possible, press higher up the streams and destroy the railroad bridges. Then if General Burnside succeeds in driving the enemy from Fredericksburg, he (the enemy) no longer has the road to Richmond, but we have it, and can march into the city. Or, possibly, having forced the enemy from his line, we could move upon and destroy his army. General Burnside's main army would have the same line of supply and retreat as he has now provided. The Rappahannock force would have that river for supply, and gunboats to fall back upon; and the Pamunkey force would have that river for supply, and a line between the two rivers—Pamunkey and Mattapony—along which to fall back upon its gunboats. I think the plan promises the best results, with the least hazard, of any now conceivable.

Note.—The above plan proposed by me was rejected by General Halleck and General Burnside on the ground that we could not raise and put in position the Pamunkey force without too much waste of time. A. L.

Executive Mansion, January 1, 1863.

Major-General Halleck.

My dear Sir: General Burnside wishes to cross the Rappahannock with his army, but his grand division commanders all oppose the movement. If in such a difficulty as this you do not help, you fail me precisely in the point for which I sought your assistance. You know what General Burnside's plan is, and it is my wish that you go with him to the ground, examine it as far as practicable, confer with the officers, getting their judgment and ascertaining their temper—in a word, gather all the elements for forming a judgment of your own, and then tell General Burnside that you do approve or that you do not approve his plan. Your military skill is useless to me if you will not do this.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Indorsement.*]

January 1, 1863.

Withdrawn, because considered harsh by General Halleck. A. Lincoln.

Headquarters of the Army,

January 1, 1863.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War,
Washington, D. C.

Sir: From my recent interview with the President and yourself, and from the President's letter of this morning, which you delivered to me at your reception, I am led to believe that there is a very important difference of opinion in regard to my relations toward generals commanding armies in the field, and that I cannot perform the duties of my present office satisfactorily at the same time to the President and to my-

self. I therefore respectfully request that I may be relieved from further duties as general-in-chief.[1]

Very respectfully your obedient servant,

H. W. Halleck.

See letter to Ambrose E. Burnside of January 5, 1863.

Executive Mansion, January 7, 1863.

Major-General Halleck.

My dear Sir: What think you of forming a reserve cavalry corps of, say, 6,000, for the Army of the Potomac? Might not such a corps be constituted from the cavalry of Sigel's and Slocum's corps with scraps we could pick up here and there? Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Soldiers' Home,

Washington, July 6, 1863. 7 p. m.

Major-General Halleck.

I left the telegraph office a good deal dissatisfied. You know I did not like the phrase—in Orders, No. 68,[2] I believe—"Drive the invaders from our soil." Since that, I see a despatch from General French, saying the enemy is crossing his wounded over the river in flats, without saying why he does not stop it, or even intimating a thought that it ought to be stopped. Still later, another despatch from General Pleasonton, by direction of General Meade, to General French, stating that the main army is halted because it is believed the rebels are concentrating "on the road toward Hagerstown, beyond Fairfield," and is not to move until it is ascertained

[1] This application was withdrawn upon the withdrawal of the President's letter.

[2] Issued by Meade on July 4, after his defeat of Lee at Gettysburg, Pa.

that the rebels intend to evacuate Cumberland Valley.

These things all appear to me to be connected with a purpose to cover Baltimore and Washington, and to get the enemy across the river again without a further collision, and they do not appear connected with a purpose to prevent his crossing and to destroy him. I do fear the former purpose is acted upon and the latter is rejected.

If you are satisfied the latter purpose is entertained, and is judiciously pursued, I am content. If you are not so satisfied, please look to it.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, July 29, 1863.

Major-General Halleck.

Seeing General Meade's despatch of yesterday to yourself causes me to fear that he supposes the Government here is demanding of him to bring on a general engagement with Lee as soon as possible. I am claiming no such thing of him. In fact, my judgment is against it; which judgment, of course, I will yield if yours and his are the contrary. If he could not safely engage Lee at Williamsport, it seems absurd to suppose he can safely engage him now when he has scarcely more than two thirds of the force he had at Williamsport, while it must be that Lee has been reinforced. True, I desired General Meade to pursue Lee across the Potomac, hoping, as has proved true, that he would thereby clear the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and get some advantages by harassing him on his retreat. These being past, I am unwilling he should now get into a general engagement on

the impression that we here are pressing him, and I shall be glad for you to so inform him, unless your own judgment is against it.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Note.*]

August 31, 1863.

It is not improbable that retaliation for the recent great outrage at Lawrence, in Kansas,[1] may extend to indiscriminate slaughter on the Missouri border, unless averted by very judicious action. I shall be obliged if the general-in-chief can make any suggestions to General Schofield upon the subject. A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, September 15, 1863.

Major-General Halleck.

If I did not misunderstand General Meade's last despatch, he posts you on facts as well as he can, and desires your views and those of the Government as to what he shall do. My opinion is that he should move upon Lee at once in manner of general attack, leaving to developments whether he will make it a real attack. I think this would develop Lee's real condition and purposes better than the cavalry alone can do. Of course my opinion is not to control you and General Meade. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, September 19, 1863.

Major-General Halleck.

By General Meade's despatch to you of yesterday it appears that he desires your views and those of the Government as to whether he shall advance upon the enemy. I am not prepared to

[1] Quantrell's massacre of August 21, 1863.

order, or even advise, an advance in this case, wherein I know so little of particulars, and wherein he, in the field, thinks the risk is so great, and the promise of advantage so small.

And yet the case presents matter for very serious consideration in another aspect. These two armies confront each other across a small river, substantially midway between the two capitals, each defending its own capital, and menacing the other. General Meade estimates the enemy's infantry in front of him at not less than 40,000. Suppose we add fifty per cent. to this for cavalry, artillery, and extra-duty men stretching as far as Richmond, making the whole force of the enemy 60,000.

General Meade, as shown by the returns, has with him, and between him and Washington, of the same classes of well men, over 90,000. Neither can bring the whole of his men into a battle; but each can bring as large a percentage in as the other. For a battle, then, General Meade has three men to General Lee's two. Yet, it having been determined that choosing ground and standing on the defensive gives so great advantage that the three cannot safely attack the two, the three are left simply standing on the defensive also.

If the enemy's 60,000 are sufficient to keep our 90,000 away from Richmond, why, by the same rule, may not 40,000 of ours keep their 60,000 away from Washington, leaving us 50,000 to put to some other use? Having practically come to the mere defensive, it seems to be no economy at all to employ twice as many men for that object as are needed. With no object, certainly, to mislead myself, I can perceive no

fault in this statement, unless we admit we are not the equal of the enemy, man for man. I hope you will consider it.

To avoid misunderstanding, let me say that to attempt to fight the enemy slowly back into his intrenchments at Richmond, and then to capture him, is an idea I have been trying to repudiate for quite a year.

My judgment is so clear against it that I would scarcely allow the attempt to be made if the general in command should desire to make it. My last attempt upon Richmond was to get McClellan, when he was nearer there than the enemy was, to run in ahead of him.[1] Since then I have constantly desired the Army of the Potomac to make Lee's army, and not Richmond, its objective point. If our army cannot fall upon the enemy and hurt him where he is, it is plain to me it can gain nothing by attempting to follow him over a succession of intrenched lines into a fortified city.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, September 21, 1863.

Major-General Halleck.

I think it very important for General Rosecrans to hold his position at or about Chattanooga, because if held from that place to Cleveland, both inclusive, it keeps all Tennessee clear of the enemy, and also breaks one of his most important railroad lines. To prevent these consequences is so vital to his cause that he cannot give up the effort to dislodge us from the position, thus bringing him to us and saving us the labor, expense, and hazard of going farther to

[1] See letter to George B. McClellan of October 13, 1862.

find him, and also giving us the advantage of choosing our own ground and preparing it to fight him upon. The details must, of course, be left to General Rosecrans, while we must furnish him the means to the utmost of our ability. If you concur, I think he would better be informed that we are not pushing him beyond this position; and that, in fact, our judgment is rather against his going beyond it. If he can only maintain this position, without more, this rebellion can only eke out a short and feeble existence, as an animal sometimes may with a thorn in its vitals. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, October 16, 1863.

Major-General Halleck.

I do not believe Lee can have over 60,000 effective men.

Longstreet's corps would not be sent away to bring an equal force back upon the same road; and there is no other direction for them to have come from.

Doubtless, in making the present movement, Lee gathered in all available scraps, and added them to Hill's and Ewell's corps; but that is all, and he made the movement in the belief that four corps had left General Meade; and General Meade's apparently avoiding a collision with him has confirmed him in that belief. If General Meade can now attack him on a field no worse than equal for us, and will do so with all the skill and courage which he, his officers, and men possess, the honor will be his if he succeeds, and the blame may be mine if he fails.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, October 24, 1863.

Major-General Halleck.

Taking all our information together, I think it probable that Ewell's corps has started for East Tennessee by way of Abingdon, marching last Monday, say, from Meade's front directly to the railroad at Charlottesville.

First, the object of Lee's recent movement against Meade; his destruction of the Alexandria and Orange Railroad, and subsequent withdrawal, without more motive, not otherwise apparent, would be explained by this hypothesis.

Secondly, the direct statement of Sharpe's men that Ewell has gone to Tennessee.

Thirdly, the Irishman's statement that he has not gone through Richmond and his further statement of an appeal made to the people at Richmond to go and protect their salt, which could only refer to the works near Abingdon.

Fourthly, Graham's statement from Martinsburg that Imboden is in retreat for Harrisonburg. This last matches with the idea that Lee has retained his cavalry, sending Imboden and perhaps other scraps to join Ewell. Upon this probability what is to be done?

If you have a plan matured, I have nothing to say. If you have not, then I suggest that, with all possible expedition, the Army of the Potomac get ready to attack Lee, and that in the mean time a raid shall, at all hazards, break the railroad at or near Lynchburg.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, January 28, 1864.
Major-General Halleck.

Some citizens of Missouri, vicinity of Kansas City, are apprehensive that there is special danger of renewed troubles in that neighborhood, and thence on the route toward New Mexico. I am not impressed that the danger is very great or imminent, but I will thank you to give Generals Rosecrans and Curtis, respectively, such orders as may turn their attention thereto and prevent as far as possible the apprehended disturbance. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Washington City, July 27, 1864.
Major-General Halleck.

General: Lieutenant-General Grant having signified that, owing to the difficulties and delay of communication between his headquarters and Washington, it is necessary that in the present emergency military orders must be issued directly from Washington, the President directs me to instruct you that all the military operations for the defense of the Middle Department, the Department of the Susquehanna, the Department of Washington, and the Department of West Virginia, and all the forces in those departments, are placed under your general command, and that you will be expected to take all military measures necessary for defense against any attack of the enemy and for his capture and destruction. You will issue from time to time such orders to the commanders of the respective departments and to the military authorities therein as may be proper.

Your obedient servant,
Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

George B. McClellan.[1]

See letter to Winfield Scott of November 1, 1861.

Executive Mansion, December 6, 1861.

Major-General McClellan.

My dear Sir: Captain Francis G. Young, of the California regiment (Colonel Baker's), is in some difficulty—I do not precisely understand what. I believe you know I was unfavorably impressed toward him because of apparently contradictory accounts he gave me of some matters at the battle of Ball's Bluff. At length he has brought me the paper which accompanies this, showing, I think, that he is entitled to respectful consideration. As you see, it is signed by several senators and representatives as well as other well-known and respectable gentlemen. I attach considerable consequence to the name of Lieutenant-Colonel Shaler, late Major Shaler, of the New York Seventh. These things, and his late connection with Colonel Baker, induce me to ask you if, consistently with the public service, the past, whatever it is, cannot be waived, and he placed in service and given another chance?

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[1] McClellan was considered the leading military engineer of the country. At West Point he led his class in mathematics, and he served with credit in the only United States corps of engineers in the Mexican War. He visited Europe in 1855 to report on foreign army organization and the Crimean War. His report was published in 1861 as a book entitled *The Armies of Europe*, and brought him great praise. At the outbreak of the Civil War he was a railroad president. On April 23, 1861, he was appointed major-general of Ohio volunteers. He invaded West Virginia and captured it for the Union. For his success he was called to Washington to organize the Army of the Potomac, of which he was made commander August 20, 1861.

Washington, December 10, 1861.

Your Excellency: I inclose the paper you left with me, filled as requested.[1] In arriving at the numbers given, I have left the minimum number in garrison and observation.

Information received recently leads me to believe that the enemy could meet us in front with equal forces nearly, and I have now my mind actively turned toward another plan of campaign that I do not think at all anticipated by the enemy nor by many of our own people.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
George B. McClellan, Major-General.

[*Inclosure.*]

If it were determined to make a forward movement of the Army of the Potomac without awaiting further increase of numbers or better drill and discipline, how long would it require to actually get in motion?

If bridge trains ready by December 15, probably 25th.

After leaving all that would be necessary, how many troops could join the movement from southwest of the river?

Seventy-one thousand.

How many from northeast of it?

Thirty-three thousand.

Suppose, then, that of those southwest of the river fifty thousand move forward and menace the enemy at Centreville; the remainder of the movable force on that side move rapidly to the crossing of the Occoquan by the road from Alexandria to Richmond, there to be joined by the whole movable force from northeast of the river, having landed from the Potomac, just

[1] McClellan's notes are written in pencil. They are here printed in italics.

below the mouth of the Occoquan, moved by land up the south side of that stream to the crossing point named, then the whole move together by the road thence to Brentsville and beyond to the railroad just south of its crossing of Broad Run, a strong detachment of cavalry having gone rapidly ahead to destroy the railroad bridges south and north of the point.

If the crossing of the Occoquan by those from above be resisted, those landing from the Potomac below to take the resisting force of the enemy in rear; or, if the landing from the Potomac be resisted, those crossing the Occoquan from above to take that resisting force in the rear. Both points will probably not be successfully resisted at the same time.

The force in front of Centreville, if pressed too hardly, should fight back slowly into the intrenchments behind them.

Armed vessels and transportation should remain at the Potomac landing to cover a possible retreat.

Executive Mansion, February 3, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

My dear Sir: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac—yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas.

If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours.

First. Does not your plan involve a greatly

larger expenditure of time and money than mine?

Second. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?

Third. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?

Fourth. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would?

Fifth. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine?

Yours truly, Abraham Lincoln.

[*Memorandum.*]

First. Suppose the enemy should attack us in force before we reach the Occoquan, what?

Second. Suppose the enemy in force shall dispute the crossing of the Occoquan, what? In view of this, might it not be safest for us to cross the Occoquan at Colchester, rather than at the village of Occoquan? This would cost the enemy two miles more of travel to meet us, but would, on the contrary, leave us two miles farther from our ultimate destination.

Third. Suppose we reach Maple Valley without an attack, will we not be attacked there in force by the enemy marching by the several roads from Manassas; and if so, what?

Executive Mansion, March 31, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

My dear Sir: This morning I felt constrained to order Blenker's division to Frémont, and I write this to assure you I did so with great pain, understanding that you would wish it otherwise.

If you could know the full pressure of the case, I am confident that you would justify it, even beyond a mere acknowledgment that the commander-in-chief may order what he pleases.

Yours very truly, Abraham Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, April 6, 1862. 8 p. m.

General G. B. McClellan.

Yours of 11 a. m. to-day received. Secretary of War informs me that the forwarding of transportation, ammunition, and Woodbury's brigade, under your orders, is not, and will not be, interfered with. You now have over one hundred thousand troops with you, independent of General Wool's command. I think you better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick River at once. This will probably use time as advantageously as you can.

A. Lincoln, President.

Washington, April 9, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

My dear Sir: Your despatches, complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much.

Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you knew the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it—certainly not without reluctance.

After you left I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field-battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to go to General

Hooker's old position; General Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was divided and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented (or would present, when McDowell and Sumner [1] should be gone) a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangements to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was not satisfied. I was constrained to substitute something for it myself.

And now allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond *via* Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.

There is a curious mystery about the number of the troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over 100,000 with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement, taken as he said from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and *en route* to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all *en route* to you

[1] General Edwin V. Sumner.

shall have reached you. How can this discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for?

As to General Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was away. I suppose the whole force which has gone forward to you is with you by this time; and if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you—that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can by reinforcements alone.

And once more let me tell you it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note—is noting now—that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can; but you must act.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, April 21, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

Your despatch of the 19th was received that day. Fredericksburg is evacuated and the bridges

destroyed by the enemy, and a small part of McDowell's command occupies this side of the Rappahannock, opposite the town. He purposes moving his whole force to that point.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, May 1, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

Your call for Parrott guns [1] from Washington alarms me, chiefly because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be done?

A. Lincoln.

Fort Monroe, Virginia, May 9, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

My dear Sir: I have just assisted the Secretary of War in framing part of a despatch to you relating to army corps, which despatch of course will have reached you long before this will.

I wish to say a few words to you privately on this subject. I ordered the army corps organization not only on the unanimous opinion of the twelve generals whom you had selected and assigned as generals of division, but also on the unanimous opinion of every military man I could get an opinion from (and every modern military book), yourself only excepted. Of course I did not on my own judgment pretend to understand the subject. I now think it indispensable for you to know how your struggle against it is received in quarters which we cannot entirely disregard. It is looked upon as merely an effort to pamper

[1] Rifled cannon of long range and great endurance, invented by Robert P. Parrott, superintendent of the West Point cannon foundry at Cold Spring, N. Y. He refused to enrich himself from the Government by his invention.

one or two pets and to persecute and degrade their supposed rivals. I have had no word from Sumner, Heintzelman, or Keyes. The commanders of these corps are of course the three highest officers with you, but I am constantly told that you have no consultation or communication with them; that you consult and communicate with nobody but General Fitz-John Porter and perhaps General Franklin. I do not say these complaints are true or just, but at all events it is proper you should know of their existence.[1] Do the commanders of corps disobey your orders in anything?

When you relieved General Hamilton of his command the other day, you thereby lost the confidence of at least one of your best friends in the Senate. And here let me say, not as applicable to you personally, that senators and representatives speak of me in their places as they please without question, and that officers of the army must cease addressing insulting letters to them for taking no greater liberty with them.

But to return. Are you strong enough—are you strong enough, even with my help—to set your foot upon the necks of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes all at once? This is a practical and very serious question for you.

The success of your army and the cause of the country are the same, and of course I only desire the good of the cause.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[1] This charge of favoritism soon received substantiation by McClellan dividing the army into two provisional army corps commanded one by Porter and one by Franklin.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington City, May 15, 1862.

Major-General McClellan,

Cumberland, Virginia.

Your long despatch of yesterday is just received. I will answer more fully soon. Will say now that all your despatches to the Secretary of War have been promptly shown to me. Have done and shall do all I could and can to sustain you. Hoped that the opening of James River and putting Wool and Burnside in communication, with an open road to Richmond, or to you, had effected something in that direction. I am still unwilling to take all our force off the direct line between Richmond and here.

A. Lincoln.

Washington, May 18, 1862. 2 p. m.

Major-General George B. McClellan, Commanding Army of the Potomac, before Richmond.

General: Your despatch to the President, asking reinforcements, has been received and carefully considered.

The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely; and it is believed that even if this were prudent, it would require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock by the way of the Potomac and York Rivers than by a land march. In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest moment, General McDowell has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route. He is ordered, keeping himself always in position to save the capital from all possible attack, so to operate as to put

his left wing in communication with your right wing, and you are instructed to coöperate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible by extending your right wing to the north of Richmond.

It is believed that this communication can be safely established either north or south of the Pamunkey River.

In any event, you will be able to prevent the main body of the enemy's forces from leaving Richmond and falling in overwhelming force upon General McDowell. He will move with between thirty-five and forty thousand men.

A copy of the instructions to General McDowell are with this. The specific task assigned to his command has been to provide against any danger to the capital of the nation.

At your earnest call for reinforcements, he is sent forward to coöperate in the reduction of Richmond, but charged, in attempting this, not to uncover the city of Washington; and you will give no order, either before or after your junction, which can put him out of position to cover this city. You and he will communicate with each other by telegraph or otherwise as frequently as may be necessary for efficient cooperation. When General McDowell is in position on your right, his supplies must be drawn from West Point,[1] and you will instruct your staff-officers to be prepared to supply him by that route.

The President desires that General McDowell retain the command of the Department of the

[1] In King William Co., Va., at the head of York River, an arm of Chesapeake Bay.

Rappahannock and of the forces with which he moves forward.

By order of the President:

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 21, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

I have just been waited on by a large committee who present a petition signed by twenty-three senators and eighty-four representatives asking me to restore General Hamilton to his division. I wish to do this, and yet I do not wish to be understood as rebuking you. Please answer at once. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington City, May 22, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

Your long despatch of yesterday just received. You will have just such control of General McDowell and his forces as you therein indicate. McDowell can reach you by land sooner than he could get aboard of boats, if the boats were ready at Fredericksburg, unless his march shall be resisted, in which case the force resisting him will certainly not be confronting you at Richmond. By land he can reach you in five days after starting, whereas by water he would not reach you in two weeks, judging by past experience. Franklin's single division did not reach you in ten days after I ordered it.

A. Lincoln, President United States.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 24, 1862.

Major-General George B. McClellan.

I left General McDowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields's command is there, but it is so worn that he cannot move before Monday morning, the 26th. We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one regiment infantry, two companies cavalry, putting General Banks in some peril.

The enemy's forces under General Anderson [1] now opposing General McDowell's advance have as their line of supply and retreat the road to Richmond.

If, in conjunction with McDowell's movement against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy's supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy's retreat, you will prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of numbers of nearly 15,000 men; and if you succeed in saving the bridges you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not while you are building the Chickahominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both say they can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to move cautiously and safely.

You will have command of McDowell, after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long despatch to us of the 21st.

A. Lincoln.

[1] Richard H. Anderson.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 24, 1862. 4 p. m.
Major-General George B. McClellan.

In consequence of General Banks's critical position, I have been compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy [1] are making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, and we are trying to throw General Frémont's force and part of General McDowell's in their rear. A. Lincoln, President.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 25, 1862. 2 p. m.
Major-General McClellan.

The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to drive General Banks before him—precisely in what force we cannot tell. He is also threatening Leesburg and Geary, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, from both north and south—in precisely what force we cannot tell. I think the movement is a general and concerted one, such as would not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very desperate defense of Richmond. I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come to the defense of Washington. Let me hear from you instantly. A. Lincoln, President.

[*Telegram in Cipher.*]

War Department, May 25, 1862. 8.30 p. m.
Major-General McClellan.

Your despatch received. General Banks was at Strasburg, with about 6,000 men, Shields hav-

[1] Under "Stonewall" Jackson (see Frémont correspondence).

ing been taken from him to swell a column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of his force scattered at various places. On the 23d a rebel force of 7,000 to 10,000 fell upon one regiment and two companies guarding the bridge at Front Royal, destroying it entirely; crossed the Shenandoah, and on the 24th (yesterday) pushed to get north of Banks, on the road to Winchester. Banks ran a race with them, beating them into Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a battle ensued between the two forces, in which Banks was beaten back into full retreat toward Martinsburg, and probably is broken up into a total rout. Geary, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, just now reports that Jackson is now near Front Royal, with 10,000, following up and supporting, as I understand, the force now pursuing Banks; also that another force of 10,000 is near Orleans, following on in the same direction. Stripped bare, as we are here, it will be all we can do to prevent them crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or above. We have about 20,000 of McDowell's force moving back to the vicinity of Front Royal, and General Frémont, who was at Franklin, is moving to Harrisonburg; both these movements intended to get in the enemy's rear.

One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered through here to Harper's Ferry; the rest of his force remains for the present at Fredericksburg. We are sending such regiments and dribs from here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's Ferry, supplying their places in some sort by calling in militia from the adjacent States. We also have eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's Ferry, of which arm there is not a sin-

gle one yet at that point. This is now our situation.

If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be utterly helpless. Apprehension of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain you, has always been my reason for withholding McDowell's force from you. Please understand this, and do the best you can with the force you have. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 26, 1862. 12.40 p. m.

Major-General McClellan.

We have General Banks's official report. He has saved his army and baggage, and has made a safe retreat to the river, and is probably safe at Williamsport. He reports the attacking force at 15,000. A. Lincoln, President.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 26, 1862.

Major-General George B. McClellan.

Can you not cut the Aquia Creek Railroad? Also, what impression have you as to intrenched works for you to contend with in front of Richmond? Can you get near enough to throw shells into the city? A. Lincoln, President.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 28, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

What of F. J. Porter's expedition? Please answer. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 28, 1862. 8.40 p. m.
Major-General McClellan.

I am very glad of General F. J. Porter's victory.[1] Still, if it was a total rout of the enemy, I am puzzled to know why the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad was not seized again, as you say you have all the railroads but the Richmond and Fredericksburg. I am puzzled to see how, lacking that, you can have any, except the scrap from Richmond to West Point. The scrap of the Virginia Central from Richmond to Hanover Junction, without more, is simply nothing. That the whole of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond, I think cannot be certainly known to you or me. Saxton, at Harper's Ferry, informs us that large forces, supposed to be Jackson's and Ewell's, forced his advance from Charlestown to-day. General King telegraphs us from Fredericksburg that contrabands give certain information that 15,000 left Hanover Junction Monday morning to reinforce Jackson. I am painfully impressed with the importance of the struggle before you, and shall aid you all I can consistently with my view of due regard to all points. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, May 29, 1862. 10.30 a. m.
Major-General McClellan.

I think we shall be able within three days to tell you certainly whether any considerable force

[1] On May 27 Porter defeated General Branch. There was no practical result of the victory. Porter marched back to camp.

of the enemy—Jackson or any one else—is moving on to Harper's Ferry or vicinity. Take this expected development into your calculations.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 31, 1862. 10.20 p. m.

Major-General McClellan.

A circle whose circumference shall pass through Harper's Ferry, Front Royal, and Strasburg, and whose center shall be a little northeast of Winchester, almost certainly has within it this morning the forces of Jackson, Ewell, and Edward Johnson. Quite certainly they were within it two days ago. Some part of their forces attacked Harper's Ferry at dark last evening, and are still in sight this morning. Shields, with McDowell's advance, retook Front Royal at 11 a. m. yesterday, with a dozen of our own prisoners taken there a week ago, 150 of the enemy, two locomotives, and eleven cars, some other property and stores, and saved the bridge.

General Frémont, from the direction of Moorefield, promises to be at or near Strasburg at 5 p. m. to-day. General Banks at Williamsport, with his old force and his new force at Harper's Ferry, is directed to coöperate.[1] Shields at Front Royal reports a rumor of still an additional force of the enemy, supposed to be Anderson's, having entered the valley of Virginia. This last may or may not be true. Corinth is certainly in the hands of General Halleck. A. Lincoln.

[1] See Frémont correspondence.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington City, D.C., June 1, 1862. 9.30.
Major-General McClellan.

You are probably engaged with the enemy. I suppose he made the attack. Stand well on your guard, hold all your ground, or yield any only inch by inch and in good order. This morning we merge General Wool's department into yours, giving you command of the whole, and sending General Dix to Fort Monroe and General Wool to Fort McHenry. We also send General Sigel to report to you for duty. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, June 1, 1862. 5 p. m.
Major-General McClellan.

Thanks for what you could and did say in your despatch of noon to-day to the Secretary of War. If the enemy shall not have renewed the attack this afternoon, I think the hardest of your work is done.

Shields's advance came in collision with part of the enemy yesterday evening, six miles from Front Royal, in a direction between Winchester and Strasburg, driving them back, capturing a few prisoners and one rifled cannon. Firing in that direction to-day, heard both from Harper's Ferry and Front Royal, indicates a probability that Frémont has met the enemy.

We have concluded to send General Sigel to Harper's Ferry, so that what I telegraphed you about him this morning is revoked. Dix goes to Fort Monroe to-night. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, June 3, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

With these continuous rains I am very anxious about the Chickahominy—so close in your rear and crossing your line of communication. Please look to it. A. Lincoln, President.

War Department, June 15, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

My dear Sir: The night between your two late battles of Saturday and Sunday I went earnestly to work to find a way of putting General Wool's force under your control without wounding any one's feelings. But, after all, General Dix was a little hurt at being taken from an independent command and put in a dependent one. I could not help this without giving up the principal object of the move. So soon as you can (which I do not expect is yet), I wish you to give me the benefit of your suggestions as to how an independent command can be given him without detriment.

The Secretary of War has turned over to me your despatch about sending McDowell to you by water, instead of by land. I now fear he cannot get to you either way in time. Shields's division has got so terribly out of shape, out at elbows, and out at toes, that it will require a long time to get it in again. I expect to see McDowell within a day or two, when I will again talk with him about the mode of moving. McCall's division has nearly or quite reached you by now. This, with what you get from General Wool's old command, and the new regiments sent you,

must give you an increase since the late battles of over twenty thousand. Doubtless the battles and other causes have decreased you half as much in the same time; but then the enemy have lost as many in the same way. I believe I would come and see you were it not that I fear my presence might divert you and the army from more important matters.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, June 18, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

Yours of to-day, making it probable that Jackson has been reinforced by about 10,000 from Richmond, is corroborated by a despatch from General King at Fredericksburg, saying a Frenchman, just arrived from Richmond by way of Gordonsville, met 10,000 to 15,000 passing through the latter place to join Jackson.

If this is true, it is as good as a reinforcement to you of an equal force. I could better dispose of things if I could know about what day you can attack Richmond, and would be glad to be informed, if you think you can inform me with safety. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, June 19, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

Yours of last night just received, and for which I thank you.

If large reinforcements are going from Richmond to Jackson, it proves one of two things; either that they are very strong at Richmond, or do not mean to defend the place desperately.

On reflection, I do not see how reinforcements from Richmond to Jackson could be in Gordonsville, as reported by the Frenchman and your deserters. Have not all been sent to deceive?

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington City, June 20, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

We have this morning sent you a despatch of General Sigel corroborative of the proposition that Jackson is being reinforced from Richmond. This may be reality, and yet may only be contrivance for deception, and to determine which is perplexing. If we knew it was not true, we could send you some more force; but as the case stands we do not think we safely can. Still, we will watch the signs and do so if possible. . . .

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, June 21, 1862. 6 p. m.

Major-General George B. McClellan.

Your despatch of yesterday (2 p. m.) was received this morning. If it would not divert too much of your time and attention from the army under your immediate command, I would be glad to have your views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country, as you say you would be glad to give them. I would rather it should be by letter than by telegraph, because of the better chance of secrecy. As to the numbers and positions of the troops not under your command in Virginia and elsewhere, even if I could do it with accuracy, which I cannot, I would rather not transmit either by telegraph or letter because of the chances of its

reaching the enemy. I would be very glad to talk with you, but you cannot leave your camp, and I cannot well leave here.

A. Lincoln, President.

Washington, June 26, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

Your three despatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending with the statement that you completely succeeded in making your point, are very gratifying.

The latter one of 6.15 p. m., suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by 200,000, and talking of where the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have, while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted and shall omit no opportunity to send you reinforcements whenever I possibly can.

A. Lincoln.

P. S. General Pope thinks if you fall back it would be much better toward York River than toward the James. As Pope now has charge of the capital, please confer with him through the telegraph.

[*Telegram.*] [1]

War Department, June 28, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

Save your army, at all events. Will send reinforcements as fast as we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next

[1] Sent in reply to a despairing despatch of McClellan after Porter's defeat at Gaines's Mill on June 27th.

day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed reinforcements. I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have been upon us before the troops could have gotten to you. Less than a week ago you notified us that reinforcements were leaving Richmond to come in front of us. It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the Government is to blame. Please tell at once the present condition and aspect of things. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, July 1, 1862. 3.30 p. m.

Major-General George B. McClellan.

It is impossible to reinforce you for your present emergency. If we had a million of men, we could not get them to you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy, you must find a place of security, and wait, rest, and repair. Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country, and will bring it out. A Lincoln.

War Department, July 2, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

Your despatch of Tuesday morning induces me to hope your army is having some rest. In this hope allow me to reason with you a mo-

ment. When you ask for 50,000 men to be promptly sent you, you surely labor under some gross mistake of fact. Recently you sent papers showing your disposal of forces made last spring for the defense of Washington, and advising a return to that plan. I find it included in and about Washington 75,000 men. Now, please be assured I have not men enough to fill that very plan by 15,000. All of Frémont's in the valley, all of Banks's, all of McDowell's not with you, and all in Washington, taken together, do not exceed, if they reach, 60,000. With Wool and Dix added to those mentioned, I have not, outside of your army, 75,000 men east of the mountains. Thus the idea of sending you 50,000, or any other considerable force, promptly, is simply absurd. If, in your frequent mention of responsibility, you have the impression that I blame you for not doing more than you can, please be relieved of such impression. I only beg that in like manner you will not ask impossibilities of me. If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now. Save the army, material and personal, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of 300,000, which I accept. A. Lincoln.

War Department, July 3, 1862.

Major-General George B. McClellan.

Yours of 5.30 yesterday is just received. I am satisfied that yourself, officers, and men have done the best you could. All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it.

On the 28th we sent General Burnside an order to send all the force he could spare to you. We then learned that you had requested him to go to Goldsborough; upon which we said to him our order was intended for your benefit, and we did not wish to be in conflict with your views.

We hope you will have help from him soon. To-day we have ordered General Hunter to send you all he can spare. At last advices General Halleck thinks he cannot send reinforcements without endangering all he has gained.

A. Lincoln, President.

War Department,
Washington City, D. C., July 4, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

I understand your position as stated in your letter and by General Marcy. To reinforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. In addition to that arrived and now arriving from the Potomac (about 10,000 men, I suppose, and about 10,000 I hope you will have from Burnside very soon, and about 5,000 from Hunter a little later), I do not see how I can send you another man within a month. Under these circumstances the defensive for the present must be your only care. Save the army—first, where you are, if you can; secondly, by removal, if you must. You, on the ground, must be the judge as to which you will attempt, and of the means for effecting it. I but give it as my opinion that with the aid of the gunboats and the reinforcements mentioned above, you can hold your present position—provided, and so long as, you can keep the James River open be-

low you. If you are not tolerably confident you can keep the James River open, you had better remove as soon as possible. I do not remember that you have expressed any apprehension as to the danger of having your communication cut on the river below you, yet I do not suppose it can have escaped your attention.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

P. S. If at any time you feel able to take the offensive, you are not restrained from doing so.

A. L.

Washington, July 5, 1862. 9 a. m.

Major-General George B. McClellan.

A thousand thanks for the relief your two despatches of 12 and 1 p. m. yesterday gave me. Be assured the heroism and skill of yourself and officers and men is, and forever will be, appreciated.

If you can hold your present position, we shall have the enemy yet. A. Lincoln.

On July 9, 1862, the President had an interview with General McClellan and other officers at McClellan's headquarters at Harrison's Landing, Virginia. In this the President inquired categorically about number of troops, their health, the location, strength, and condition of enemy, possibility of easy withdrawal of Union troops, and their security in present position.

Executive Mansion,
Washington, July 13, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

My dear Sir: I am told that over 160,000 men have gone into your army on the Peninsula. When I was with you the other day we made out 86,500 remaining, leaving 73,500 to be ac-

counted for. I believe 23,500 will cover all the killed, wounded, and missing in all your battles and skirmishes, leaving 50,000 who have left otherwise. Not more than 5,000 of these have died, leaving 45,000 of your army still alive and not with it. I believe half or two thirds of them are fit for duty to-day. Have you any more perfect knowledge of this than I have? If I am right, and you had these men with you, you could go into Richmond in the next three days. How can they be got to you, and how can they be prevented from getting away in such numbers for the future? A. Lincoln.

On August 3, 1862, General McClellan was ordered to move his army to Aquia Creek, an arm of the Potomac in Stafford County, northern Virginia. He was three weeks in doing so. On the 29th and 30th of August Pope was defeated by Longstreet and Jackson in the second battle of Bull Run.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, August 29, 1862. 4.10 p. m.
Major-General McClellan.

Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative—to wit, "to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope"—is the right one, but I wish not to control. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided by your counsels. A. Lincoln.

Halleck, in despair over Pope's defeat, called McClellan to Washington for counsel. On September 2d the President placed the defense of Washington in McClellan's hands. In five days McClellan had reorganized the demoralized defense. On September 7th Lee had crossed the Potomac into Maryland, and McClellan set out to meet him.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C.,
September 8, 1862. 5 p. m.

Major-General McClellan, Rockville, Md.

How does it look now? A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion,
September 11, 1862. 6 p. m.

Major-General McClellan.

This is explanatory. If Porter, Heintzelman, and Sigel were sent you, it would sweep everything from the other side of the river, because the new troops have been distributed among them, as I understand. Porter reports himself 21,000 strong, which can only be by the addition of new troops. He is ordered to-night to join you as quickly as possible. I am for sending you all that can be spared, and I hope others can follow Porter very soon. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington City, D. C.,
September 12, 1862. 5.45 p. m.

Major-General McClellan.

Governor Curtin telegraphs me:

> I have advices that Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the whole rebel army will be drawn from Maryland.

Receiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Martinsburg to-day, and positive information from Wheeling that the line is cut, corroborates

the idea that the enemy is recrossing the Potomac. Please do not let him get off without being hurt. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, Washington,
September 15, 1862. 2.45 p. m.

Major-General McClellan.

Your despatch of to-day received. God bless you, and all with you. Destroy the rebel army if possible. A. Lincoln.

McClellan defeated Lee at Antietam Creek, Md., on September 17th.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., October 6, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south. Your army must move now, while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your operation, you can be reinforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what line you adopt, and when you intend to cross the river; also to what point the reinforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads. I am directed to add that the Secretary of War

and the general-in-chief fully concur with the President in these instructions.

H. W. Halleck, General-in-chief.

Executive Mansion, October 13, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

My dear Sir: You remember my speaking to you of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim? As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpeper Court House, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you, and in fact ignores the question of time, which cannot and must not be ignored. Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is to "operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own." You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your com-

munications with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania; but if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him. If he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier. Exclusive of the water-line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his. You know I desired, but did not order, you to cross the Potomac below, instead of above, the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My idea was that this would at once menace the enemy's communications, which I would seize if he would permit.

If he should move northward, I would follow him closely, holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his communications and move toward Richmond, I would press closely to him, fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I say "try"; if we never try, we shall never succeed. If he makes a stand at Winchester, moving neither north nor south, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we cannot beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a moment. In coming to us he tenders us an advantage which we

should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier nearer to us than far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond.

Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, the facility of supplying from the side away from the enemy is remarkable, as it were, by the different spokes of a wheel extending from the hub toward the rim, and this whether you move directly by the chord or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The chord-line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Hay Market, and Fredericksburg; and you see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally the Potomac, by Aquia Creek, meet you at all points from Washington; the same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way.

The gaps through the Blue Ridge I understand to be about the following distances from Harper's Ferry, to wit: Vestal's, 5 miles; Gregory's, 13; Snicker's, 18; Ashby's, 28; Manassas, 38; Chester, 45; and Thornton's, 53. I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together for dread of you. The gaps would enable you to attack if you should wish. For a great part of the way you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here. When at length running for Richmond ahead of

him enables him to move this way, if he does so, turn and attack him in rear. But I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached. It is all easy if our troops march as well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it. This letter is in no sense an order.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, October 21, 1862. 3 p. m.

Major-General George B. McClellan.

Your telegram of 12 m. has been submitted to the President. He directs me to say that he has no change to make in his order of the 6th instant. If you have not been and are not now in condition to obey it, you will be able to show such want of ability. The President does not expect impossibilities, but he is very anxious that all this good weather should not be wasted in inactivity. Telegraph when you will move, and on what lines you propose to march.

H. W. Halleck, General-in-chief.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, October 24, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

I have just read your despatch about sore-tongued and fatigued horses. Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything? A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion,
October 26, 1862. 11.30 a. m.

Major-General McClellan.

Yours, in reply to mine about horses, received. Of course you know the facts better than I; still, two considerations remain. Stuart's cavalry outmarched ours, having certainly done more marked service on the Peninsula and everywhere since. Secondly, will not a movement of our army be a relief to the cavalry, compelling the enemy to concentrate instead of foraging in squads everywhere? But I am so rejoiced to learn from your despatch to General Halleck that you begin crossing the river this morning.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion,
October 27, 1862. 12.10 p. m.

Major-General McClellan.

Yours of yesterday received. Most certainly I intend no injustice to any, and if I have done any I deeply regret it. To be told, after more than five weeks' total inaction of the army, and during which period we have sent to the army every fresh horse we possibly could, amounting in the whole to 7,918, that the cavalry horses were too much fatigued to move, presents a very cheerless, almost hopeless, prospect for the future, and it may have forced something of impatience in my despatch. If not recruited and rested then, when could they ever be? I suppose the river is rising, and I am glad to believe you are crossing.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion,
October 27, 1862. 3.25 p. m.

Major-General McClellan.

Your despatch of 3 p. m. to-day, in regard to filling up old regiments with drafted men, is received, and the request therein shall be complied with as far as practicable.

And now I ask a distinct answer to the question, Is it your purpose not to go into action again until the men now being drafted in the States are incorporated into the old regiments?

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, October 29, 1862.

Major-General McClellan.

Your despatches of night before last, yesterday, and last night all received. I am much pleased with the movement of the army. When you get entirely across the river let me know. What do you know of the enemy?

A. Lincoln.

[*Order.*]

Executive Mansion, November 5, 1862.

By direction of the President, it is ordered that Major-General McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major-General Burnside take the command of that army. Also that Major-General Hunter take command of the corps in said army which is now commanded by General Burnside. That Major-General Fitz-John Porter be relieved from

command of the corps he now commands in said army, and that Major-General Hooker take command of said corps.

The general-in-chief is authorized, in [*his*] discretion, to issue an order substantially as the above, forthwith, or so soon as he may deem proper. A. Lincoln.

David Hunter.

Executive Mansion, December 31, 1861.

Major-General Hunter.

Dear Sir: Yours of the 23d is received, and I am constrained to say it is difficult to answer so ugly a letter in good temper. I am, as you intimate, losing much of the great confidence I placed in you, not from any act or omission of yours touching the public service, up to the time you were sent to Leavenworth, but from the flood of grumbling despatches and letters I have seen from you since. I knew you were being ordered to Leavenworth at the time it was done; and I aver that with as tender a regard for your honor and your sensibilities as I had for my own, it never occurred to me that you were being "humiliated, insulted and disgraced"; nor have I, up to this day, heard an intimation that you have been wronged, coming from any one but yourself— No one has blamed you for the retrograde movement from Springfield, nor for the information you gave General Cameron; and this you could readily understand, if it were not for your unwarranted assumption that the ordering you to Leavenworth must necessarily have been done as a *punishment* for some *fault*. I thought then, and think yet, the position assigned to you is as responsible, and as honorable, as that as-

signed to Buell—I know that General McClellan expected more important results from it. My impression is that at the time you were assigned to the new Western Department, it had not been determined to replace General Sherman in Kentucky; but of this I am not certain, because the idea that a command in Kentucky was very desirable, and one in the farther West undesirable, had never occurred to me. You constantly speak of being placed in command of only 3,000. Now tell me, is this not mere impatience? Have you not known all the while that you are to command four or five times that many?

I have been, and am sincerely your friend; and if, as such, I dare to make a suggestion, I would say you are adopting the best possible way to ruin yourself. "Act well your part, there all the honor lies." He who does *something* at the head of one regiment, will eclipse him who does *nothing* at the head of a hundred.

Your friend, as ever, A. Lincoln.

On the outside of the envelope in which this letter was found, General Hunter had written:

"The President's reply to my 'ugly letter.' This lay on his table a month after it was written, and when finally sent was by a special conveyance, with the direction that it was only to be given to me when I was in a good humor."

In March, 1862, General Hunter was transferred to the Department of the South with headquarters at Port Royal, S. C. On April 12th he issued an order freeing the slaves of enemies of the United States. This coming to the attention of the President, on May 17th he indorsed on the order:

May 17, 1862.

No commanding general shall do such a thing upon my responsibility without consulting me.

A. Lincoln.

See letter to George B. McClellan of November 5, 1862.

[*Private.*]

Executive Mansion, April 1, 1863.

Major-General Hunter.

My dear Sir: I am glad to see the accounts of your colored force at Jacksonville, Florida. I see the enemy are driving at them fiercely, as is to be expected. It is important to the enemy that such a force shall not take shape and grow and thrive in the South, and in precisely the same proportion it is important to us that it shall. Hence the utmost caution and vigilance is necessary on our part. The enemy will make extra efforts to destroy them, and we should do the same to preserve and increase them.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, April 14, 1863.

General Hunter and Admiral Dupont.

This is intended to clear up an apparent inconsistency between the recent order to continue operations before Charleston and the former one to remove to another point in a certain contingency. No censure upon you, or either of you, is intended. We still hope that by cordial and judicious coöperation you can take the batteries on Morris Island and Sullivan's Island and Fort Sumter. But whether you can or not, we wish the demonstration kept up for a time, for a collateral and very important object. We wish the

attempt to be a real one, though not a desperate one, if it affords any considerable chance of success. But if prosecuted as a demonstration only, this must not become public, or the whole effect will be lost. Once again before Charleston, do not leave till further orders from here. Of course this is not intended to force you to leave unduly exposed Hilton Head or other near points in your charge. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

P. S.—Whoever receives this first, please send a copy to the other immediately A. L.

[*Private.*]

Executive Mansion, April 30, 1863.

Major-General Hunter.

My dear Sir: This morning I was presented an order of yours, dismissing from the service, subject to my approval, a Captain Schaadt, of one of the Pennsylvania regiments. Disloyalty, without any statement of the evidence supposed to have proved it, is assigned as the cause of the dismissal; and he represents at home—as I am told—that the sole evidence was his refusal to sanction a resolution (indorsing the Emancipation Proclamation, I believe); and our friends assure me that this statement is doing the Union cause great harm in his neighborhood and county, especially as he is a man of character, did good service in raising troops for us last fall, and still declares for the Union and his wish to fight for it.

On this state of the case I wrote a special indorsement on the order, which I suppose he will present to you; and I write this merely to assure you that no censure is intended upon you; but

that it is hoped that you will inquire into the case more minutely, and that if there be no evidence but his refusal to sanction the resolution, you will restore him.

Yours as ever, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, June 30, 1863.

Major-General Hunter.

My dear General: I have just received your letter of the 25th of June.

I assure you, and you may feel authorized in stating, that the recent change of commanders in the Department of the South was made for no reasons which convey any imputation upon your known energy, efficiency, and patriotism; but for causes which seemed sufficient, while they were in no degree incompatible with the respect and esteem in which I have always held you as a man and an officer.

I cannot, by giving my consent to a publication of whose details I know nothing, assume the responsibility of whatever you may write. In this matter your own sense of military propriety must be your guide, and the regulations of the service your rule of conduct.

I am very truly your friend, A. Lincoln.

In May, 1864, General Hunter was placed in command of the Department of West Virginia.

[*Telegram.*]

[Washington], July 17, 1864.

Major-General Hunter,

Harper's Ferry, West Virginia.

Yours of this morning received. You misconceive. The order you complain of was only

nominally mine, and was framed by those who really made it with no thought of making you a scapegoat. It seemed to be General Grant's wish that the forces under General Wright and those under you should join and drive at the enemy under General Wright. Wright had the larger part of the force, but you had the rank. It was thought that you would prefer Crook's commanding your part to your serving in person under Wright. That is all of it. General Grant wishes you to remain in command of the department, and I do not wish to order otherwise.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram in Cipher.*]

War Department, July 23, 1864.

Major-General Hunter,

Harper's Ferry, West Virginia.

Are you able to take care of the enemy, when he turns back upon you, as he probably will on finding that Wright has left? A. Lincoln.

Don Carlos Buell.[1]

[*Telegram.*]

Washington City, January 1, 1862.

Brigadier-General Buell, Louisville.

General McClellan should not yet be disturbed with business. I think you better get in concert with General Halleck at once. I write you to-night. I also telegraph and write Halleck.

A. Lincoln.

[1] In November, 1861, General Buell succeeded General W. T. Sherman in command in Kentucky.

Executive Mansion, January 6, 1862.

Brigadier-General Buell.

My dear Sir: Your despatch of yesterday has been received, and it disappoints and distresses me. I have shown it to General McClellan, who says he will write you to-day. I am not competent to criticise your views, and therefore what I offer is in justification of myself. Of the two, I would rather have a point on the railroad south of Cumberland Gap than Nashville. First, because it cuts a great artery of the enemy's communication, which Nashville does not; and secondly, because it is in the midst of loyal people who would rally around it, while Nashville is not. Again, I cannot see why the movement in East Tennessee would not be a diversion in your favor rather than a disadvantage, assuming that a movement toward Nashville is the main object. But my distress is that our friends in East Tennessee are being hanged and driven to despair, and even now, I fear, are thinking of taking rebel arms for the sake of personal protection. In this we lose the most valuable stake we have in the South. My despatch, to which yours is an answer, was sent with the knowledge of Senator Johnson and Representative Maynard of East Tennessee, and they will be upon me to know the answer, which I cannot safely show them. They would despair, possibly resign to go and save their families somehow, or die with them. I do not intend this to be an order in any sense, but merely, as intimated before, to show you the grounds of my anxiety.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

Washington, January 7, 1862.

Brigadier-General D. C. Buell, Louisville.

Please name as early a day as you safely can on or before which you can be ready to move southward in concert with Major-General Halleck. Delay is ruining us, and it is indispensable for me to have something definite. I send a like despatch to Major-General Halleck.

A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, January 13, 1862.

Brigadier-General Buell.

My dear Sir: Your despatch of yesterday is received, in which you say: "I have received your letter and General McClellan's, and will at once devote all my efforts to your views and his." In the midst of my many cares, I have not seen or asked to see General McClellan's letter to you. For my own views, I have not offered and do not now offer them as orders; and while I am glad to have them respectfully considered, I would blame you to follow them contrary to your own clear judgment, unless I should put them in the form of orders. As to General McClellan's views, you understand your duty in regard to them better than I do. With this preliminary, I state my general idea of this war to be that we have the greater numbers, and the enemy has the greater facility of concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail unless we can find some way of making our advantage an overmatch for his; and that this can only be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points at the same time, so that we can safely attack one or both if he makes no change; and if he weakens one to strengthen the

other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but seize and hold the weakened one, gaining so much. To illustrate: Suppose, last summer, when Winchester ran away to reinforce Manassas, we had forborne to attack Manassas, but had seized and held Winchester. I mention this to illustrate and not to criticise. I did not lose confidence in McDowell, and I think less harshly of Patterson than some others seem to. In application of the general rule I am suggesting, every particular case will have its modifying circumstances, among which the most constantly present and most difficult to meet will be the want of perfect knowledge of the enemy's movements. This had its part in the Bull Run case; but worse in that case was the expiration of the terms of the three months' men. Applying the principle to your case, my idea is that Halleck shall menace Columbus and "down river" generally, while you menace Bowling Green and East Tennessee. If the enemy shall concentrate at Bowling Green, do not retire from his front, yet do not fight him there either, but seize Columbus and East Tennessee, one or both, left exposed by the concentration at Bowling Green. It is a matter of no small anxiety to me, and one which I am sure you will not overlook, that the East Tennessee line is so long and over so bad a road. Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Indorsement.*]

January 13, 1862.

Having to-day written General Buell a letter, it occurs to me to send General Halleck a copy of it. A. Lincoln.

Washington, March 10, 1862.

General D. C. Buell.

The evidence is very strong that the enemy in front of us here is breaking up and moving off. General McClellan is after him. Some part of the force may be destined to meet you. Look out and be prepared. I telegraphed Halleck, asking him to assist you if needed.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department,
September 8, 1862. 7.20 p. m.

General Buell.

What degree of certainty have you that Bragg, with his command, is not now in the valley of the Shenandoah, Virginia? A. Lincoln.

War Department,
October 19, 1862. 1.33 p. m.

Major-General Buell, Mount Vernon, Kentucky.

Your telegram of the 17th was received this morning, and has been laid before the President, who concurs in the views expressed in my telegram to you yesterday. The capture of East Tennessee should be the main object of your campaign. You say it is the heart of the enemy's resources; make it the heart of yours. Your army can live there if the enemy's can. You must in a great measure live upon the country, paying for your supplies where proper, and levying contributions where necessary. I am directed by the President to say to you that your army must enter East Tennessee this fall, and that it ought to move there while the roads are passable. Once between the enemy and Nashville, there

will be no serious difficulty in reopening your communications with that place. He does not understand why we cannot march as the enemy marches, live as he lives, and fight as he fights, unless we admit the inferiority of our troops and of our generals. Once hold the valley of the upper Tennessee, and the operations of guerrillas in that State and Kentucky will soon cease.

H. W. Halleck, General-in-chief.

Edwin M. Stanton.[1]

Executive Mansion, January 22, 1862.

Hon. Secretary of War.

My dear Sir: On reflection I think it will not do, as a rule, for the adjutant-general to attend me wherever I go: not that I have any objection to his presence, but that it would be an uncompensating encumbrance both to him and me. When it shall occur to me to go anywhere, I wish to be free to go at once, and not to have to notify the adjutant-general and wait till he can get ready.

It is better, too, for the public service that he shall give his time to the business of his office, and not to personal attendance on me.

While I thank you for the kindness of the suggestion, my view of the matter is as I have stated. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[1] When, on the 15th of January, 1862, the President was able to remove his incompetent Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, he appointed to the place Mr. Stanton, an able lawyer, and a patriot, as he had proved himself as Attorney-General in Buchanan's Cabinet in 1860-1861. While of an irritable temper, that in petty matters brought him into clashes with the President, he was Lincoln's mainstay.

Executive Mansion, January 31, 1862.

Hon. Secretary of War.

My dear Sir: It is my wish that the expedition commonly called the "Lane Expedition" shall be, as much as has been promised at the adjutant-general's office, under the supervision of General McClellan, and not any more. I have not intended, and do not now intend, that it shall be a great, exhausting affair, but a snug, sober column of 10,000 or 15,000. General Lane has been told by me many times that he is under the command of General Hunter, and assented to it as often as told. It was the distinct agreement between him and me, when I appointed him, that he was to be under Hunter.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

On March 15, 1862, the President wrote Secretary Stanton in reference to arms delivered by the manufacturers after time set in contract. He said:

If . . . these men acted in good faith, I think they should not be ruined by the transaction, but that the guns should be accepted and paid for. Of course, I understand the principle of strict law would not oblige the Government to take them, even if it were an individual.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, April 3, 1862.

The Secretary of War will order that one or the other of the corps of General McDowell and General Sumner remain in front of Washington until further orders from the department, to operate at or in the direction of Manassas Junction, or otherwise, as occasion may require; that the other corps not so ordered to remain go for-

ward to General McClellan as speedily as possible; that General McClellan commence his forward movements from his new base at once, and that such incidental modifications as the foregoing may render proper be also made.

A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, July 22, 1862.

Hon. Secretary of War.

Sir: I think it will be better to do nothing now which can be construed into a demand for troops in addition to the three hundred thousand for which we have recently called. We do not need more, nor, indeed, so many, if we could have the smaller number very soon. It is a very important consideration, too, that one recruited into an old regiment is nearly or quite equal in value to two in a new one. We can scarcely afford to forego any plan within our power which may facilitate the filling of the old regiments with recruits. If, on consideration, you are of opinion that this object can be advanced by causing the militia of the several States to be enrolled, and by drafts therefrom, you are at liberty to take the proper steps and do so, provided that any number of recruits so obtained from any State within the next three months shall, if practicable, be an abatement of the quota of volunteers from such State under the recent call.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

On August 12, 1862, the President wrote Secretary Stanton about a soldier who was with his brother (also in the army), the support of their widowed mother. He had been a deserter, but had reënlisted in another company:

Let him be discharged from arrest and go to duty. I think, too, he should have his pay for duty actually performed. Loss of pay falls so hard upon poor families.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, January 1, 1863.

Hon. Secretary of War.

Dear Sir: Yesterday a piteous appeal was made to me by an old lady of genteel appearance, saying she had, with what she thought sufficient assurance that she would not be disturbed by the Government, fitted up the two south divisions of the old "Duff Green" building in order to take boarders, and has boarders already in it, and others, including members of Congress, engaged; and that now she is ordered to be out of it by Saturday, the 3d instant; and that independently of the ruin it brings on her by her lost outlay, she neither has nor can find another shelter for her own head. I know nothing about it myself, but promised to bring it to your notice.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, January 23, 1863.

Hon. Secretary of War.

Sir: I think General Butler should go to New Orleans again. He is unwilling to go unless he is restored to the command of the department. He should start by the first of February, and should take some force with him. The whole must be so managed as to not wrong or wound the feelings of General Banks. His original wish was to go to Texas; and it must be arranged for him to do this now with a substantial force; and yet he must not go to the endangering the open-

ing of the Mississippi. I hope this may be done by the time General Butler shall arrive there; but whether or not, I think we cannot longer dispense with General Butler's services.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, May 11, 1863.

Hon. Secretary of War.

Dear Sir: I have again concluded to relieve General Curtis. I see no other way to avoid the worst consequences there. I think of General Schofield as his successor, but I do not wish to take the matter of a successor out of the hands of yourself and General Halleck.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

General Schofield was appointed.

Executive Mansion, July 21, 1863.

Hon. Secretary of War.

My dear Sir: I desire that a renewed and vigorous effort be made to raise colored forces along the shores of the Mississippi. Please consult the general-in-chief, and if it is perceived that any acceleration of the matter can be effected, let it be done. I think the evidence is nearly conclusive that General Thomas is one of the best (if not the very best) instruments for this service. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

General Lorenzo Thomas, who had been Adjutant-General, was sent on this service.

Executive Mansion, July 28, 1863.

Hon. Secretary of War.

My dear Sir: A young son of Senator Brown of Mississippi, not yet twenty, as I understand,

was wounded and made a prisoner at Gettysburg. His mother is sister of Mrs. P. R. Fendall, of this city. Mr. Fendall, on behalf of himself and family, asks that he and they may have charge of the boy to cure him up, being responsible for his person and good behavior. Would it not be rather a grateful and graceful thing to let them have him? Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, July 29, 1863.

Hon. Secretary of War.

Sir: Can we not renew the effort to organize a force to go to Western Texas?[1]

Please consult with the general-in-chief on the subject.

If the Governor of New Jersey shall furnish any new regiments, might not they be put into such an expedition? Please think of it.

I believe no local object is now more desirable.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, August 21, 1863.

Hon. Secretary of War.

My dear Sir: In the autumn of 1861, certain persons in armed rebellion against the United States, within the counties of Accomac and Northampton, laid down their arms upon certain terms then proposed to them by General Dix, in and by a certain proclamation. It is now said that these persons, or some of them, are about to be forced into the military lines of the existing rebellion, unless they will take an oath prescribed to them since, and not included in General Dix's

[1] This was to prevent the establishment of a Mexican monarchy under Maximilian. General N. P. Banks was sent on the expedition.

proclamation referred to. Now, my judgment is that no one of these men should be forced from his home, who has not broken faith with the Government, according to the terms fixed by General Dix and these men.

It is bad faith in the Government to force new terms upon such as have kept faith with it—at least so it seems to me. A. Lincoln.

On August 26, 1863, the President gave instructions about the conduct of the draft, with particular reference to New York State. He closed his letter as follows:

I wish that also to go forward, and I wish Governor Seymour notified of it; so that if he choose, he can place agents of his with ours to see the work fairly done.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, September 1, 1863.

Hon. Secretary of War.

My dear Sir: I am now informed, contrary to my impression when I last talked with you, that the order compelling the four hundred on the eastern shore of Virginia to take the oath or be sent away is about being carried into execution. As this, and also the assessment for damage done to and at the lighthouse, are very strong measures, and as I have to bear the responsibility of them, I wish them suspended until I can at least be better satisfied of their propriety than I am now. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

The orders were suspended.

Executive Mansion, November 11, 1863.
Hon. Secretary of War.

Dear Sir: I personally wish Jacob Freese, of New Jersey, to be appointed colonel for a colored regiment, and this regardless of whether he can tell the exact shade of Julius Cæsar's hair.

Yours, etc., A. Lincoln.

On November 17, 1863, Secretary Stanton sent the President a schedule of close train arrangements to go to Gettysburg, Pa., for the dedication ceremonies of the National Cemetery, and to return within one day. On this the President made the following indorsement:

[*Indorsement.*]

I do not like this arrangement. I do not wish to so go that by the slightest accident we fail entirely, and, at the best, the whole be a mere breathless running of the gauntlet. But, any way. A. Lincoln.

November 17, 1863.

Executive Mansion, December 18, 1863.
Hon. Secretary of War.

My dear Sir: I believe General Schofield must be relieved from command of the department of Missouri; otherwise a question of veracity, in relation to his declarations as to his interfering, or not, with the Missouri legislature, will be made with him, which will create an additional amount of trouble, not to be overcome by even a correct decision of the question. The question itself must be avoided. Now for the mode. Senator Henderson, his friend, thinks he can be induced to ask to be relieved, if he shall understand he will be generously treated; and,

on this latter point, Gratz Brown will help his nomination as a major-general through the Senate. In no other way can he be confirmed; and upon his rejection alone it would be difficult for me to sustain him as commander of the department. Besides, his being relieved from command of the department, and at the same time confirmed as a major-general, will be the means of Henderson and Brown leading off together as friends, and will go far to heal the Missouri difficulty. Another point. I find it is scarcely less than indispensable for me to do something for General Rosecrans; and I find Henderson and Brown will agree to him for the commander of their department.

Again, I have received such evidence and explanations, in regard to the supposed cotton transactions of General Curtis, as fully restore in my mind the fair presumption of his innocence; and, as he is my friend, and what is more, as I think, the country's friend, I would be glad to relieve him from the impression that I think him dishonest by giving him a command. Most of the Iowa and Kansas delegations, a large part of that of Missouri, and the delegates from Nebraska and Colorado, ask this in behalf of General C., and suggest Kansas and other contiguous territory west of Missouri as a department for him. In a purely military point of view it may be that none of these things are indispensable, or perhaps advantageous; but in another aspect, scarcely less important, they would give great relief; while, at the worst, I think they could not injure the military service much. I therefore shall be greatly obliged if yourself and General Halleck can give me your hearty co-

operation in making the arrangement. Perhaps the first thing would be to send General Schofield's nomination to me. Let me hear from you before you take any actual step in the matter.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Private.*]

Executive Mansion, December 21, 1863.

Hon. Secretary of War.

My dear Sir: Sending a note to the Secretary of the Navy, as I promised, he called over and said that the strikes in the ship-yards had thrown the completion of vessels back so much that he thought General Gillmore's proposition entirely proper. He only wishes (and in which I concur) that General Gillmore will courteously confer with, and explain to, Admiral Dahlgren.

In regard to the Western matter, I believe the program will have to stand substantially as I first put it. Henderson, and especially Brown, believe that the social influence of St. Louis would inevitably tell injuriously upon General Pope in the particular difficulty existing there, and I think there is some force in that view.

As to retaining General Schofield temporarily, if this should be done, I believe I should scarcely be able to get his nomination through the Senate. Send me over his nomination, which, however, I am not quite ready to send to the Senate.

Yours as ever, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, December 31, 1863.

Hon. Secretary of War.

Sir: Please fix up the department to which Curtis is to go, without waiting to wind up the

Missouri matter. Lane is very anxious to have Fort Smith in it, and I am willing, unless there be decided military reasons to the contrary, in which case of course, I am not for it. It will oblige me to have the Curtis department fixed at once. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

On the next day General Curtis was appointed to the department of Kansas.

Executive Mansion, February 1, 1864.

Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

Sir: You are directed to have a transport (either a steam or sailing vessel, as may be deemed proper by the Quartermaster-General) sent to the colored colony established by the United States at the Island of Vache, on the coast of San Domingo, to bring back to this country such of the colonists there as desire to return. You will have the transport furnished with suitable supplies for that purpose, and detail an officer of the Quartermaster's department, who, under special intructions to be given, shall have charge of the business. The colonists will be brought to Washington unless otherwise hereafter directed, and be employed and provided for at the camps for colored persons around that city.

Those only will be brought from the island who desire to return, and their effects will be brought with them. Abraham Lincoln.

[*Indorsement upon a form of oath.*]

Submitted to the Secretary of War. On principle I dislike an oath which requires a man to swear he has not done wrong. It rejects the

Christian principle of forgiveness on terms of repentance. I think it is enough if the man does no wrong hereafter. A. Lincoln.

February 5, 1864.

Executive Mansion, February 11, 1864.

Hon. Secretary of War.

My dear Sir: In January, 1863, The Provost-Marshal at St. Louis, having taken the control of a certain church from one set of men and given it to another, I wrote General Curtis on the subject as follows:

> The United States Government must not, as by this order, undertake to run the churches. When an individual in a church or out of it becomes dangerous to the public interest, he must be checked; but the churches, as such, must take care of themselves. It will not do for the United States to appoint trustees, supervisors, or other agents for the churches.

Some trouble remaining in this same case, I, on the twenty-second of December, 1863, in a letter to Mr. O. D. Filley, repeated the above language, and among other things added:

> I have never interfered nor thought of interfering as to who shall or shall not preach in any church; nor have I knowingly or believingly tolerated any one else to so interfere by my authority. If any one is so interfering by color of my authority, I would like to have it specifically made known to me. . . . I will not have control of any church on any side.

After having made these declarations in good faith, and in writing, you can conceive of my embarrassment at now having brought to me what purports to be a formal order of the War Department, bearing date November 30, 1863,

giving Bishop Ames control and possession of all the Methodist churches in certain Southern military departments, whose pastors have not been appointed by a loyal bishop or bishops, and ordering the military to aid him against any resistance which may be made to his taking such possession and control. What is to be done about it? Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Stanton modified the objectionable features of his order.

On February 27, 1864, the President wrote to Secretary Stanton upon a report of special commissioners on the draft in New York. Referring to his instructions of August 26, 1863, he said:

My idea was to do the work over according to the law, in presence of the complaining party, and thereby to correct anything which might be found amiss. The commission, whose work I am considering, seem to have proceeded upon a totally different idea. Not going forth to find men at all, they have proceeded altogether upon paper examinations and mental processes. One of their conclusions, as I understand, is that, as the law stands, and attempting to follow it, the enrolling officers could not have made the enrolments much more accurately than they did. . . . [Yet] the commission conclude [admit?] that the quotas for the draft should be based upon entire population, and they . . . give a table for the State of New York, in which some districts are reduced and some increased. For the now ensuing draft, let the quotas stand as made by the enrolling officers, in the districts wherein this table requires them to be increased; and let them be reduced according to the table in the

others: this to be no precedent for the subsequent action. . . .

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, March 1, 1864.

Hon. Secretary of War.

My dear Sir: A poor widow, by the name of Baird, has a son in the army, that for some offense has been sentenced to serve a long time without pay, or at most with very little pay. I do not like this punishment of withholding pay —it falls so very hard upon poor families. After he had been serving in this way for several months, at the tearful appeal of the poor mother, I made a direction that he be allowed to enlist for a new term, on the same conditions as others. She now comes and says she cannot get it acted upon. Please do it.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Memorandum.*]

I think the Amsterdam projectile is too good a thing to be lost to the service, and if offered at the Hotchkiss prices, and not in excessive quantities, nor unreasonable terms in other respects, by either or both parties to the patent controversy, take it, so that the test be fully made. I am for the Government having the best articles in spite of patent controversies.

A. Lincoln.

March 10, 1864.

Executive Mansion, March 18, 1864.

Hon. Secretary of War.

My dear Sir: I am so pressed in regard to prisoners of war in our custody, whose homes

are within our lines, and who wish to not be exchanged, but to take the oath and be discharged, that I hope you will pardon me for again calling up the subject. My impression is that we will not ever force the exchange of any of this class; that, taking the oath and being discharged, none of them will again go to the rebellion; but the rebellion again coming to them, a considerable percentage of them, probably not a majority, would rejoin it; that, by a cautious discrimination, the number so discharged would not be large enough to do any considerable mischief in any event, will relieve distress in at least some meritorious cases, and would give me some relief from an intolerable pressure. I shall be glad, therefore, to have your cheerful assent to the discharge of those whose names I may send, which I will only do with circumspection. . . .

A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, March 28, 1864.

Hon. Secretary of War.

My dear Sir: The Governor of Kentucky is here, and desires to have the following points definitely fixed:

First. That the quotas of troops furnished, and to be furnished, by Kentucky may be adjusted upon the basis as actually reduced by able-bodied men of hers having gone into the rebel service; and that she be required to furnish no more than her just quotas upon fair adjustment upon such basis.

Second. To whatever extent the enlistment and drafting, one or both, of colored troops may be found necessary within the State, it may be conducted within the law of Congress; and, so far

as practicable, free from collateral embarrassments, disorders, and provocations.

I think these requests of the Governor are reasonable; and I shall be obliged if you will give him a full hearing, and do the best you can to effect these objects.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, July 14, 1864.

Hon. Secretary of War.

Sir: Your note of to-day inclosing General Halleck's letter of yesterday relative to offensive remarks supposed to have been made by the Postmaster-General [1] concerning the military officers on duty about Washington is received. The General's letter in substance demands of me that if I approve the remarks I shall strike the names of those officers from the rolls; and that if I do not approve them the Postmaster-General shall be dismissed from the Cabinet.

Whether the remarks were really made I do not know, nor do I suppose such knowledge is necessary to a correct response. If they were made, I do not approve them; and yet, under the circumstances, I would not dismiss a member of the Cabinet therefor. I do not consider what may have been hastily said in a moment of vexation at so severe a loss is sufficient ground for so grave a step. Besides this, truth is generally the best vindication against slander. I propose continuing to be myself the judge as to when a member of the Cabinet shall be dismissed.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[1] Montgomery Blair (see correspondence with him).

Executive Mansion, August 22, 1864.
Hon. Secretary of War.

My dear Sir: I very much wish to oblige Henry Ward Beecher by releasing Howard;[1] but I wish you to be satisfied when it is done. What say you? Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

I have no objection if you think it right—and this a proper time. E. M. S.

Let Howard, imprisoned in regard to the bogus proclamation, be discharged.

A. Lincoln.

August 23, 1864.

Executive Mansion, August 27, 1864.
Hon. Secretary of War.

My dear Sir: If General Sigel has asked for an inquiry, let him have it, if there is not some insurmountable, or at least, very serious obstacle. He is fairly entitled to this consideration.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, October 31, 1864.
Hon. Secretary of War.

Sir: Herewith is a letter of Governor Curtin, which speaks for itself. I suggest for your consideration, whether, to the extent of, say, 5,000, we might not exempt from the draft, upon the men being put in good shape to defend and give assurance to the border. I have not said even

[1] Joseph Howard, a New York journalist, forged a proclamation about the draft for stock-rigging purposes. He was imprisoned for the crime in Fort Lafayette, and the *World* and the *Journal of Commerce*, papers which published the proclamation, were temporarily suspended.

this much to the bearer, General Todd,[1] whom I hope you will see and hear.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, January 19, 1865.

Hon. Secretary of War.

Dear Sir: You remember that from time to time appeals have been made to us by persons claiming to have attempted to come through our lines with their effects to take the benefit of the amnesty proclamation, and to have been despoiled of their effects under General Butler's administration. Some of these claims have color of merit, and may be really meritorious. Please consider whether we cannot set on foot an investigation which may advance justice in the premises. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

City Point, Virginia,
March 25, 1865. 8.30 a. m.

Hon. Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

. . . General Lee has sent the Russell letter back, concluding, as I understand from Grant, that their dignity does not admit of their receiving the document from us. Robert just now tells me there was a little rumpus up the line this morning, ending about where it began.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

City Point, Virginia,
March 27, 1865. 3.35 p. m.

Hon. Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

Yours inclosing Fort Sumter order received.

[1] John B. S. Todd.

I think of but one suggestion. I feel quiet confident that Sumter fell on the 13th, and not on the 14th of April, as you have it. It fell on Saturday, the 13th; the first call for troops on our part was got up on Sunday, the 14th, and given date and issued on Monday, the 15th. Look up the old almanac and other data, and see if I am not right. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

City Point, Virginia, March 28, 1865. 12 m.
Hon. Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

After your explanation, I think it is little or no difference whether the Fort Sumter ceremony takes place on the 13th or 14th. . . .

A. Lincoln.

City Point, Va., March 30, 1865. 7.30 p. m.
Hon. Secretary of War.

I begin to feel that I ought to be at home and yet I dislike to leave without seeing nearer to the end of General Grant's present movement. He has now been out since yesterday morning and although he has not yet been diverted from his programme no considerable effort has yet been produced so far as we know here. Last night at 10.15 p. m. when it was dark as a rainy night without a moon could be, a furious cannonade soon joined in by a heavy musketry fire opened near Petersburg and lasted about two hours. The sound was very distinct here as also were the flashes of the guns upon the clouds. It seemed to me a great battle, but the older hands here scarcely noticed it and sure enough this morning it was found that very little had been done. A. Lincoln.

[*Cipher Telegram.*]

City Point, Va., April 3, 1865. 5 p. m.

Hon. Edwin M. Stanton,
Secretary of War.

Yours received. Thanks for your caution, but I have already been to Petersburg, stayed with General Grant an hour and a half and returned here. It is certain now that Richmond is in our hands, and I think I will go there to-morrow. I will take care of myself. A. Lincoln.

Nathaniel Gordon.

On February 4, 1862, the President having refused the petition of "a large number of respectable citizens" to commute the death sentence of Nathaniel Gordon, convicted of being a slave trader, gave him a respite from February 7, 1862, to February 21, 1862, because of the seeming probability that the expectation of a commutation of sentence may have prevented Gordon "from making the necessary preparation for the awful change which awaits him."

In granting this respite it becomes my painful duty to admonish the prisoner that, relinquishing all expectation of pardon by human authority, he refer himself alone to the mercy of the common God and Father of all men.

In testimony, etc. Abraham Lincoln.

By the President:

William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

Samuel F. Dupont.

In conformity with an act of Congress approved December 21, 1861, "further to promote the efficiency of the navy," Captain Dupont was nominated to the Senate to continue as flag-officer in command of the squadron "which recently rendered such important

service to the Union in the expedition to the coast of South Carolina." On February 4, 1862, the President sent a Message to Congress in which he said:

Believing that no occasion could arise which would more fully correspond with the intention of the law, or be more pregnant with happy influence as an example, I cordially recommend that Captain Samuel F. Dupont receive a vote of thanks of Congress for his services and gallantry displayed in the capture of Forts Walker and Beauregard, commanding the entrance of Port Royal harbor, on the 7th of November, 1861. Abraham Lincoln.

Washington, February 4, 1862.

[*Message to Congress.*]

March 20, 1862.

I cordially recommend that Captain Samuel F. Dupont receive a vote of thanks of Congress for his services and gallantry displayed in the capture, since the 21st of December, 1861, of various points on the coasts of Georgia and Florida, particularly Brunswick, Cumberland Island and Sound, Amelia Island, the towns of St. Mary's, St. Augustine, Jacksonville, and Fernandina. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, April 13, 1863.

Admiral Dupont.

Hold your position inside the bar near Charleston; or, if you shall have left it, return to it, and hold it till further orders. Do not allow the enemy to erect new batteries or defenses on Morris Island. If he has begun it, drive him

out. I do not herein order you to renew the general attack. That is to depend on your own discretion or a further order. A. Lincoln.

See letter to David Hunter of April 14, 1863.

Louis M. Goldsborough.

[*Message to Congress.*]

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States: . . .

Believing that no occasion could arise which would more fully correspond with the intention of the law [*authorizing the President to recommend to Congress naval officers to receive vote of thanks for gallant service*], or be more pregnant with happy influence as an example, I cordially recommend that Louis M. Goldsborough receive a vote of thanks of Congress for his services and gallantry displayed in the combined attack of the forces commanded by him and Brigadier-General Burnside in the capture of Roanoke Island and the destruction of rebel gunboats on the 7th, 8th, and 10th of February, 1862.

Abraham Lincoln.

Washington, February 15, 1862.

[*Telegram.*]

Fort Monroe, Virginia, May 7, 1862.

Flag-officer Goldsborough.

Sir: Major-General McClellan telegraphs that he has ascertained by a reconnaissance that the battery at Jamestown has been abandoned, and he again requests that gunboats may be sent up the James River.

If you have tolerable confidence that you can

successfully contend with the *Merrimac* without the help of the *Galena* and two accompanying gunboats, send the *Galena* and two gunboats up the James River at once. Please report your action on this to me at once. I shall be found either at General Wool's headquarters or on board the *Miami*.

Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln.

Fort Monroe, Virginia, May 10, 1862.

Flag-officer Goldsborough.

My dear Sir: I send you this copy of your report of yesterday for the purpose of saying to you in writing that you are quite right in supposing that the movement made by you and therein reported was made in accordance with my wishes verbally expressed to you in advance. I avail myself of the occasion to thank you for your courtesy and all your conduct, so far as known to me, during my brief visit here.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., June 28, 1862.

Flag-officer Goldsborough, Fort Monroe.

Enemy has cut McClellan's communication with White House, and is driving Stoneman back on that point. Do what you can for him with gunboats at or near your place. McClellan's main force is between the Chickahominy and the James. Also do what you can to communicate with him and support him there. A. Lincoln.

Henry J. Raymond.

[*Private.*]

Executive Mansion, March 9, 1862.

Hon. Henry J. Raymond.

My dear Sir: I am grateful to the New York journals, and not less so to the *Times* than to others, for the kind notices of the late special message to Congress.

Your paper, however, intimates that the proposition, though well intentioned, must fail on the score of expense. I do hope you will reconsider this. Have you noticed the facts that less than one half day's cost of this war would pay for all the slaves in Delaware at $400 per head—that eighty-seven days' cost of this war would pay for all in Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Kentucky, and Missouri at the same price? Were those States to take the step, do you doubt that it would shorten the war more than eighty-seven days, and thus be an actual saving of expense?

Please look at these things and consider whether there should not be another article in the *Times*.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, August 15, 1864.

Hon. Henry J. Raymond.

My dear Sir: I have proposed to Mr. Greeley that the Niagara correspondence be published, suppressing only the parts of his letters over which the red pencil is drawn in the copy which I herewith send. He declines giving his consent to the publication of his letters unless these parts be published with the rest. I have concluded that it is better for me to submit for the time to the consequences of the false position in which

I consider he has placed me than to subject the country to the consequences of publishing their discouraging and injurious parts. I send you this and the accompanying copy, not for publication, but merely to explain to you, and that you may preserve them until the proper time shall come. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

James A. McDougall.

Executive Mansion, March 14, 1862.

Hon. James A. McDougall, United States Senate.

My dear Sir: As to the expensiveness of the plan of gradual emancipation with compensation, proposed in the late message, please allow me one or two brief suggestions.

Less than one-half day's cost of this war would pay for all the slaves in Delaware at four hundred dollars per head.

Thus, all the slaves in Delaware by the census of 1860, are.....	1,798
	400
Cost of the slaves	$719,200
One day's cost of the war	2,000,000

Again, less than eighty-seven days' cost of this war would, at the same price, pay for all in Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Kentucky, and Missouri.

Thus, slaves in	Delaware	1,798
" "	Maryland	87,188
" "	Dist. of Columbia.	3,181
" "	Kentucky	225,490
" "	Missouri	114,965
		432,622
		400
Cost of slaves		$173,048,800
Eighty-seven days' cost of the war		174,000,000

Do you doubt that taking the initiatory steps on the part of those States and this District would shorten the war more than eighty-seven days, and thus be an actual saving of expense?

A word as to the time and manner of incurring the expense. Suppose, for instance, a State devises and adopts a system by which the institution absolutely ceases therein by a named day —say January 1, 1882. Then let the sum to be paid to such a State by the United States be ascertained by taking from the census of 1860 the number of slaves within the State, and multiplying that number by four hundred—the United States to pay such sums to the State in twenty equal annual instalments, in six per cent. bonds of the United States.

The sum thus given, as to time and manner, I think, would not be half as onerous as would be an equal sum raised now for the indefinite prosecution of the war; but of this you can judge as well as I. I inclose a census table for your convenience. Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

Samuel Boyd Tobey.

Executive Mansion, March 19, 1862.

Dr. Samuel Boyd Tobey.

My dear Sir: A domestic affliction, of which doubtless you are informed, has delayed me so long in making acknowledgment of the very kind and appropriate letter signed . . . by . . . representatives of the Society of Friends for New England, held at Providence, Rhode Island, the 8th of second month, 1862. . . .

Engaged as I am in a great war, I fear it will be difficult for the world to understand how

fully I appreciate the principles of peace inculcated in this letter and everywhere by the Society of Friends.

Grateful to the good people you represent for the prayers in behalf of our common country, I look forward hopefully to an early end of war and return to peace.

Your obliged friend, A. Lincoln.

Richard Yates and William Butler.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, April 10, 1862.

Hon. R. Yates and William Butler, Springfield, Illinois.

I fully appreciate General Pope's splendid achievements, with their invaluable results; but you must know that major-generalships in the regular army are not as plenty as blackberries.

A. Lincoln.

Andrew Johnson.

On April 27, 1862, the President telegraphed Governor Johnson in regard to military operations in Tennessee:

War Department, April 27, 1862.

Governor Andrew Johnson,
Nashville, Tennessee.

General Halleck understands better than we can here, and he must be allowed to control in that quarter. If you are not in communication with Halleck, telegraph him at once, freely and frankly. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram in Cipher.*]

Washington, June 4, 1862.

Hon. Andrew Johnson, Nashville, Tennessee.

Do you really wish to have control of the question of releasing rebel prisoners so far as they may be Tennesseeans? If you do, please tell us so. Your answer not to be made public.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, June 7, 1862.

Governor Johnson, Nashville, Tennessee.

The President has received your two despatches of the 5th instant. He approves your proceedings of reprisal against the secessionists.

In regard to the release of the rebel prisoners, he holds the question as to the time when executive clemency shall be exercised under consideration. It has always been the design of the Government to leave the exercise of that clemency to your judgment and discretion whenever the period arrives that it can properly be exercised.

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

[*Telegram in Cipher.*]

Washington, June 9, 1862.

Hon. Andrew Johnson,
Nashville, Tennessee.

Your despatch about seizing seventy rebels to exchange for a like number of Union men was duly received. I certainly do not disapprove the proposition.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, July 11, 1862.

Hon. Andrew Johnson.

My dear Sir: Yours of yesterday is received. Do you not, my good friend, perceive that what you ask is simply to put you in command in the West? I do not suppose you desire this. You only wish to control in your own localities; but this you must know may derange all other posts. Can you not, and will you not, have a full conference with General Halleck? Telegraph him, and meet him at such place as he and you can agree upon. I telegraph him to meet you and confer fully with you. A. Lincoln.

See also letter to Henry W. Halleck of July 11, 1862.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, October 31, 1862.

Gov. Andrew Johnson, Nashville, Tenn., via Louisville, Ky.

Yours of the 29th received. I shall take it to General Halleck, but I already know it will be very inconvenient to take General Morgan's command from where it now is. I am glad to hear you speak hopefully for Tennessee. I sincerely hope Rosecrans may find it possible to do something for her. David Nelson, son of the M. C. of your State, regrets his father's final defection, and asks me for a situation. Do you know him? Could he be of service to you or to Tennessee in any capacity in which I could send him?

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, November 14, 1862.
Gov. Andrew Johnson, Nashville, Tennessee.

Your despatch of the 4th, about returning troops from western Virginia to Tennessee, is just received, and I have been to General Halleck with it. He says an order has already been made by which those troops have already moved, or soon will move, to Tennessee. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, January 8, 1863.
Governor Johnson, Nashville, Tennessee.

A despatch of yesterday from Nashville says the body of Captain Todd, of the Sixth Kentucky, was brought in to-day.

Please tell me what was his Christian name, and whether he was in our service or that of the enemy. I shall also be glad to have your impressions as to the effect the late operations about Murfreesborough will have on the prospects of Tennessee. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, January 10, 1863.
Governor Johnson, Nashville, Tennessee.

Yours received. I presume the remains of Captain Todd are in the hands of his family and friends, and I wish to give no order on the subject; but I do wish your opinion of the effects of the late battles about Murfreesborough upon the prospects of Tennessee. A. Lincoln.

[*Private.*]

Executive Mansion, March 26, 1863.

Hon. Andrew Johnson.

My dear Sir: I am told you have at least thought of raising a negro military force. In my opinion the country now needs no specific thing so much as some man of your ability and position to go to this work. When I speak of your position, I mean that of an eminent citizen of a slave State and himself a slaveholder. The colored population is the great available and yet unavailed of force for restoring the Union. The bare sight of fifty thousand armed and drilled black soldiers upon the banks of the Mississippi would end the rebellion at once; and who doubts that we can present that sight if we but take hold in earnest? If you have been thinking of it, please do not dismiss the thought.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion,

Washington, September 8, 1863. 9.30 a. m.

Hon. Andrew Johnson, Nashville, Tennessee.

Despatch of yesterday just received. I shall try to find the paper you mention and carefully consider it. In the meantime let me urge that you do your utmost to get every man you can, black and white, under arms at the very earliest moment, to guard roads, bridges and trains, allowing all the better trained soldiers to go forward to Rosecrans. Of course I mean for you to act in coöperation with, and not independently of, the military authorities. A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, September 11, 1863.
Hon. Andrew Johnson.

My dear Sir: All Tennessee is now clear of armed insurrectionists. You need not to be reminded that it is the nick of time for reinaugurating a loyal State government. Not a moment should be lost. You and the coöperating friends there can better judge of the ways and means than can be judged by any here. I only offer a few suggestions. The reinauguration must not be such as to give control of the State and its representation in Congress to the enemies of the Union, driving its friends there into political exile. The whole struggle for Tennessee will have been profitless to both State and nation if it so ends that Governor Johnson is put down and Governor Harris is put up. It must not be so. You must have it otherwise. Let the reconstruction be the work of such men only as can be trusted for the Union. Exclude all others, and trust that your government so organized will be recognized here as being the one of republican form to be guaranteed to the State, and to be protected against invasion and domestic violence. It is something on the question of time to remember that it cannot be known who is next to occupy the position I now hold, nor what he will do. I see that you have declared in favor of emancipation in Tennessee, for which may God bless you. Get emancipation into your new State government—constitution—and there will be no such word as fail for your case. The raising of colored troops, I think, will greatly help every way. Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Inclosure.*]

Executive Mansion, September 19, 1863.

Hon. Andrew Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee.

In addition to the matters contained in the orders and instructions given you by the Secretary of War, you are hereby authorized to exercise such powers as may be necessary and proper to enable the loyal people of Tennessee to present such a republican form of State government as will entitle the State to the guaranty of the United States therefor, and to be protected under such State government by the United States against invasion and domestic violence, all according to the fourth section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States. Abraham Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, July 27, 1864.

Governor Johnson, Nashville, Tennessee.

I also received yours about General Carl Schurz. I appreciate him certainly, as highly as you do; but you can never know until you have the trial, how difficult it is to find a place for an officer of so high rank when there is no place seeking him. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion,
Washington, August 25, 1864.

Governor Johnson, Nashville, Tennessee.

Thanks to General Gillam for making the news, and also to you for sending it. Does Joe Heiskell's "walking to meet us" mean any more

than that "Joe" was scared and wanted to save his skin? A. Lincoln.

See letter of October 22, 1864, to William B. Campbell.

In the fall election of 1864 Governor Johnson was elected Vice-President.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., January 14, 1865.
Governor Johnson, Nashville, Tennessee.

Yours announcing ordinance of emancipation received. Thanks to the convention and to you. When do you expect to be here? Would be glad to have your suggestions as to supplying your place of military governor. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, January 24, 1865.
Hon. Andrew Johnson, Nashville, Tennessee.

Several members of the Cabinet, with myself, considered the question to-day as to the time of your coming on here. While we fully appreciate your wish to remain in Tennessee until her State government shall be completely reinaugurated, it is our unanimous conclusion that it is unsafe for you to not be here on the 4th of March. Be sure to reach here by that time. A. Lincoln.

Charles P. Stone.

[*Message to the Senate.*]

To the Senate of the United States: In answer to the resolution of the Senate [*of April 22*]

in relation to Brigadier-General Stone,[1] I have the honor to state that he was arrested and imprisoned under my general authority, and upon evidence which, whether he be guilty or innocent, required, as appears to me, such proceedings to be had against him for the public safety. I deem it incompatible with the public interest, as also, perhaps, unjust to General Stone, to make a more particular statement of the evidence.

He has not been tried because, in the state of military operations at the time of his arrest and since, the officers to constitute a court martial and for witnesses could not be withdrawn from duty without serious injury to the service. He will be allowed a trial without any unnecessary delay; the charges and specifications will be furnished him in due season, and every facility for his defense will be afforded him by the War Department. Abraham Lincoln.

Washington, May 1, 1862.

David G. Farragut.[2]

[*Message to Congress.*]

May 14, 1862.

The President recommends "that Captain D. G. Farragut receive a vote of thanks of Congress for his services and gallantry displayed in the capture, since the 21st of December, 1861, of Forts Jackson and St.

[1] General Charles P. Stone was arrested after the defeat of Ball's Bluff, for conspiracy. He was confined for six months in Fort Lafayette, New York City, and then, no proof developing, was discharged.

[2] Farragut, the most distinguished naval officer of the war, was a native of Tennessee, and, at the outbreak of the war, a resident of Norfolk, Va. He heartily approved of the President's call for troops to suppress the rebellion, and, when told that a person with such sentiments could not live in Norfolk, moved North. In December, 1861,

Philip, city of New Orleans, and the destruction of various rebel gun-boats, rams, etc." The President names thirty other officers who distinguished themselves in these operations, and recommends that they also receive the thanks of Congress.

[*Inclosure.*]

Executive Mansion, November 6, 1864.

Naval officer in command at Mobile Bay.

Do not on any account, or on any showing of authority whatever, from whomsoever purporting to come, allow the blockade to be violated.

A. Lincoln.

See letter to E. R. S. Canby of December 12, 1864.

Members of Methodist Conference.

About the middle of May the President replied as follows to resolutions of the East Baltimore Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church:

These kind words of approval, coming from so numerous a body of intelligent Christian people, and so free from all suspicion of sinister motives, are indeed encouraging to me. By the help of an all-wise Providence, I shall endeavor to do my duty, and I shall expect the continuance of your prayers for a right solution of our national difficulties and the restoration of our country to peace and prosperity.

Your obliged and humble servant,

A. Lincoln.

he was ordered to command an expedition to the Gulf of Mexico. He sailed from Hampton Roads, Va., on February 2, 1862. His capture of New Orleans was an heroic feat, and one of the most important events of the war, leading to the conquest of the entire Mississippi, and causing Napoleon III. of France to abandon his idea of recognizing the Confederacy as a nation.

Irvin McDowell.

[*Memorandum.*]

May 17, 1862.

You will retain the separate command of the forces taken with you; but while co-operating with General McClellan you will obey his orders, except that you are to judge, and are not to allow your force to be disposed otherwise than so as to give the greatest protection to this capital which may be possible from that distance.

[*Indorsement.*]

To the Secretary of War.

The President having shown this to me, I suggest that it is dangerous to direct a subordinate not to obey the orders of his superior in any case, and that to give instructions to General McClellan to this same end and furnish General McDowell with a copy thereof would effect the object desired by the President. He desired me to say that the sketch of instructions to General McClellan herewith he thought made this addition unnecessary.

Respectfully, M. C. M.
[Quartermaster-General Meigs.]

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, May 24, 1862. 5 p. m.

Major-General McDowell, Fredericksburg.

General Frémont has been ordered by telegraph to move from Franklin on Harrisonburg to relieve General Banks, and capture or destroy Jackson's and Ewell's forces.[1]

You are instructed, laying aside for the present the movement on Richmond, to put 20,000 men in motion at once for the Shenandoah, mov-

[1] See Frémont correspondence.

ing on the line or in advance of the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad. Your object will be to capture the forces of Jackson and Ewell, either in co-operation with General Frémont, or, in case want of supplies or of transportation interferes with his movements, it is believed that the force which you move will be sufficient to accomplish this object alone. The information thus far received here makes it probable that if the enemy operate actively against General Banks, you will not be able to count upon much assistance from him, but may even have to release him.

Reports received this moment are that Banks is fighting with Ewell eight miles from Winchester. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, May 24, 1862.

Major-General McDowell, Falmouth.

In view of the operations of the enemy on the line of General Banks, the President thinks the whole force you designed to move from Fredericksburg should not be taken away, and he therefore directs that one brigade in addition to what you designed to leave at Fredericksburg should be left there: this brigade to be the least effective of your command.

Edwin M. Stanton.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, May 24, 1862. 8 p. m.

Major-General McDowell.

I am highly gratified by your alacrity in obeying my order. The change was as painful to me as it can possibly be to you or to any one.

Everything now depends upon the celerity and vigor of your movement. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, May 26, 1862. 1 p. m.
Major-General McDowell, Falmouth, Virginia.

. . . Should not the remainder of your forces, except sufficient to hold the point at Fredericksburg, move this way—to Manassas Junction or Alexandria? As commander of this department, should you not be here? I ask these questions.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 28, 1862. 1 p. m.
General McDowell, Manassas Junction.

. . . If Porter effects a lodgment on both railroads near Hanover Court House, consider whether your forces in front of Fredericksburg should not push through and join him.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 28, 1862. 4 p. m.
General McDowell, Manassas Junction.

You say General Geary's scouts report that they find no enemy this side of the Blue Ridge. Neither do I. Have they been to the Blue Ridge looking for them? A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 28, 1862. 5.40 p. m.
General McDowell, Manassas Junction.

I think the evidence now preponderates that Ewell and Jackson are still about Winchester. Assuming this, it is for you a question of legs.

Put in all the speed you can. I have told Frémont as much, and directed him to drive at them as fast as possible. By the way, I suppose you know Frémont has got up to Moorefield, instead of going to Harrisonburg. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 29, 1862. 12 m.
Major-General McDowell, Manassas Junction.

General Frémont's force should, and probably will, be at or near Strasburg by twelve (noon) to-morrow. Try to have your force, or the advance of it, at Front Royal as soon.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, May 30, 1862. 9.30 p. m.
Major-General McDowell, Rectortown, Virginia.

I send you a despatch just received from Saxton at Harper's Ferry:

. . . The enemy appeared this morning and then retired, with the intention of drawing us on. . . .

It seems the game is before you. Have sent a copy to General Frémont. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 30, 1862. 10 a. m.
Major-General McDowell, Manassas Junction.

I somewhat apprehend that Frémont's force, in its present condition, may not be quite strong enough in case it comes in collision with the enemy. For this additional reason I wish you to push forward your column as rapidly as possible. Tell me what number your force reaching Front Royal will amount to. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 30, 1862. 12.40 p. m.
Major-General McDowell, Rectortown.

Your despatch of to-day received and is satisfactory. Frémont has nominally 22,000, really about 17,000. Blenker's division is part of it. I have a despatch from Frémont this morning, not telling me where he is; but he says:

> Scouts and men from Winchester represent Jackson's force variously at 30,000 to 60,000. With him Generals Ewell and Longstreet.

The high figures erroneous, of course. Do you know where Longstreet is? Corinth is evacuated and occupied by us. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 30, 1862. 2.30 p. m.
Major-General McDowell.

Herewith I send a telegram just received from General Frémont. The despatch is dated of last night, and the point he says he will be at five o'clock Saturday afternoon is "Strasburg, or as near it as it may be to the enemy at that time."

I direct Frémont to come to time as fixed by himself, and you will act your discretion, taking this information into your calculation.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, June 3, 1862. 6.15 p. m.
Major-General McDowell, Front Royal, Virginia.

Anxious to know whether Shields can head or

flank Jackson. Please tell about where Shields and Jackson, respectively, are at the time this reaches you. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram in Cipher.*]

Washington, June 6, 1862.

Major-General McDowell.

The President directs that McCall's division be sent by water to General McClellan immediately, and that you place such force at Fredericksburg by the time McCall leaves there as may, in your judgment, be necessary to hold that place. In respect to the operations of the residue of your force, the President reserves directions, to be given as soon as he determines.

Transportation has been ordered up the Rappahannock from here and from Fortress Monroe.

Adjutant-General shall issue the order.

Edwin M. Stanton.

G. Montague Hicks.

[*Indorsement on Letter.*]

This note, as Colonel Hicks did verbally yesterday, attempts to exçite me against the Secretary of War, and therein is offensive to me. My "order," as he is pleased to call it, is plainly no order at all. A. Lincoln.

May 22, 1862.

Rufus Saxton.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, May 24, 1862. 1 p. m.

General Saxton.

Geary reports Jackson with 20,000 moving from Ashby's Gap by the Little River turnpike,

through Aldie, toward Centreville. This, he says, is reliable. He is also informed of large forces south of him. We know a force of some 15,000 broke up Saturday night from in front of Fredericksburg and went we know not where. Please inform us, if possible, what has become of the force which pursued Banks yesterday; also any other information you have. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, May 25, 1862. 4.15 p. m.
General Saxton, Harper's Ferry.

If Banks reaches Martinsburg, is he any the better for it? Will not the enemy cut him from thence to Harper's Ferry? Have you sent anything to meet him and assist him at Martinsburg? This is an inquiry, not an order. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, May 25, 1862. 6.50 p. m.
General Saxton, Harper's Ferry.

One good six-gun battery, complete in its men and appointments, is now on its way to you from Baltimore. Eleven other guns, of different sorts, are on their way to you from here. Hope they will all reach you before morning. As you have but 2,500 men at Harper's Ferry, where are the rest which were in that vicinity and which we have sent forward? Have any of them been cut off? A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, May 25, 1862.
General Saxton, Harper's Ferry.

I fear you have mistaken me. I did not mean to question the correctness of your conduct; on

the contrary, I approve what you have done. As the 2,500 reported by you seemed small to me, I feared some had got to Banks and been cut off with him. Please tell me the exact number you now have in hand. A. Lincoln.

See also correspondence with Frémont, McDowell, and Banks.

D. S. Miles.

War Department, May 24, 1862. 1.30 p. m.
Colonel Miles, Harper's Ferry, Virginia.

Could you not send scouts from Winchester who would tell whether enemy are north of Banks, moving on Winchester? What is the latest you have? A. Lincoln.

Nathaniel P. Banks.

War Department, May 24, 1862.
Major-General Banks, Winchester.

In your despatch of this evening to the President, you say that you intend to return with your command to Strasburg. The question is suggested whether you will not by that movement expose your stores and trains at Winchester. The President desires, therefore, more detailed information than you have yet furnished respecting the force and position of the enemy in your neighborhood before you make a movement that will subject Winchester or Harper's Ferry to danger from sudden attack.

You will please report fully before moving.
Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 29, 1862. 12 m.

Major-General Banks, Williamsport, Maryland.

General McDowell's advance should, and probably will, be at or near Front Royal at twelve (noon) to-morrow. General Frémont will be at or near Strasburg as soon. Please watch the enemy closely, and follow and harass and detain him if he attempts to retire. I mean this for General Saxton's force as well as that immediately with you. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 30, 1862. 10.15 a. m.

Major-General Banks,

Williamsport, Maryland, *via* Harper's Ferry.

If the enemy in force is in or about Martinsburg, Charlestown, and Winchester, or any or all of them, he may come in collision with Frémont, in which case I am anxious that your force, with you and at Harper's Ferry, should so operate as to assist Frémont if possible; the same if the enemy should engage McDowell. This was the meaning of my despatch yesterday.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

On June 1, 1862, Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, telegraphed General Banks at Williamsport of the addition to his force of Major-General Sigel with 10,000 men, adding—"the President desires you to assume actively the offensive against the retreating enemy without the loss of an hour."

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, June 22, 1862.

Major-General Banks, Middletown.

I am very glad you are looking well to the west for a movement of the enemy in that direction. You know my anxiety on that point. All was quiet at General McClellan's headquarters at two o'clock to-day. A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, November 22, 1862.

My dear General Banks: Early last week you left me in high hope with your assurance that you would be off with your expedition at the end of that week, or early in this. It is now the end of this, and I have just been overwhelmed and confounded with the sight of a requisition made by you which, I am assured, cannot be filled and got off within an hour short of two months. I inclose you a copy of the requisition, in some hope that it is not genuine —that you have never seen it. My dear general, this expanding and piling up of *impedimenta* has been, so far, almost our ruin, and will be our final ruin if it is not abandoned. If you had the articles of this requisition upon the wharf, with the necessary animals to make them of any use, and forage for the animals, you could not get vessels together in two weeks to carry the whole, to say nothing of your twenty thousand men; and, having the vessels, you could not put the cargoes aboard in two weeks more. And, after all, where you are going you have no use for them. When you parted with me you had no such ideas in your mind. I know you had not, or you could not have expected to be

off so soon as you said. You must get back to something like the plan you had then, or your expedition is a failure before you start. You must be off before Congress meets. You would be better off anywhere, and especially where you are going, for not having a thousand wagons doing nothing but hauling forage to feed the animals that draw them, and taking at least two thousand men to care for the wagons and animals, who otherwise might be two thousand good soldiers. Now, dear general, do not think this is an ill-natured letter; it is the very reverse. The simple publication of this requisition would ruin you.

Very truly your friend, A. Lincoln.

The President's letter was effective, and the expedition proceeded expeditiously. Arrived at New Orleans, General Banks superseded General Benjamin F. Butler in command.

[*Private Letter.*]

Executive Mansion, March 29, 1863.

Major-General Banks.

My dear Sir: Hon. Daniel Ullman, with a commission of a brigadier-general and two or three hundred other gentlemen as officers, goes to your department and reports to you, for the purpose of raising a colored brigade. To now avail ourselves of this element of force is very important, if not indispensable. I therefore will thank you to help General Ullman forward with his undertaking as much and as rapidly as you can; and also to carry the general object beyond his particular organization if you find it practicable. The necessity of this is palpable if, as I understand, you are now unable to effect any-

thing with your present force; and which force is soon to be greatly diminished by the expiration of terms of service, as well as by ordinary causes. I shall be very glad if you will take hold of the matter in earnest. You will receive from the [*War*] Department a regular order upon this subject. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, August 5, 1863.

My dear General Banks:

Being a poor correspondent is the only apology I offer for not having sooner tendered my thanks for your very successful and very valuable military operations this year. The final stroke in opening the Mississippi never should, and I think never will, be forgotten.

Recent events in Mexico, I think, render early action in Texas more important than ever. I expect, however, the general-in-chief will address you more fully upon this subject.

Governor Boutwell read me to-day that part of your letter to him which relates to Louisiana affairs. While I very well know what I would be glad for Louisiana to do, it is quite a different thing for me to assume direction of the matter. I would be glad for her to make a new constitution recognizing the Emancipation Proclamation, and adopting emancipation in those parts of the State to which the proclamation does not apply. And while she is at it, I think it would not be objectionable for her to adopt some practical system by which the two races could gradually live themselves out of the old relation to each other, and both come out better prepared for the new. Education for young blacks should be included in the plan. After all, the power or

element of "contract" may be sufficient for this probationary period; and, by its simplicity and flexibility, may be the better.

As an anti-slavery man, I have a motive to desire emancipation which pro-slavery men do not have; but even they have strong enough reason to thus place themselves again under the shield of the Union; and to thus perpetually hedge against the recurrence of the scenes through which we are now passing.

Governor Shepley has informed me that Mr. Durant is now taking a registry, with a view to the election of a constitutional convention in Louisiana. This to me appears proper. If such convention were to ask my views, I could present little else than what I now say to you. I think the thing should be pushed forward, so that, if possible, its mature work may reach here by the meeting of Congress.

For my own part, I think I shall not, in any event, retract the Emancipation Proclamation; nor, as executive, ever return to slavery any person who is freed by the terms of that proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress.

If Louisiana shall send members to Congress, their admission to seats will depend, as you know, upon the respective Houses, and not upon the President.

If these views can be of any advantage in giving shape and impetus to action there, I shall be glad for you to use them prudently for that object. Of course you will confer with intelligent and trusty citizens of the State, among whom I would suggest Messrs. Flanders, Hahn, and Durant; and to each of whom I now think I may send copies of this letter.

Still, it is perhaps better to not make the letter generally public.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Indorsement.*]

Copies sent to Messrs. Flanders, Hahn, and Durant, each indorsed as follows:

The within is a copy of a letter to General Banks.

Please observe my directions to him. Do not mention the paragraph about Mexico.

A. Lincoln.

August 6, 1863.

Executive Mansion, November 5, 1863.

. . . Mr. Flanders . . . is now here, and he says nothing has yet been done [about the registry of voters]. This disappoints me bitterly; yet I do not throw blame on you or on them.

I do, however, urge both you and them to lose no more time.

Governor Shepley has special instructions from the War Department. I wish him—those gentlemen and others coöperating — without waiting for more territory, to go to work and give me a tangible nucleus which the remainder of the State may rally around as fast as it can, and which I can at once recognize and sustain as the true State government. And in that work I wish you and all under your command to give them a hearty sympathy and support.

The instruction to Governor Shepley bases the movement (and rightfully, too) upon the loyal element. Time is important. There is danger, even now, that the adverse element seeks insidi-

ously to preoccupy the ground. If a few professedly loyal men shall draw the disloyal about them, and colorably set up a State government, repudiating the Emancipation Proclamation, and reëstablishing slavery, I cannot recognize or sustain their work. I should fall powerless in the attempt. This Government in such an attitude would be a house divided against itself.

I have said, and say again, that if a new State government, acting in harmony with this Government, and consistently with general freedom, shall think best to adopt a reasonable temporary arrangement in relation to the landless and homeless freed people, I do not object; but my word is out to be for and not against them on the question of their permanent freedom. I do not insist upon such temporary arrangement, but only say such would not be objectionable to me.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, December 24, 1863.

Major-General Banks.

Yours of the sixth instant has been received and fully considered. I deeply regret to have said or done anything which could give you pain or uneasiness. I have all the while intended you to be master, as well in regard to reorganizing a State government for Louisiana, as in regard to the military matters of the department; and hence my letters on reconstruction have nearly, if not quite, all been addressed to you. My error has been that it did not occur to me that Governor Shepley or any one else would set up a claim to act independently of you; and hence I said nothing expressly upon the point.

Language has not been guarded at a point where no danger was thought of. I now tell you that in every dispute with whomsoever, you are master.

Governor Shepley was appointed to assist the commander of the department, and not to thwart him or act independently of him. Instructions have been given directly to him merely to spare you detail labor, and not to supersede your authority. This, in its liability to be misconstrued, it now seems was an error in us. But it is past. I now distinctly tell you that you are master of all, and that I wish you to take the case as you find it, and give us a free State reorganization of Louisiana in the shortest possible time. What I say here is to have a reasonable construction. I do not mean that you are to withdraw from Texas, or abandon any other military measure which you may deem important. Nor do I mean that you are to throw away available work already done for reconstruction; nor that war is to be made upon Governor Shepley, or upon any one else, unless it be found that they will not coöperate with you, in which case, and in all cases you are master while you remain in command of the department.

My thanks for your successful and valuable operations in Texas.[1]

Yours as ever, A. Lincoln.

On December 29, 1863, the President wrote General Banks a letter in which he said:

[1] During the preceding month General Banks had captured Brownsville, Tex., and commanded the coast between it and Galveston.

I intend you to be master in every controversy made with you. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, January 13, 1864.

Major-General Banks.

I have received two letters from you, which are duplicates each of the other, except that one bears date the 27th and the other the 30th of December. Your confidence in the practicability of constructing a free-State government speedily for Louisiana, and your zeal to accomplish it are very gratifying. It is a connection than in which the words "can" and "will" were never more precious. I am much in hope that on the authority of my letter of December 24, you have already begun the work. Whether you shall have done so or not, please, on receiving this, proceed with all possible despatch, using your own absolute discretion in all matters which may not carry you away from the conditions stated in your letters to me, nor from those of the message and proclamation of December 8. Frame orders, and fix times and places for this and that, according to your own judgment. I am much gratified to know that Mr. Dennison, the Collector at New Orleans, and who bears you this, understands your views and will give you his full and zealous coöperation. It is my wish and purpose that all others holding authority from me shall do the like; and, to spare me writing, I will thank you to make this known to them.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, January 31, 1864.

Major-General Banks.

Yours of the 22d instant is just received. In the proclamation of December 8, which contains the oath that you say some loyal people wish to avoid taking, I said: "And still further, that this proclamation is intended to present the people of the States wherein the national authority has been suspended, and loyal State governments have been subverted, a mode in and by which the national authority and loyal State governments may be reëstablished within said States, or in any of them; and while the mode presented is the best the executive can suggest with his present impressions, it must not be understood that no other possible mode would be acceptable."

And speaking of this in the message [*of December 8, 1863*] I said: "Saying that reconstruction will be accepted if presented in a specified way, it is not said it will never be accepted in any other way."

These things were put into these documents on purpose that some conformity to circumstances should be admissible; and when I have, more than once, said to you in my letters that available labor already done should not be thrown away, I had in my mind the very class of cases you now mention. So you see it is not even a modification of anything I have heretofore said, when I tell you that you are at liberty to adopt any rule which shall admit to vote any unquestionably loyal free-State men and none others.

And yet I do wish they would all take the oath. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, August 9, 1864.
Major-General Banks.

I have just seen the new constitution adopted by the convention of Louisiana; and I am anxious that it shall be ratified by the people. I will thank you to let the civil officers in Louisiana, holding under me, know that this is my wish, and let me know at once who of them openly declare for the constitution, and who of them, if any, decline to so declare.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, November 26, 1864.
Major-General Banks.

I had a full conference this morning with the Secretary of War in relation to yourself. The conclusion is that it will be best for all if you proceed to New Orleans and act there in obedience to your order; and, in doing which, having continued, say, one month, if it shall then, as now, be your wish to resign, your resignation will be accepted. Please take this course.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, December 2, 1864.
Major-General Banks.

I know you are dissatisfied, which pains me very much, but I wish not to be argued with further. I entertain no abatement of confidence or friendship for you. I have told you why I cannot order General Canby from the Department of the Gulf—that he whom I must hold responsible for military results is not agreed. Yet I do believe that you, of all men, can best perform the part of advancing the new State government of Louisiana, and therefore I have

wished you to go and try, leaving it to yourself to give up the trial at the end of a month if you find it impracticable, or personally too disagreeable.

This is certainly meant in no unkindness, but I wish to avoid further struggle about it.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

R. B. Marcy.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 29, 1862. 1.20 p. m.

General R. B. Marcy.

Your despatch as to the South Anna and Ashland being seized by our forces this morning is received. Understanding these points to be on the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, I heartily congratulate the country, and thank General McClellan and his army for their seizure. A. Lincoln.

G. A. McCall.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 31, 1862.

General McCall.

The President directs me to say to you that there can be nothing to justify a panic at Fredericksburg. He expects you to maintain your position there as becomes a soldier and a general.

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

Franz Sigel.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, June 12, 1862.

Major-General Sigel, Winchester.

Your despatches of yesterday and to-day were received. It cannot be possible that Jackson has any such reinforcement as thirty or thirty-five thousand.

McClellan telegraphs that two regiments of reinforcements were sent from Richmond to Jackson.

What necessity can there be for General Banks to fall back from Front Royal and his positions until Frémont comes up?

Does it not leave a gap for Jackson to pass through Front Royal as before?

The President directs that your forces and Banks's shall not fall back from Front Royal and their present positions until further developments.

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, June 17, 1862.

General Sigel, Winchester.

The forces at Front Royal are there by order of the President.

When he desires their position to be changed, the order will be given by him.

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

See also letter to William Cullen Bryant of May 14, 1863, and letter to Edwin M. Stanton of August 27, 1864.

Carl Schurz.

See letter to Simon Cameron of May 13, 1861.

Washington, June 16, 1862.

Brigadier-General Schurz, Mount Jackson, Virginia.

Your long letter is received. The information you give is valuable. You say it is fortunate that Frémont did not intercept Jackson; that Jackson had the superior force, and would have overwhelmed him. If this is so, how happened it that Frémont fairly fought and routed him on the 8th? Or is the account that he did fight and rout him false and fabricated? Both General Frémont and you speak of Jackson having beaten Shields. By our accounts he did not beat Shields. He had no engagement with Shields. He did meet and drive back with disaster about 2,000 of Shields's advance till they were met by an additional brigade of Shields's, when Jackson himself turned and retreated. Shields himself and more than half his force were not nearer than twenty miles to any of it. A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, November 24, 1862.

General Carl Schurz.

My dear Sir: I have just received and read your letter of the 20th. The purport of it is that we lost the late elections and the Administration is failing because the war is unsuccessful, and that I must not flatter myself that I am not justly to blame for it. I certainly know that if the war fails, the Administration fails, and that I will be blamed for it, whether I deserve it or not. And I ought to be blamed if I could do

better. You think I could do better; therefore, you blame me already. I think I could not do better; therefore I blame you for blaming me. I understand you now to be willing to accept the help of men who are not Republicans, provided they have "heart in it." Agreed. I want no others. But who is to be the judge of hearts, or of "heart in it"? If I must discard my own judgment and take yours, I must also take that of others; and by the time I should reject all I should be advised to reject, I should have none left, Republicans or others—not even yourself. For be assured, my dear sir, there are men who have "heart in it" that think you are performing your part as poorly as you think I am performing mine. I certainly have been dissatisfied with the slowness of Buell and McClellan; but before I relieved them I had great fears I should not find successors to them who would do better; and I am sorry to add that I have seen little since to relieve those fears.

I do not clearly see the prospect of any more rapid movements. I fear we shall at last find out that the difficulty is in our case rather than in particular generals. I wish to disparage no one—certainly not those who sympathize with me; but I must say I need success more than I need sympathy, and that I have not seen the so much greater evidence of getting success from my sympathizers than from those who are denounced as the contrary. It does seem to me that in the field the two classes have been very much alike in what they have done and what they have failed to do. In sealing their faith with their blood, Baker and Lyon and Bohlen and Richardson, Republicans, did all that men

could do; but did they any more than Kearny and Stevens and Reno and Mansfield, none of whom were Republicans, and some at least of whom have been bitterly and repeatedly denounced to me as secession sympathizers? I will not perform the ungrateful task of comparing cases of failure.

In answer to your question, "Has it not been publicly stated in the newspapers, and apparently proved as a fact, that from the commencement of the war the enemy was continually supplied with information by some of the confidential subordinates of as important an officer as Adjutant-General Thomas?" I must say "No," as far as my knowledge extends. And I add that if you can give any tangible evidence upon the subject, I will thank you to come to this city and do so.

Very truly your friend, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, April 11, 1863.

Major-General Schurz.

My dear Sir: I cannot comply with your request to take your division away from the Army of the Potomac. General Hooker does not wish it done. I do not myself see a good reason why it should be done. The division will do itself and its officers more honor and the country more service where it is. Besides these general reasons, as I understand, the Army of the Potomac will move before these proposed changes could be conveniently made. I always wish to oblige you, but I cannot in this case.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Private.*]

Washington, March 13, 1864.

Major-General Schurz.

My dear Sir: Yours of February 29 reached me only four days ago; but the delay was of little consequence because I found, on feeling around, I could not invite you here without a difficulty which at least would be unpleasant, and perhaps would be detrimental to the public service. Allow me to suggest that if you wish to remain in the military service, it is very dangerous for you to get temporarily out of it; because, with a major-general once out, it is next to impossible for even the President to get him in again. With my appreciation of your ability and correct principle, of course I would be very glad to have your service for the country in the approaching political canvass; but I fear we cannot properly have it without separating you from the military.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, March 23, 1864.

Major-General Schurz.

My dear Sir: The letter, of which the above is a copy, was sent to you before Mr. Willman saw me, and now yours of the 19th tells me you did not receive it. I do not wish to be more specific about the difficulty of your coming to Washington. I think you can easily conjecture it.

I perceive no objection to your making a political speech when you are where one is to be made; but quite surely speaking in the North and fighting in the South at the same time are not possible; nor could I be justified to detail any officer to the political campaign during its continuance and then return him to the army.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

See also letter to Andrew Johnson of July 27, 1864.

J. W. Crisfield.

Executive Mansion, June 26, 1862.

Hon. John W. Crisfield.

My dear Sir: I have been considering the appeal made by yourself and Senator Pearce in behalf of Judge Carmichael. His charge to the Grand Jury was left with me by the senator, and on reading it I must confess I was not very favorably impressed toward the judge. The object of the charge, I understand, was to procure prosecution and punishment of some men for arresting or doing violence to some secessionists —that is, the judge was trying to help a little by giving the protection of law to those who were endeavoring to overthrow the supreme law—trying if he could find a safe place for certain men to stand on the Constitution, whilst they should stab it in another place.

But possibly I am mistaken.

The Secretary of War and I have agreed that if the judge will take the oath of allegiance usually taken in such cases, he may be discharged. Please ascertain and inform me whether he will do it. Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

Ambrose E. Burnside.

Ambrose E. Burnside, a West Point graduate, was treasurer of the Illinois Central Railroad at the outbreak of the war. He commanded the first troops sent out by Rhode Island, and at the battle of Bull Run acted with notable bravery. Early in 1862 he captured the North Carolina coast, and was about to take Goldsboro, an important railroad center, when he received the following telegram:

War Department, June 28, 1862.
Major-General Burnside, Newbern.

We have intelligence that General McClellan has been attacked in large force and compelled to fall back toward the James River. We are not advised of his exact condition, but the President directs that you shall send him all the reinforcements from your command to the James River that you can safely do without abandoning your own position. Let it be infantry entirely, as he said yesterday that he had cavalry enough.

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, June 28, 1862.
General Burnside.

I think you had better go, with any reinforcements you can spare, to General McClellan.

A. Lincoln.

See letter to George B. McClellan of November 5, 1862.

On November 5, 1862, General Burnside succeeded General McClellan in command of the Army of the Potomac.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion,
November 25, 1862. 11.30 a. m.
Major-General Burnside, Falmouth, Virginia.

If I should be in boat off Aquia Creek at dark to-morrow (Wednesday) evening, could you, without inconvenience, meet me and pass an hour or two with me? A. Lincoln.

On November 27 General Burnside held this interview with the President. It was decided that he should

cross the Rappahannock and attack Lee in Fredericksburg. He did so, and was disastrously defeated on December 13, being compelled to withdraw over the Rappahannock.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department,
December 30, 1862. 3.30 p. m.

Major-General Burnside.

I have good reason for saying you must not make a general movement of the army without letting me know. A. Lincoln.

On January 5, 1863, General Burnside wrote to the President that the general officers of his command were opposed to another crossing of the Rappahannock to attack Fredericksburg, but that he had issued orders to the engineers and artillery to prepare for it. Realizing that this determination might run counter to other plans of the President of which he was ignorant, Burnside offered his resignation to relieve Lincoln of embarrassment. General Halleck replied to this letter on the 7th, endorsing the idea of the movement, if a crossing could be effected on favorable or equal terms with the enemy. "It will not do to keep your army inactive. As you yourself admit, it devolves on you to decide upon the time, place, and character of the crossing. . . . I can only advise that the attempt be made, and as early as possible."

On this letter the President made the following indorsement:

[*Indorsement.*]

January 8, 1863.

General Burnside.

I understand General Halleck has sent you a letter of which this is a copy. I approve this letter. I deplore the want of concurrence with you in opinion by your general officers, but I do not see the remedy. Be cautious, and do not

understand that the Government or country is driving you. I do not yet see how I could profit by changing the command of the Army of the Potomac; and if I did, I should not wish to do it by accepting the resignation of your commission.

A. Lincoln.

[*Order Relieving General A. E. Burnside and Making Other Changes.*]

(General Orders No. 20.)

War Department, Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington, D. C., January 25, 1863.

I. The President of the United States has directed:

1st. That Major-General A. E. Burnside, at his own request, be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac.

2d. That Major-General E. V. Sumner, at his own request, be relieved from duty in the Army of the Potomac.

3d. That Major-General W. B. Franklin be relieved from duty in the Army of the Potomac.

4th. That Major-General J. Hooker be assigned to the command of the Army of the Potomac.

II. The officers relieved as above will report in person to the adjutant-general of the army.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. D. Townsend,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

On March 25, 1863, General Burnside was placed in command of the Department of the Ohio, with headquarters at Cincinnati.

On April 13, 1863, General Burnside issued "Order No. 38" that "all persons . . . who commit acts for the

benefit of the enemies of our country will be tried [by martial law] as spies or traitors, and if convicted, will suffer death," and that "persons declaring sympathy with such offenses will be . . . sent beyond our lines into the lines of their friends [the Rebels]." Under this order he arrested and convicted a prominent Democratic ex-Congressman of Ohio, Clement L. Vallandigham, for inciting his auditors to resist the draft.

War Department, April 29, 1863.

Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside,
Commanding Department of the Ohio, Cincinnati.

A telegram from Louisville, published in the *National Intelligencer* of this morning, contains the following paragraph:

> During the sale of a lot of negroes at the court-house this morning, the provost-marshal notified the owners that four were free under the President's proclamation. They nevertheless went on, when the matter of the four contrabands was turned over to the district judge, who will take measures to annul the sale.

The President directs me to say to you that he is much surprised to find that persons who are free under his proclamation have been suffered to be sold under any pretense whatever; and also desires me to remind you of the terms of the acts of Congress by which the fugitive negroes of rebel owners taking refuge within our lines are declared to be "captives of war." He desires you to take immediate measures to prevent any persons who, by act of Congress, are entitled to protection from the Government as "captives of war" from being returned to bondage or suffering any wrong prohibited by that act. A detailed despatch, with instructions, will be sent to you to-day. Your vigilant and earnest

attention to this subject within your department is specially requested.

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

War Department, May 20, 1863.

Major-General A. E. Burnside,

Commanding Department of the Ohio, Cincinnati, Ohio.

Your despatch of three o'clock this afternoon to the Secretary of War has been received and shown to the President. He thinks the best disposition to be made of Vallandigham is to put him beyond the lines, as directed in the order transmitted to you last evening, and directs that you execute that order by sending him forward under secure guard without delay to General Rosecrans.

By order of the President:

Ed. R. S. Canby, Brigadier-General.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 29, 1863.

Major-General Burnside, Cincinnati, Ohio.

Your despatch of to-day received. When I shall wish to supersede you I will let you know. All the Cabinet regretted the necessity of arresting, for instance, Vallandigham, some perhaps doubting there was a real necessity for it; but, being done, all were for seeing you through with it.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, July 27, 1863.

Major-General Burnside, Cincinnati, Ohio.

Let me explain. In General Grant's first despatch after the fall of Vicksburg, he said, among

other things, he would send the Ninth Corps to you. Thinking it would be pleasant to you, I asked the Secretary of War to telegraph you the news. For some reasons never mentioned to us by General Grant, they have not been sent, though we have seen outside intimations that they took part in the expedition against Jackson. General Grant is a copious worker and fighter, but a very meager writer or telegrapher. No doubt he changed his purpose in regard to the Ninth Corps for some sufficient reason, but has forgotten to notify us of it. A. Lincoln.

On August 16, 1863, Burnside started for the seat of war at Chattanooga, Tenn. By rapid marches over the mountains he eluded Buckner, waiting for him at Cumberland Gap, and entered Knoxville on September 4.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, September 11, 1863. 11.30 a. m.
Major-General Burnside, Cumberland Gap.

Yours received. A thousand thanks for the late successes you have given us. We cannot allow you to resign until things shall be a little more settled in East Tennessee. If then, purely on your own account, you wish to resign, we will not further refuse you. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department,
September 21, 1863. 11 a. m.
General Burnside, Greenville, Tennessee.

If you are to do any good to Rosecrans it will not do to waste time with Jonesboro. It is already too late to do the most good that might

have been done, but I hope it will still do some good. Please do not lose a moment.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, September 21, 1863.

General Burnside, Knoxville, Tenn.

Go to Rosecrans with your force without a moment's delay. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*] [1]

War Department,
September 27, 1863. 8 p. m.

Major-General Burnside, Knoxville, Tennessee.

It was suggested to you, not ordered, that you should move to Rosecrans on the north side of the river, because it was believed the enemy would not permit you to join him if you should move on the south side. Hold your present positions, and send Rosecrans what you can spare, in the quickest and safest way. In the meantime hold the remainder as nearly in readiness to go to him as you can consistently with the duty it is to perform while it remains. East Tennessee can be no more than temporarily lost so long as Chattanooga is firmly held.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department,
September 27, 1863. 6.45 p. m.

Major-General Burnside, Knoxville, Tennessee.

Your despatch just received. My order to you meant simply that you should save Rosecrans from being crushed out, believing if he lost his

[1] This telegram was sent in place of a stinging despatch, which the President held two days, and then determined not to send.

position you could not hold East Tennessee in any event; and that if he held his position, East Tennessee was substantially safe in any event. This despatch is in no sense an order. General Halleck will answer you fully. A. Lincoln.

John A. Dix.[1]

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, June 28, 1862.

General Dix.

Communication with McClellan by White House is cut off. Strain every nerve to open communication with him by James River, or any other way you can. Report to me.

A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, December 22, 1862.

Major-General Dix.

Owing to extreme pressure of business, I have neglected for a week to write this note. General Busteed is with you. I bespeak for him your kindest consideration. His case is peculiar. Without much military experience, he has entered the service from purely patriotic motives. Please assign him the position best adapted to his case which may be within your power.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

[1] Dix was a prominent Democratic statesman of New York, a senator from 1845 to 1849, and Secretary of the Treasury under Buchanan in 1861. While in the latter position he ordered the captain of a revenue cutter at New Orleans to bring it to New York. The captain refused, and Secretary Dix telegraphed for another man to arrest the captain and assume command, adding: "If any one attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the spot." Dix enlisted on the first call for troops, and in July was put in command at Baltimore.

[*Private and Confidential.*]

Executive Mansion, January 14, 1863.

Major-General Dix.

My dear Sir: The proclamation has been issued. We were not succeeding—at best were progressing too slowly—without it. Now that we have it, and bear all the disadvantages of it (as we do bear some in certain quarters), we must also take some benefit from it, if practicable. I therefore will thank you for your well-considered opinion whether Fortress Monroe and Yorktown, one or both, could not, in whole or in part, be garrisoned by colored troops, leaving the white forces now necessary at those places to be employed elsewhere.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

See letter to J. J. Astor and others of November 9, 1863.

In the summer of 1863, after the draft riots in New York, General Dix was transferred to that city.

[*Order.*]

Executive Mansion, May 18, 1864.

Major-General Dix, Commanding at New York.

Whereas there has been wickedly and traitorously printed and published this morning in the New York *World* and New York *Journal of Commerce*, newspapers printed and published in the city of New York, a false and spurious proclamation, purporting to be signed by the President and to be countersigned by the Secretary of State, which publication is of a treasonable nature designed to give aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States and to the rebels

now at war against the Government, and their aiders and abettors: you are therefore hereby commanded forthwith to arrest and imprison, in any fort or military prison in your command, the editors, proprietors, and publishers of the aforesaid newspapers, and all such persons as, after public notice has been given of the falsehood of said publication, print and publish the same with intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy; and you will hold the persons so arrested in close custody until they can be brought to trial before a military commission for their offense. You will also take possession by military force, of the printing establishments of the New York *World* and *Journal of Commerce,* and hold the same until further orders, and prevent any further publication therefrom. A. Lincoln,

President of the United States.

By the President:

William H. Seward, Secretary of State.

GOVERNORS OF MAINE, NEW HAMPSHIRE, VERMONT, CONNECTICUT, NEW YORK, NEW JERSEY, PENNSYLVANIA, MARYLAND, VIRGINIA, MICHIGAN, TENNESSEE, MISSOURI, INDIANA, OHIO, MINNESOTA, ILLINOIS, WISCONSIN, AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE MILITARY BOARD OF KENTUCKY.

On June 28 the above State executives, inspired by the President, asked the President to "call upon the several States for such number of men as may be required to fill up all military organizations now in the field, and add to the armies heretofore organized such additional number of men as may, in [his] judgment, be necessary to garrison and hold all the numerous cities and military positions that have been captured by our armies, and to speedily crush the rebellion that still

exists in several of our Southern States, thus practically restoring to the civilized world our great and good government." In reply the President wrote as follows:

Executive Mansion, July 1, 1862.

Gentlemen: Fully concurring in the wisdom of the views expressed to me in so patriotic a manner by you, in the communication of the twenty-eighth day of June, I have decided to call into the service an additional force of 300,000 men. I suggest and recommend that the troops should be chiefly of infantry. The quota of your State would be ——. I trust that they may be enrolled without delay, so as to bring this unnecessary and injurious civil war to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion. An order fixing the quotas of the respective States will be issued by the War Department to-morrow.

Abraham Lincoln.

[*Circular Letter. Private and Confidential.*]

War Department, July 3, 1862. 10.30 a. m.

Governor Washburn, Maine [and other governors].

I should not want the half of 300,000 new troops if I could have them now. If I had 50,000 additional troops here now, I believe I could substantially close the war in two weeks. But time is everything, and if I get 50,000 new men in a month, I shall have lost 20,000 old ones during the same month, having gained only 30,000, with the difference between old and new troops still against me. The quicker you send, the fewer you will have to send. Time is everything. Please act in view of this. The enemy

having given up Corinth, it is not wonderful that he is thereby enabled to check us for a time at Richmond. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Andrew H. Foote.

[*Message to Congress.*]

To the Senate and House of Representatives: I most cordially recommend that Captain Andrew H. Foote, of the United States Navy, receive a vote of thanks of Congress for his eminent services in organizing the flotilla on the western waters, and for his gallantry at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Island Number Ten, and at various other places, whilst in command of the naval forces, embracing a period of nearly ten months. Abraham Lincoln.

Washington, D. C., July 1, 1862,

Naval Officers.

[*Message to Congress.*]

To the Senate and House of Representatives: I recommend that the thanks of Congress be given to the following officers of the United States Navy:

Captain John L. Lardner, for meritorious conduct at the battle of Port Royal, and distinguished services on the coast of the United States against the enemy.

Captain Charles Henry Davis, for distinguished services in conflict with the enemy at Fort Pillow, at Memphis, and for successful operations at other points in the waters of the Mississippi River.

Commander John A. Dahlgren, for distin-

guished services in the line of his profession, improvements in ordnance, and zealous and efficient labors in the ordnance branch of the service.

Commander Stephen C. Rowan, for distinguished services in the waters of North Carolina, and particularly in the capture of Newbern, being in chief command of the naval forces.

Commander David D. Porter, for distinguished services in the conception and preparation of the means used for the capture of the forts below New Orleans, and for highly meritorious conduct in the management of the mortar flotilla during the bombardment of Forts Jackson and St. Philip.

Captain Silas H. Stringham, now on the retired list, for distinguished services in the capture of Forts Hatteras and Clark.

Abraham Lincoln.

Washington, D. C., July 11, 1862.

J. T. Boyle.

On July 13, 1862, the President telegraphed General J. T. Boyle at Louisville, Ky., that "we cannot venture to order troops from General Buell . . . he may be attacked himself," and that he should call on General Halleck, "who commands, and whose business it is to understand and care for the whole field."

On September 12, 1862, the President again telegraphed General Boyle in reply to further importunity: "For us to control him [General Halleck] there on the ground would be a babel of confusion which would be utterly ruinous. Where do you understand Buell to be, and what is he doing? A. Lincoln.

On February 1, 1863, President Lincoln wrote to General Boyle enclosing his endorsement of Senator Powell's request that moneys collected from citizens in

certain Kentucky counties be refunded them. Of this collection the President says: "This course of procedure, though just and politic in some cases, is so liable to gross abuse as to do great injustice in some others, and give the Government immense trouble."

Cornelius Vanderbilt.

On July 17, 1862, the President informed Congress by message that Cornelius Vanderbilt, of New York, had "gratuitously presented to the United States the ocean-steamer *Vanderbilt*, by many considered the finest steamer in the world. She has ever since been, and still is, doing valuable service to the Government. For the patriotic act in making this magnificent and valuable present to the country, I recommend that some suitable acknowledgment be made."

Cuthbert Bullitt.

[*Private.*]

Washington, D. C., July 28, 1862.

Cuthbert Bullitt, Esq., New Orleans, Louisiana.

Sir: The copy of a letter addressed to yourself by Mr. Thomas J. Durant has been shown to me. The writer appears to be an able, a dispassionate, and an entirely sincere man. The first part of the letter is devoted to an effort to show that the secession ordinance of Louisiana was adopted against the will of a majority of the people. This is probably true, and in that fact may be found some instruction. Why did they allow the ordinance to go into effect? Why did they not assert themselves? Why stand passive and allow themselves to be trodden down by a minority? Why did they not hold popular meetings and have a convention of their own to express and enforce the true sentiment of the State? If preorganization was against

them then, why not do this now that the United States army is present to protect them? The paralysis—the dead palsy—of the Government in this whole struggle is, that this class of men will do nothing for the Government, nothing for themselves, except demanding that the Government shall not strike its open enemies lest they be struck by accident!

Mr. Durant complains that in various ways the relation of master and slave is disturbed by the presence of our army, and he considers it particularly vexatious that this, in part, is done under cover of an act of Congress, while constitutional guaranties are suspended on the plea of military necessity. The truth is, that what is done and omitted about slaves is done and omitted on the same military necessity. It is a military necessity to have men and money; and we can get neither in sufficient numbers or amounts if we keep from or drive from our lines slaves coming to them. Mr. Durant cannot be ignorant of the pressure in this direction, nor of my efforts to hold it within bounds till he and such as he shall have time to help themselves.

I am not posted to speak understandingly on all the police regulations of which Mr. Durant complains. If experience shows any one of them to be wrong, let them be set right. I think I can perceive in the freedom of trade which Mr. Durant urges that he would relieve both friends and enemies from the pressure of the blockade. By this he would serve the enemy more effectively than the enemy is able to serve himself. I do not say or believe that to serve the enemy is the purpose of Mr. Durant, or that he is conscious of any purpose other than na-

tional and patriotic ones. Still, if there were a class of men who, having no choice of sides in the contest, were anxious only to have quiet and comfort for themselves while it rages, and to fall in with the victorious side at the end of it without loss to themselves, their advice as to the mode of conducting the contest would be precisely such as his is. He speaks of no duty—apparently thinks of none—resting upon Union men. He even thinks it injurious to the Union cause that they should be restrained in trade and passage without taking sides. They are to touch neither a sail nor a pump, but to be merely passengers—deadheads at that—to be carried snug and dry throughout the storm, and safely landed right side up. Nay, more: even a mutineer is to go untouched, lest these sacred passengers receive an accidental wound. Of course the rebellion will never be suppressed in Louisiana if the professed Union men there will neither help to do it nor permit the Government to do it without their help. Now, I think the true remedy is very different from what is suggested by Mr. Durant. It does not lie in rounding the rough angles of the war, but in removing the necessity for the war. The people of Louisiana who wish protection to person and property have but to reach forth their hands and take it. Let them in good faith reinaugurate the national authority, and set up a State government conforming thereto under the Constitution. They know how to do it, and can have the protection of the army while doing it. The army will be withdrawn so soon as such State government can dispense with its presence; and the people of the State can then, upon the old constitutional terms, govern them-

selves to their own liking. This is very simple and easy.

If they will not do this—if they prefer to hazard all for the sake of destroying the Government, it is for them to consider whether it is probable I will surrender the Government to save them from losing all. If they decline what I suggest, you scarcely need to ask what I will do. What would you do in my position? Would you drop the war where it is? Or would you prosecute it in future with elder-stalk squirts charged with rose-water? Would you deal lighter blows rather than heavier ones? Would you give up the contest, leaving any available means unapplied? I am in no boastful mood. I shall not do more than I can, and I shall do all I can, to save the Government, which is my sworn duty as well as my personal inclination. I shall do nothing in malice. What I deal with is too vast for malicious dealing.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

August Belmont.

July 31, 1862.

Dear Sir: You send to Mr. W—— an extract from a letter written at New Orleans the 9th instant, which is shown to me. You do not give the writer's name; but plainly he is a man of ability, and probably of some note. He says: "The time has arrived when Mr. Lincoln must take a decisive course. Trying to please everybody, he will satisfy nobody. A vacillating policy in matters of importance is the very worst. Now is the time, if ever, for honest men who love their country to rally to its support. Why

will not the North say officially that it wishes for the restoration of the Union as it was?"

And so, it seems, this is the point on which the writer thinks I have no policy. Why will he not read and understand what I have said?

The substance of the very declaration he desires is in the inaugural, in each of the two regular messages to Congress, and in many, if not all, the minor documents issued by the Executive since the inauguration.

Broken eggs cannot be mended; but Louisiana has nothing to do now but to take her place in the Union as it was, barring the already broken eggs. The sooner she does so, the smaller will be the amount of that which will be past mending. This Government cannot much longer play a game in which it stakes all, and its enemies stake nothing. Those enemies must understand that they cannot experiment for ten years trying to destroy the Government, and if they fail still come back into the Union unhurt. If they expect in any contingency to ever have the Union as it was, I join with the writer in saying, "Now is the time."

How much better it would have been for the writer to have gone at this, under the protection of the army at New Orleans, than to have sat down in a closet writing complaining letters northward! Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Count Gasparin.

Executive Mansion, August 4, 1862.

To Count A. de Gasparin.

Dear Sir: Your very acceptable letter, dated Orbe, Canton de Vaud, Switzerland, 18th of

July, 1862, is received. The moral effect was the worst of the affair before Richmond, and that has run its course downward. We are now at a stand, and shall soon be rising again, as we hope. I believe it is true that, in men and material, the enemy suffered more than we in that series of conflicts, while it is certain he is less able to bear it.

With us every soldier is a man of character, and must be treated with more consideration than is customary in Europe. Hence our great army, for slighter causes than could have prevailed there, has dwindled rapidly, bringing the necessity for a new call earlier than was anticipated. We shall easily obtain the new levy, however. Be not alarmed if you shall learn that we shall have resorted to a draft for part of this. It seems strange even to me, but it is true, that the Government is now pressed to this course by a popular demand. Thousands who wish not to personally enter the service, are nevertheless anxious to pay and send substitutes, provided they can have assurance that unwilling persons, similarly situated, will be compelled to do likewise. Besides this, volunteers mostly choose to enter newly forming regiments, while drafted men can be sent to fill up the old ones, wherein man for man they are quite doubly as valuable.

You ask, "Why is it that the North with her great armies so often is found with inferiority of numbers face to face with the armies of the South?" While I painfully know the fact, a military man—which I am not—would better answer the question. The fact, I know, has not been overlooked; and I suppose the cause of its

continuance lies mainly in the other facts that the enemy holds the interior and we the exterior lines; and that we operate where the people convey information to the enemy, while he operates where they convey none to us.

I have received the volume and letter which you did me the honor of addressing to me, and for which please accept my sincere thanks. You are much admired in America for the ability of your writings, and much loved for your generosity to us and your devotion to liberal principles generally.

You are quite right as to the importance to us, for its bearing upon Europe, that we should achieve military successes, and the same is true for us at home as well as abroad. Yet it seems unreasonable that a series of successes, extending through half a year, and clearing more than 100,000 square miles of country, should help us so little, while a single half defeat should hurt us so much. But let us be patient.

I am very happy to know that my course has not conflicted with your judgment of propriety and policy. I can only say that I have acted upon my best convictions, without selfishness or malice, and that by the help of God I shall continue to do so.

Please be assured of my highest respect and esteem. A. Lincoln.

John M. Clay.

Executive Mansion, August 9, 1862.

Mr. John M. Clay.

My dear Sir: The snuff-box you sent, with the accompanying note, was received yesterday. Thanks for this memento of your great and pa-

triotic father. Thanks also for the assurance that, in these days of dereliction, you remain true to his principles. In the concurrent sentiment of your venerable mother, so long the partner of his bosom and his honors, and lingering now where he was but for the call to rejoin him where he is, I recognize his voice, speaking, as it ever spoke, for the Union, the Constitution, and the freedom of mankind.

Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln.

Andrew G. Curtin.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, August 12, 1862.

Governor Curtin, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

It is very important for some regiments to arrive here at once. What lack you from us? What can we do to expedite matters? Answer.

A. Lincoln.

War Department, September 11, 1862.

His Excellency Andrew G. Curtin, Governor of Pennsylvania, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

Sir: The application made to me by your adjutant-general for authority to call out the militia of the State of Pennsylvania has received careful consideration. It is my anxious desire to afford, as far as possible, the means and power of the Federal Government to protect the State of Pennsylvania from invasion by the rebel forces;[1] and since, in your judgment, the militia of the State are required, and have been called upon by you, to organize for home defense and protection, I

[1] Lee had crossed the Potomac September 4-7.

sanction the call that you have made, and will receive them into the service and pay of the United States to the extent they can be armed, equipped, and usefully employed. . . .

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department,
September 12, 1862. 10.35 a. m.

Hon. Andrew G. Curtin, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

Your despatch asking for 80,000 disciplined troops to be sent to Pennsylvania is received. Please consider we have not to exceed 80,000 disciplined troops, properly so called, this side of the mountains; and most of them, with many of the new regiments, are now close in the rear of the enemy supposed to be invading Pennsylvania. Start half of them to Harrisburg, and the enemy will turn upon and beat the remaining half, and then reach Harrisburg before the part going there, and beat it too when it comes. The best possible security for Pennsylvania is putting the strongest force possible in rear of the enemy.

A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, April 13, 1863.

Hon. Andrew G. Curtin.

My dear Sir: If, after the expiration of your present term as Governor of Pennsylvania, I shall continue in office here, and you shall desire to go abroad, you can do so with one of the first-class missions. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, April 28, 1863.

Hon. A. G. Curtin, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

I do not think the people of Pennsylvania should be uneasy about an invasion. Doubtless a small force of the enemy is flourishing about in the northern part of Virginia, on the "skew-horn" principle,[1] on purpose to divert us in another quarter. I believe it is nothing more. We think we have adequate force close after them.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, May 1, 1863.

Governor Curtin, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

The whole disposable force at Baltimore and elsewhere in reach have already been sent after the enemy which alarms you. The worst thing the enemy could do for himself would be to weaken himself before Hooker, and therefore it is safe to believe he is not doing it; and the best thing he could do for himself would be to get us so scared as to bring part of Hooker's force away, and that is just what he is trying to do.

I will telegraph you in the morning about calling out the militia. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, May 2, 1863.

Governor Curtin, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

General Halleck tells me he has a despatch from General Schenck this morning, informing him that our forces have joined, and that the

[1] *I. e.*, twisted horn, or crooked, devious.

enemy menacing Pennsylvania will have to fight or run to-day. I hope I am not less anxious to do my duty to Pennsylvania than yourself, but I really do not yet see the justification for incurring the trouble and expense of calling out the militia. I shall keep watch, and try to do my duty. A. Lincoln.

P. S. Our forces are exactly between the enemy and Pennsylvania.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., October 17, 1864.

Governor A. G. Curtin, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

Your information is erroneous. No part of Sheridan's force has left him, except by expiration of terms of service. I think there is not much danger of a raid into Pennsylvania.

A. Lincoln.

George P. Fisher.

On August 16, 1862, the President wrote to George P. Fisher in regard to various propositions made to the War Department. The letter ended as follows:

I do hope you will not indulge a thought which will admit of your saying the Administration turns you over to the fury of your enemies.

You certainly know I wish you success as much as you can wish it yourself.

Your friend, as ever, A. Lincoln.

Gillet F. Watson.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, August 21, 1862.

Gillet F. Watson, Williamsburg, Va.

Your telegram in regard to the lunatic asylum has been received. It is certainly a case of difficulty, but if you cannot remain, I cannot conceive who under my authority can. Remain as long as you safely can, and provide as well as you can for the poor inmates of the institution.

A. Lincoln.

Horace Greeley.

Executive Mansion, August 22, 1862.

Hon. Horace Greeley.

Dear Sir: I have just read yours of the 19th, addressed to myself through the *New York Tribune*. If there be in it any statements or assumptions of fact which I may know to be erroneous, I do not, now and here, controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I may believe to be falsely drawn, I do not, now and here, argue against them. If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it in deference to an old friend whose heart I have always supposed to be right.

As to the policy I "seem to be pursuing," as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt.

I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be "the Union as it was." If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery,

I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views.

I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free.

Yours, A. Lincoln.

Washington, D. C., July 9, 1864.

Hon. Horace Greeley.

Dear Sir: Your letter of the 7th, with inclosures, received.[1]

If you can find any person, anywhere, professing to have any proposition of Jefferson Davis in writing, for peace, embracing the restoration

[1] This was in reference to a proposition of Clement C. Clay, Jacob Thompson, *et al.*, to negotiate peace with the Confederacy.

of the Union and abandonment of slavery, whatever else it embraces, say to him he may come to me with you; and that if he really brings such proposition, he shall at the least have safe conduct with the paper (and without publicity, if he chooses) to the point where you shall have met him. The same if there be two or more persons. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Letter Carried by Major John Hay.*]

Executive Mansion, July 15, 1864.

Hon. Horace Greeley.

My dear Sir: Yours of the 13th is just received, and I am disappointed that you have not already reached here with those commissioners, if they would consent to come on being shown my letter to you of the 9th instant. Show that and this to them, and if they will come on the terms stated in the former, bring them. I not only intend a sincere effort for peace, but I intend that you shall be a personal witness that it is made. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, August 6, 1864.

Hon. Horace Greeley, New York.

Yours to Major Hay about publication of our correspondence received. With the suppression of a few passages in your letters in regard to which I think you and I would not disagree, I should be glad of the publication. Please come over and see me. A. Lincoln.

[*Private.*]

Executive Mansion, August 9, 1864.

Hon. Horace Greeley.

Dear Sir: Herewith is a full copy of the correspondence, and which I have had privately printed, but not made public. The parts of your letters which I wish suppressed are only those which, as I think, give too gloomy an aspect to our cause, and those which present the carrying of elections as a motive of action. I have, as you see, drawn a red pencil over the parts I wish suppressed.

As to the Alexander H. Stephens matter, so much pressed by you, I can only say that he sought to come to Washington in the name of the "Confederate States," in a vessel of "the Confederate States navy," and with no pretense even that he would bear any proposal for peace; but with language showing that his mission would be military, and not civil or diplomatic. Nor has he at any time since pretended that he had terms of peace, so far as I know or believe. On the contrary, Jefferson Davis has, in the most formal manner, declared that Stephens had no terms of peace. I thought we could not afford to give this quasi-acknowledgment of the independence of the Confederacy, in a case where there was not even an intimation of anything for our good. Still, as the parts of your letters relating to Stephens contain nothing worse than a questioning of my action, I do not ask a suppression of those parts.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

See also correspondence with Clement C. Clay.

Washington Talcott.

Executive Mansion, August 27, 1862.

Hon. Washington Talcott.

My dear Sir: I have determined to appoint you collector. I now have a very special request to make of you, which is, that you will make no war upon Mr. Washburne, who is also my friend, and of longer standing than yourself. I will even be obliged if you can do something for him if occasion presents.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Note of Introduction.*]

The Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue will please see Mr. Talcott, one of the best men there is, and, if any difference, one they would like better than they do me. A. Lincoln.

August 18, 1862.

Alexander Ramsey.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, August 27, 1862.

Governor Ramsey, St. Paul, Minnesota.

Yours received. Attend to the Indians. If the draft cannot proceed, of course it will not proceed. Necessity knows no law. The Government cannot extend the time. A. Lincoln.

Thomas Webster.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, September 9, 1862.

Thomas Webster, Philadelphia.

Your despatch received, and referred to General Halleck, who must control the questions presented. While I am not surprised at your anxiety, I do not think you are in any danger. If half our troops were in Philadelphia, the enemy could take it, because he would not fear to leave the other half in his rear; but with the whole of them here, he dares not leave them in his rear. A. Lincoln.

Alexander Henry.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, September 12, 1862.

Hon. Alexander Henry, Philadelphia.

Yours of to-day received. General Halleck has made the best provision he can for generals in Pennsylvania. Please do not be offended when I assure you that in my confident belief Philadelphia is in no danger. Governor Curtin has just telegraphed me:

> I have advices that Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the whole rebel army will be drawn from Maryland.

At all events, Philadelphia is more than 150 miles from Hagerstown, and could not be reached by the rebel army in ten days, if no hindrance was interposed. A. Lincoln.

Jesse K. Dubois.

On September 15, 1862, the President wrote his friend Dubois in Springfield, Ill., a strangely optimistic anticipation of the not very decisive victory of Antietam, which did not take place until September 17:

I now consider it safe to say that General McClellan has gained a great victory over the great rebel army in Maryland, between Fredericktown and Hagerstown. He is now pursuing the flying foe.

Had McClellan attacked Lee on the 15th, before the Confederate forces were united, as Lincoln expected he would, it is the opinion of military experts that he would have driven the invader back with a crushing defeat which might have brought the war to an early termination.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., July 11, 1863. 9 a. m.
Hon. J. K. Dubois, Springfield, Ill.

It is certain that after three days' fighting at Gettysburg, Lee withdrew and made for the Potomac; that he found the river so swollen as to prevent his crossing; that he is still this side, near Hagerstown and Williamsport, preparing to defend himself; and that Meade is close upon him, and preparing to attack him, heavy skirmishing having occurred nearly all day yesterday.

I am more than satisfied with what has happened north of the Potomac so far, and am anxious and hopeful for what is to come.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram in Cipher.*]

Washington, September 13, 1863.

Hon. J. K. Dubois, Hon. O. M. Hatch.

What nation do you desire General Allen to be made quartermaster-general of? This nation already has a quartermaster-general.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, September 22, 1863.

Hon. O. M. Hatch, Hon. J. K. Dubois, Springfield, Ill.

Your letter is just received. The particular form of my despatch was jocular, which I supposed you gentlemen knew me well enough to understand. General Allen is considered here as a very faithful and capable officer, and one who would be at least thought of for quartermaster-general if that office were vacant.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, November 15, 1864.

Hon. Jesse K. Dubois, Springfield, Illinois.

. . . You say: "State gone 25,000." Which way did it go? How stand the members of Congress and the other officers? A. Lincoln.

Edward Everett.

[*Letter of Introduction.*]

Executive Mansion, September 24, 1862.

Whom it May Concern: Hon. Edward Everett goes to Europe shortly. His reputation and the present condition of our country are such that his visit there is sure to attract notice, and

may be misconstrued. I therefore think fit to say that he bears no mission from this Government; and yet no gentleman is better able to correct misunderstandings in the minds of foreigners in regard to American affairs.

While I commend him to the consideration of those whom he may meet, I am quite conscious that he could better introduce me than I him in Europe. Abraham Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, November 20, 1863.

Hon. Edward Everett.

My dear Sir: Your kind note of to-day is received. In our respective parts yesterday, you could not have been excused to make a short address, nor I a long one. I am pleased to know that, in your judgment, the little I did say was not entirely a failure. Of course I knew Mr. Everett would not fail, and yet, while the whole discourse was eminently satisfactory, and will be of great value, there were passages in it which transcended my expectations. The point made against the theory of the General Government being only an agency whose principals are the States, was new to me, and, as I think, is one of the best arguments for the national supremacy. The tribute to our noble women for their angel ministering to the suffering soldiers surpasses in its way, as do the subjects of it, whatever has gone before.

Our sick boy,[1] for whom you kindly inquire, we hope is past the worst.

Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln.

[1] Thomas ("Tad") Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, February 4, 1864.
Hon. Edward Everett.

My dear Sir: Yours of January 30 was received four days ago, and since then the address mentioned has arrived. Thank you for it.

I send herewith the manuscript of my remarks at Gettysburg, which, with my note to you of November 20, you are at liberty to use for the benefit of our soldiers, as you have requested.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

John Ross.

Executive Mansion, September 25, 1862.
John Ross, Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation.

Sir: Your letter of the 16th instant was received two days ago. In the multitude of cares claiming my constant attention, I have been unable to examine and determine the exact treaty relations between the United States and the Cherokee Nation. Neither have I been able to investigate and determine the exact state of facts claimed by you as constituting a failure of treaty obligations on our part, and excusing the Cherokee Nation for making a treaty with a portion of the people of the United States in open rebellion against the Government thereof.

This letter, therefore, must not be understood to decide anything upon these questions. I shall, however, cause a careful investigation of them to be made. Meanwhile the Cherokee people remaining practically loyal to the Federal Union will receive all the protection which can be given them consistently with the duty of the Government to the whole country. I sincerely hope the

Cherokee Nation may not again be overrun by the enemy, and I shall do all I consistently can to prevent it.

Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln.

See letter to S. R. Curtis of October 10, 1862.

John J. Key.

Executive Mansion, September 26, 1862.

Major John J. Key.

Sir: I am informed that in answer to the question, "Why was not the rebel army bagged immediately after the battle near Sharpsburg?" propounded to you by Major Levi C. Turner, judge-advocate, etc., you answered, "That is not the game. The object is that neither army shall get much advantage of the other, that both shall be kept in the field till they are exhausted, when we will make a compromise and save slavery." I shall be very happy if you will, within twenty-four hours from the receipt of this, prove to me by Major Turner that you did not, either literally or in substance, make the answer stated.

Yours, A. Lincoln.

[*Indorsement.*]

Copy delivered to Major Key at 10.25 a. m., September 27, 1862. John Hay.

At about eleven o'clock a. m., September 27, 1862, Major Key and Major Turner appear before me. Major Turner says: "As I remember it, the conversation was: I asked the question why we did not bag them after the battle of Sharpsburg. Major Key's reply was, 'That was not the game; that we should tire the rebels out

and ourselves. That that was the only way the Union could be preserved. We must come together fraternally, and slavery be saved.'" On cross-examination Major Turner says he has frequently heard Major Key converse in regard to the present troubles, and never heard him utter a sentiment unfavorable to the maintenance of the Union. He has never uttered anything which he (Major T.) would call disloyalty. The particular conversation detailed was a private one. A. Lincoln.

[*Indorsement.*]

In my view it is wholly inadmissible for any gentleman holding a military commission from the United States to utter such sentiments as Major Key is within proved to have done. Therefore let Major John J. Key be forthwith dismissed from the military service of the United States. A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, November 24, 1862.

Major John J. Key.

Dear Sir: A bundle of letters, including one from yourself, was early last week handed me by General Halleck, as I understood at your request.

I sincerely sympathize with you in the death of your brave and noble son.

In regard to my dismissal of yourself from the military service, it seems to me you misunderstand me. I did not charge, or intend to charge, you with disloyalty.

I had been brought to fear that there was a class of officers in the army, not very inconsiderable in numbers, who were playing a game

to not beat the enemy when they could, on some peculiar notion as to the proper way of saving the Union; and when you were proved to me, in your own presence, to have avowed yourself in favor of that "game," and did not attempt to controvert the proof, I dismissed you as an example and a warning to that supposed class.

I bear you no ill will, and I regret that I could not have the example without wounding you personally. But can I now, in view of the public interest, restore you to the service, by which the army would understand that I indorse and approve that game myself? If there was any doubt of your having made the avowal, the case would be different. But when it was proved to me, in your presence, you did not deny or attempt to deny it, but confirmed it, in my mind, by attempting to sustain the position by argument.

I am really sorry for the pain the case gives you; but I do not see how, consistently with duty, I can change it. Yours, etc., A. Lincoln.

[*Indorsement.*]

The within, as appears, was written some time ago. On full reconsideration, I cannot find sufficient ground to change the conclusion therein arrived at. A. Lincoln.

December 27, 1862.

Hannibal Hamlin.

[*Strictly Private.*]

Executive Mansion, September 28, 1862.

Hon. Hannibal Hamlin.

My dear Sir: Your kind letter of the 25th is just received. It is known to some that while I hope something from the proclamation,[1] my expectations are not as sanguine as are those of some friends. The time for its effect southward has not come; but northward the effect should be instantaneous.

It is six days old, and while commendation in newspapers and by distinguished individuals is all that a vain man could wish, the stocks have declined, and troops come forward more slowly than ever. This, looked soberly in the face, is not very satisfactory. We have fewer troops in the field at the end of the six days than we had at the beginning—the attrition among the old outnumbering the addition by the new. The North responds to the proclamation sufficiently in breath; but breath alone kills no rebels.

I wish I could write more cheerfully; nor do I thank you the less for the kindness of your letter. Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, October 29, 1863.

His Excellency H. Hamlin, Vice-President.

My dear Sir: The above act of Congress[2] was

[1] Emancipation Proclamation, issued September 22, 1862.

[2] To Regulate the Duties of the Clerk of the House of Representatives in Preparing for the Organization of the House. It provided that the clerk should place on the roll only those members whose credentials indicated that they had been elected in accordance with the laws of their respective States, or of the United States.

passed, as I suppose, to exclude improper applicants from seats in the House of Representatives, and there is danger now that it will be used to exclude proper ones. The attempt will be made, if at all, upon the members of those States whose delegations are entirely, or by a majority, Union men, and of which your State is one.

I suppose your members already have the usual certificates—which let them bring on. I suggest that for greater caution, yourself, the two senators, Messrs. Fessenden and Morrill, and the Governor consider this matter, and that the Governor make out an additional certificate, or set of certificates, in the form on the other half of this sheet, and still another, if on studying the law you gentlemen shall be able to frame one which will give additional security; and bring the whole with you, to be used if found necessary. Let it all be done quietly. The members of Congress themselves need not know of it.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Mrs. Eliza P. Gurney.

Executive Mansion, September 4, 1864.

Eliza P. Gurney.

My esteemed Friend: I have not forgotten—probably never shall forget—the very impressive occasion when yourself and friends visited me on a Sabbath forenoon two years ago. Nor has your kind letter, written nearly a year later, ever been forgotten. In all it has been your purpose to strengthen my reliance on God. I am much indebted to the good Christian people of the country for their constant prayers and consolations; and to no one of them more than to your-

self. The purposes of the Almighty are perfect, and must prevail, though we erring mortals may fail to accurately perceive them in advance. We hoped for a happy termination of this terrible war long before this; but God knows best, and has ruled otherwise. We shall yet acknowledge His wisdom, and our own error therein. Meanwhile we must work earnestly in the best lights he gives us, trusting that so working still conduces to the great ends He ordains. Surely He intends some great good to follow this mighty convulsion, which no mortal could make, and no mortal could stay. Your people, the Friends, have had, and are having, a very great trial. On principle and faith opposed to both war and oppression, they can only practically oppose oppression by war. In this hard dilemma some have chosen one horn, and some the other. For those appealing to me on conscientious grounds, I have done, and shall do, the best I could and can, in my own conscience, under my oath to the law. That you believe this I doubt not; and, believing it, I shall still receive for our country and myself your earnest prayers to our Father in heaven.

Your sincere friend, A. Lincoln.

Edward Stanley.

On September 29, 1862, the President wrote Edward Stanley approbation of his course as military governor of North Carolina, and asking him to have congressional elections held in that State before January. "It is my sincere wish that North Carolina may again govern herself conformably to the Constitution of the United States."

Thomas H. Clay.

War Department, October 8, 1862.

Thomas H. Clay, Cincinnati, Ohio.

You cannot have reflected seriously when you ask that I shall order General Morgan's command to Kentucky as a favor because they have marched from Cumberland Gap. The precedent established by it would evidently break up the whole army. Buell's old troops, now in pursuit of Bragg, have done more hard marching recently; and, in fact, if you include marching and fighting, there are scarcely any old troops east or west of the mountains that have not done as hard service. I sincerely wish war was an easier and pleasanter business than it is; but it does not admit of holidays. On Morgan's command, where it is now sent, as I understand, depends the question whether the enemy will get to the Ohio River in another place. A. Lincoln.

Ulysses S. Grant.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., October 8, 1862.

Major-General Grant.

I congratulate you and all concerned in your recent battles and victories.[1] How does it all sum up? I especially regret the death of General Hackleman, and am very anxious to know the condition of General Oglesby, who is an intimate personal friend. A. Lincoln.

[1] On July 23, 1862, Grant was assigned to the command of the Department of the Tennessee. On September 19 and 20, General Rosecrans, his subordinate, defeated General Sterling Price at Iuka, and on October 3 and 4 General Van Dorn at Corinth.

Headquarters of the Army,
Washington, January 21, 1863.

Major-General Grant, Memphis.

General: The President has directed that so much of Arkansas as you may desire to control be temporarily attached to your department. This will give you control of both banks of the river.

In your operations down the Mississippi you must not rely too confidently upon any direct coöperation of General Banks and the lower flotilla, as it is possible that they may not be able to pass or reduce Port Hudson. They, however, will do everything in their power to form a junction with you at Vicksburg. If they should not be able to effect this, they will at least occupy a portion of the enemy's forces, and prevent them from reinforcing Vicksburg. I hope, however, that they will do still better and be able to join you.

It may be proper to give you some explanation of the revocation of your order expelling all Jews from your department. The President has no objection to your expelling traitors and Jew peddlers, which I suppose, was the object of your orders; but as it in terms proscribed an entire religious class, some of whom are fighting in our ranks, the President deemed it necessary to revoke it.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. W. Halleck, General-in-chief.

See letter to Thomas Knox of March 20, 1863.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, June 2, 1863.

Major-General Grant,

Vicksburg, via Memphis.

Are you in communication with General Banks? Is he coming toward you or going farther off? Is there or has there been anything to hinder his coming directly to you by water from Alexandria? A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, July 13, 1863.

Major-General Grant.

My dear General: I do not remember that you and I ever met personally. I write this now as a grateful acknowledgment for the almost inestimable service you have done the country. I wish to say a word further. When you first reached the vicinity of Vicksburg, I thought you should do what you finally did—march the troops across the neck, run the batteries with the transports, and thus go below; and I never had any faith, except a general hope that you knew better than I, that the Yazoo Pass expedition and the like could succeed. When you got below and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join General Banks, and when you turned northward, east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now wish to make the personal acknowledgment that you were right and I was wrong. Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

See letter to Ambrose E. Burnside of July 27, 1863.

Executive Mansion, August 9, 1863.

My dear General Grant:

I see by a despatch of yours that you incline quite strongly toward an expedition against Mobile. This would appear tempting to me also, were it not that in view of recent events in Mexico I am greatly impressed with the importance of reëstablishing the national authority in Western Texas as soon as possible. I am not making an order, however; that I leave, for the present at least, to the general-in-chief.

A word about another subject. General Thomas has gone again to the Mississippi Valley, with the view of raising colored troops. I have no reason to doubt that you are doing what you reasonably can upon the same subject. I believe it is a resource which if vigorously applied now will soon close the contest. It works doubly, weakening the enemy and strengthening us. We were not fully ripe for it, until the river was opened. Now, I think at least one hundred thousand can and ought to be rapidly organized along its shores, relieving all white troops to serve elsewhere. Mr. Dana understands you as believing that the Emancipation Proclamation has helped some in your military operations. I am very glad if this is so.

Did you receive a short letter from me dated the thirteenth of July?

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

See letter to John A. McClernand of August 12, 1863.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, December 8, 1863.

Major-General Grant.

Understanding that your lodgment at Chattanooga and Knoxville is now secure, I wish to tender you, and all under your command, my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude, for the skill, courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great difficulties, have effected that important object. God bless you all!

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, December 19, 1863.

General Grant, Chattanooga, Tennessee.

The Indiana delegation in Congress, or at least a large part of them, are very anxious that General Milroy shall enter active service again, and I share in this feeling. He is not a difficult man to satisfy—sincerity and courage being his strong traits. Believing in our cause, and wanting to fight for it, is the whole matter with him. Could you, without embarrassment, assign him a place, if directed to report to you?

See letters to Governor Thomas E. Bramlette of January 6 and January 17, 1864.

[*Order.*]

Executive Mansion, March 10, 1864.

Under the authority of an act of Congress to revive the grade of lieutenant-general in the United States Army, approved February 29, 1864, Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant,

United States Army, is assigned to the command of the Armies of the United States.

Abraham Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, March 10, 1864.

Lieutenant-General Grant, Army of the Potomac.

Mrs. Lincoln invites yourself and General Meade to dine with us Saturday evening. Please notify him, and answer whether you can be with us at that time. A. Lincoln.

[*Private Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, March 15, 1864.

Lieutenant-General Grant, Nashville, Tenn.

General McPherson having been assigned to the command of a department, could not General Frank Blair, without difficulty or detriment to the service, be assigned to command the corps he commanded a while last autumn?

A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, April 30, 1864.

Lieutenant-General Grant.

Not expecting to see you again before the spring campaign opens, I wish to express in this way my entire satisfaction with what you have done up to this time, so far as I understand it. The particulars of your plans I neither know nor seek to know. You are vigilant and self-reliant; and, pleased with this, I wish not to obtrude any constraints or restraints upon you. While I am very anxious that any great disaster or capture of our men in great numbers shall be avoided, I know these points are less likely to escape your attention than they would be mine. If there is

anything wanting which is within my power to give, do not fail to let me know it. And now, with a brave army and a just cause, may God sustain you. Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

See letter to F. A. Conkling of June 3, 1864.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, June 15, 1864. 7 a. m.
Lieutenant-General Grant,
Headquarters Army of the Potomac.

I have just received your despatch of 1 p. m. yesterday. I begin to see it: you will succeed. God bless you all. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington City, July 10, 1864. 2 p. m.
Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

Your despatch to General Halleck, referring to what I may think in the present emergency, is shown me. General Halleck says we have absolutely no force here fit to go to the field. He thinks that with the hundred-day men and invalids we have here we can defend Washington, and, scarcely, Baltimore. Besides these there are about 8,000, not very reliable, under Howe, at Harper's Ferry, with Hunter approaching that point very slowly, with what number I suppose you know better than I. Wallace, with some odds and ends, and part of what came up with Ricketts, was so badly beaten yesterday at Monocacy, that what is left can attempt no more than to defend Baltimore. What we shall get in from Pennsylvania and New York will scarcely be worth counting, I fear. Now, what I think is, that you should provide to retain your hold

where you are, certainly, and bring the rest with you personally, and make a vigorous effort to destroy the enemy's forces in this vicinity. I think there is really a fair chance to do this, if the movement is prompt. This is what I think upon your suggestion, and is not an order.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, July 11, 1864. 8 a. m.

Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

Yours of 10.30 p. m. yesterday received, and very satisfactory. The enemy will learn of Wright's arrival, and then the difficulty will be to unite Wright and Hunter south of the enemy before he will recross the Potomac. Some firing between Rockville and here now.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C.,
July 12, 1864. 11.30 a. m.

Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

Vague rumors have been reaching us for two or three days that Longstreet's corps is also on its way [*to*] this vicinity. Look out for its absence from your front. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

[Washington], July 17, 1864. 12.25 a. m.

Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

In your despatch of yesterday to General Sherman, I find the following, to wit:

> I shall make a desperate effort to get a position here, which will hold the enemy without the necessity of so many men.

Pressed as we are by lapse of time I am glad to hear you say this; and yet I do hope you may find a way that the effort shall not be desperate in the sense of great loss of life.

Abraham Lincoln, President.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, July 20, 1864. 4.30 p. m.
Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

Yours of yesterday, about a call for 300,000, is received. I suppose you had not seen the call for 500,000, made the day before, and which, I suppose, covers the case. Always glad to have your suggestions. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., July 26, 1864.
Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

General Rawlins arrived this morning. The President desires you to name, if you can, a time when it would be convenient for you to meet him in person at Fortress Monroe after Thursday morning.

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, July 28, 1864.
Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

Will meet you at Fort Monroe, at 8 p. m., on Saturday, the 30th, unless you shall notify me that it will be inconvenient to you.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, July 29, 1864.

Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

I have changed my purpose, so that now I expect to reach Fort Monroe at 10 a. m., Sunday the 31st.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram in Cipher.*]

Washington, D. C., August 3, 1864.

Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

I have seen your despatch in which you say, "I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy, and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also." This, I think, is exactly right as to how our forces should move; but please look over the despatches you may have received from here, ever since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here of "putting our army south of the enemy," or of following him to the "death," in any direction. I repeat to you, it will neither be done nor attempted, unless you watch it every day and hour, and force it.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C.,
August 14, 1864. 1.30 p. m.

Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

The Secretary of War and I concur that you had better confer with General Lee, and stipulate for a mutual discontinuance of house burning and other destruction of private property.

The time and manner of conference and particulars of stipulation we leave, on our part, to your convenience and judgment. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion,
August 17, 1864. 10.30 a. m.

Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

I have seen your despatch expressing your unwillingness to break your hold where you are. Neither am I willing. Hold on with a bulldog grip, and chew and choke as much as possible.

A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, September 12, 1864.

Lieutenant-General Grant.

Sheridan and Early are facing each other at a dead-lock. Could we not pick up a regiment here and there, to the number of say ten thousand men, and quietly but suddenly concentrate them at Sheridan's camp and enable him to make a strike?

This is but a suggestion.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, September 22, 1864.

Lieutenant-General Grant.

I send this as an explanation to you, and to do justice to the Secretary of War. I was induced, upon pressing application, to authorize the agents of one of the districts of Pennsylvania to recruit in one of the prison depots in Illinois; and the thing went so far before it came to the knowledge of the Secretary that, in my judgment, it could not be abandoned without greater

evil than would follow its going through. I did not know at the time that you had protested against that class of thing being done; and I now say that while this particular job must be completed, no other of the sort will be authorized, without an understanding with you, if at all. The Secretary of War is wholly free of any part in this blunder.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C.,
September 29, 1864. 10 a. m.

Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

I hope it will have no constraint on you, nor do harm any way, for me to say I am a little afraid lest Lee sends reinforcements to Early, and thus enables him to turn upon Sheridan.

A. Lincoln.

On October 5, 1864, the President wrote Grant requesting him to permit an exchange of a few naval prisoners through his lines under supervision of General Benjamin F. Butler. He added:

Still, you are at liberty to arrest the whole operation if in your judgment the public good requires it. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., January 14, 1865.

Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

You have perhaps seen in the papers that ex-Senator Foote, with his family, attempted to escape from Richmond to Washington, and that he was pursued and taken back. His wife and child

are now here. Please give me the earliest information you may receive concerning him, what is likely to be done with him, etc.

A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, January 19, 1865.

Lieutenant-General Grant.

Please read and answer this letter as though I was not President, but only a friend. My son, now in his twenty-second year, having graduated at Harvard, wishes to see something of the war before it ends. I do not wish to put him in the ranks, nor yet to give him a commission, to which those who have already served long are better entitled and better qualified to hold. Could he, without embarrassment to you or detriment to the service, go into your military family with some nominal rank, I, and not the public, furnishing his necessary means? If no, say so without the least hesitation, because I am as anxious and as deeply interested that you shall not be encumbered as you can be yourself.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, February 1, 1865.

Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

Let nothing which is transpiring change, hinder, or delay your military movements or plans.

A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion (about February 1, 1865).

Lieutenant-General Grant.

Some time ago you telegraphed that you had stopped a Mr. Laws from passing our lines with a boat and cargo; and I directed you to be in-

formed that you must be allowed to do as you please in such matters. To-night Mr. Laws calls on me, and I have told him, and now tell you, that the matter as to his passing the lines is under your control absolutely; and that he can have any relaxation you choose to give him and none other. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., February 2, 1865.

Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

Say to the gentlemen [1] I will meet them personally at Fort Monroe as soon as I can get there. A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, February 7, 1865.

Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

General Singleton, who bears you this, claims that he already has arrangements made, if you consent, to bring a large amount of Southern produce through your lines. For its bearing on our finances I would be glad for this to be done if it can be without injuriously disturbing your military operations, or supplying the enemy. I wish you to be judge and master on these points. Please see and hear him fully, and decide whether anything, and if anything what, can be done in the premises.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[1] The Confederate Peace Commissioners, Vice-President Alexander H. Stephens, Senator R. M. T. Hunter, and John A. Campbell, Assistant Secretary of War. The conference was abortive.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, February 8, 1865.
Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

I am called on by the House of Representatives to give an account of my interview with Messrs. Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell, and it is very desirable to me to put in your despatch of February 1, to the Secretary of War, in which, among other things, you say: "I fear now their going back without any expression from any one in authority will have a bad influence." I think the despatch does you credit, while I do not see that it can embarrass you. May I use it?

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., February 24, 1865.
Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

I am in a little perplexity. I was induced to authorize a gentleman to bring Roger A. Pryor here with a view of effecting an exchange of him; but since then I have seen a despatch of yours showing that you specially object to his exchange. Meantime he has reached here and reported to me. It is an ungracious thing for me to send him back to prison, and yet inadmissible for him to remain here long. Cannot you help me out with it? I can conceive that there may be difference to you in days, and I can keep him a few days to accommodate on that point. I have not heard of my son's reaching you.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, February 25, 1865.

Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

General Sheridan's despatch to you, of to-day, in which he says he "will be off on Monday," and that he "will leave behind about 2,000 men," causes the Secretary of War and myself considerable anxiety. Have you well considered whether you do not again leave open the Shenandoah Valley entrance to Maryland and Pennsylvania, or, at least, to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad? A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., February 27, 1865.

Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

Subsequent reflection, conference with General Halleck, your despatch, and one from General Sheridan, have relieved my anxiety; and so I beg that you will dismiss any concern you may have on my account, in the matter of my last despatch. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, March 3, 1865. 12 p. m.

Lieutenant-General Grant.

The President directs me to say that he wishes you to have no conference with General Lee unless it be for capitulation of General Lee's army, or on some minor or purely military matter. He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any political questions. Such questions the President holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military con-

ferences or conventions. Meanwhile you are to press to the utmost your military advantages.

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

Executive Mansion, March 7, 1865.

Lieutenant-General Grant.

In accordance with a joint resolution of Congress, approved December 17, 1863, I now have the honor of transmitting and presenting to you, in the name of the people of the United States of America, a copy of said resolution, engrossed on parchment, together with the gold medal therein ordered and directed.

Please accept for yourself and all under your command the renewed expression of my gratitude for your and their arduous and well-performed public service.

Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln.

Washington, D. C., March 9, 1865.

Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

I see your despatch to the Secretary of War, objecting to rebel prisoners being allowed to take the oath and go free. Supposing that I am responsible for what is done in this way, I think fit to say that there is no general rule of action, allowing prisoners to be discharged merely on taking the oath. What has been done is that members of Congress come to me, from time to time, with lists of names, alleging that from personal knowledge, and evidence of reliable persons, they are satisfied that it is safe to discharge the particular persons named on the lists, and I have ordered their discharge. These members are chiefly from the border States, and those they get discharged are their neighbors and

neighbors' sons. They tell me that they do not bring to me one-tenth of the names which are brought to them, bringing only such as their knowledge or the proof satisfies them about. I have, on the same principle, discharged some on the representations of others than members of Congress; as, for instance, Governor Johnson, of Tennessee. The number I have discharged has been rather larger than I liked, reaching, I should think, an average of fifty a day since the recent general exchange commenced. On the same grounds, last year, I discharged quite a number at different times, aggregating perhaps a thousand Missourians and Kentuckians; and their members, returning here since the prisoners' return to their homes, report to me only two cases of proving false. Doubtless some more have proved false; but, on the whole, I believe what I have done in this way has done good rather than harm. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., March 20, 1865.

Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

Your kind invitation received. Had already thought of going immediately after the next rain. Will go sooner if any reason for it. Mrs. Lincoln and a few others will probably accompany me. Will notify you of exact time, once it shall be fixed upon. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, March 23, 1865.

Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia.

We start to you at 1 p. m. to-day. May lie

over during the dark hours of the night. Very small party of us. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

City Point, April 1, 1865. 5.45 p. m.
Lieutenant-General Grant.

Yours showing Sheridan's success of to-day is just received, and highly appreciated.[1] Having no great deal to do here, I am still sending the substance of your despatches to the Secretary of War. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Headquarters Armies of the United States,
City Point, April 6, 1865. 12 m.
Lieutenant-General Grant, in the Field.

Secretary Seward was thrown from his carriage yesterday and seriously injured. This, with other matters, will take me to Washington soon. I was at Richmond yesterday and the day before, when and where Judge Campbell, who was with Messrs. Hunter and Stephens in February, called on me, and made such representations as induced me to put in his hands an informal paper, repeating the propositions in my letter of instructions to Mr. Seward, which you remember, and adding that if the war be now further persisted in by the rebels, confiscated property shall at the least bear the additional cost, and that confiscation shall be remitted to the people of any State which will now promptly and in good faith withdraw its troops and other support from resistance to the Government.

Judge Campbell thought it not impossible that the rebel legislature of Virginia would do the

[1] Victory of Five Forks, Va.

latter if permitted; and accordingly I addressed a private letter to General Weitzel, with permission to Judge Campbell to see it, telling him (General Weitzel) that if they attempt this, to permit and protect them, unless they attempt something hostile to the United States, in which case to give them notice and time to leave, and to arrest any remaining after such time.

I do not think it very probable that anything will come of this, but I have thought best to notify you so that if you should see signs you may understand them.

From your recent despatches it seems that you are pretty effectually withdrawing the Virginia troops from opposition to the Government. Nothing that I have done, or probably shall do, is to delay, hinder, or interfere with your work.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Headquarters Armies of the United States,
City Point, April 7, 1865. 11 a. m.

Lieutenant-General Grant.

General Sheridan says "If the thing is pressed I think that Lee will surrender." Let the *thing* be pressed. A. Lincoln.

William R. Morrison.

Executive Mansion, November 5, 1862.

Colonel William R. Morrison, Waterloo, Illinois.

Your letter of September 23 is this moment received. While your words of kindness are very grateful, your suspicions that I intend you injustice are very painful to me. I assure you such suspicions are groundless. I cannot even conjecture what juniors of yours you suppose I contemplate promoting over you. True, senior-

ity has not been my rule in this connection; but in considering military merit, the world has abundant evidence that I disregard politics.

A. Lincoln.

JOHN POPE.

During August, 1862, the Sioux of Minnesota rose up and massacred hundreds of settlers. Troops seized the ringleaders, who were sentenced to be hanged.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, November 10, 1862.

Major-General Pope, St. Paul, Minnesota.

Your despatch giving the names of 300 Indians condemned to death is received. Please forward as soon as possible the full and complete record of their convictions; and if the record does not fully indicate the more guilty and influential of the culprits, please have a careful statement made on these points and forwarded to me. Send all by mail. A. Lincoln.

On December 1, 1862, the President inquired of the Judge-Advocate General for his legal opinion "whether if I should conclude to execute only a part of them, I must myself designate which, or could I leave the designation to some officer on the ground?" The opinion was that the President should designate the Indians to be executed, and this Lincoln did on December 6, 1862.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department,
Washington, April 11, 1863.

Major-General Pope, Milwaukee, Wis.

The President directs that under no circumstances will our troops cross the boundary line into British territory without his authority.

H. W. Halleck, General-in-chief.

G. F. Shepley.[1]

See letter to Benjamin F. Butler of October 14, 1862.

Executive Mansion, November 21, 1862.

Hon. G. F. Shepley. . . .

I wish elections for congressmen to take place in Louisiana; but I wish it to be a movement of the people of the districts, and not a movement of our military or quasi-military authorities there. I merely wish our authorities to give the people a chance—to protect them against secession interference. Of course the election cannot be according to strict law. By State law there is, I suppose, no election day before January; and the regular election officers will not act in many cases, if in any. These knots must be cut, the main object being to get an expression of the people. If they would fix a day in a way for themselves all the better; but if they stand idle, not seeming to know what to do, do you fix these things for them by proclamation. And do not waste a day about it, but fix the election day early enough, that we can hear the result here by the first of January. Fix a day for an election in all the districts, and have it held in as many places as you can.

Yours very truly, A Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, November 21, 1862.

Hon. G. F. Shepley.

Dear Sir: Dr. Kennedy, bearer of this, has some apprehension that Federal officers not citizens of Louisiana may be set up as candidates

[1] Colonel Shepley was appointed military governor of Louisiana on June 10, 1862.

for Congress in that State. In my view there could be no possible object in such an election. We do not particularly need members of Congress from there to enable us to get along with legislation here. What we do want is the conclusive evidence that respectable citizens of Louisiana are willing to be members of Congress and to swear support to the Constitution, and that other respectable citizens there are willing to vote for them and send them. To send a parcel of Northern men here as representatives, elected, as would be understood (and perhaps really so), at the point of the bayonet, would be disgusting and outrageous; and were I a member of Congress here, I would vote against admitting any such man to a seat.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

See letters to Nathaniel P. Banks of August 5, 1863; November 5, 1863; and December 24, 1863.

GEORGE ROBERTSON.

Executive Mansion,
Washington, November 26, 1862.

My dear Sir: A few days since I had a despatch from you which I did not answer. If I were to be wounded personally, I think I would not shun it. But it is the life of the nation. I now understand the trouble is with Colonel Utley: that he has five slaves in his camp, four of whom belong to rebels, and one belonging to you. If this be true, convey yours to Colonel Utley, so that he can make him free, and I will pay you any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars.

Yours, etc., A. Lincoln.

EDWARD BATES.

Executive Mansion, November 29, 1862.

Hon. Attorney-General.

My dear Sir: Few things perplex me more than this question between Governor Gamble and the War Department, as to whether the peculiar force organized by the former in Missouri are State troops or United States troops. Now, this is either an immaterial or a mischievous question. First, if no more is desired than to have it settled what name the force is to be called by, it is immaterial. Secondly, if it is desired for more than the fixing a name, it can only be to get a position from which to draw practical inferences; then it is mischievous. Instead of settling one dispute by deciding the question, I should merely furnish a nestful of eggs for hatching new disputes. I believe the force is not strictly either "State troops" or "United States troops." It is of mixed character. I therefore think it is safer, when a practical question arises, to decide that question directly, and not indirectly by deciding a general abstraction supposed to include it, and also including a great deal more. Without dispute Governor Gamble appoints the officers of this force, and fills vacancies when they occur. The question now practically in dispute is: Can Governor Gamble make a vacancy by removing an officer or accepting a resignation? Now, while it is proper that this question shall be settled, I do not perceive why either Governor Gamble or the Government here should care which way it is settled. I am perplexed with it only because there seems to be pertinacity about it. It seems to me that

it might be either way without injury to the service; or that the offer of the Secretary of War to let Governor Gamble make vacancies, and he (the Secretary) to ratify the making of them, ought to be satisfactory.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

John L. Worden.

[*Message to Congress.*]

To the Senate and House of Representatives.

In conformity to the law of July 16, 1862, I most cordially recommend that Commander John L. Worden, United States Navy, receive a vote of thanks of Congress for the eminent skill and gallantry exhibited by him in the late remarkable battle between the United States iron-clad steamer *Monitor*, under his command, and the rebel iron-clad steamer *Merrimac*, in March last. . . .

Abraham Lincoln.

Washington, D. C., December 8, 1862.

George U. Morris.

[*Message to Congress.*]

To the Senate and House of Representatives.

In conformity to the law of July 16, 1862, I most cordially recommend that Lieutenant-Commander George U. Morris, United States Navy, receive a vote of thanks of Congress for the determined valor and heroism displayed in his defense of the United States ship of war *Cumberland*, temporarily under his command in the naval engagement at Hampton Roads on the 8th of March, 1862, with the rebel iron-clad steamfrigate *Merrimac*. Abraham Lincoln.

Washington, D. C., December 10, 1862.

Fernando Wood.

Executive Mansion, December 12, 1862.

Hon. Fernando Wood.

My dear Sir: Your letter of the 8th, with the accompanying note of same date, was received yesterday. The most important paragraph in the letter, as I consider, is in these words: "On the 25th of November last I was advised by an authority which I deemed likely to be well informed as well as reliable and truthful, that the Southern States would send representatives to the next Congress, provided that a full and general amnesty should permit them to do so. No guaranties or terms were asked for other than the amnesty referred to."

I strongly suspect your information will prove to be groundless; nevertheless, I thank you for communicating it to me. Understanding the phrase in the paragraph above quoted—"the Southern States would send representatives to the next Congress"—to be substantially the same as that "the people of the Southern States would cease resistance, and would reinaugurate, submit to, and maintain the national authority within the limits of such States under the Constitution of the United States," I say that in such case the war would cease on the part of the United States; and that if within a reasonable time "a full and general amnesty" were necessary to such end, it would not be withheld.

I do not think it would be proper now for me to communicate this formally or informally to the people of the Southern States. My belief is that they already know it; and when they choose, if ever, they can communicate with me

unequivocally. Nor do I think it proper now to suspend military operations to try any experiment of negotiation.

I should nevertheless receive with great pleasure the exact information you now have, and also such other as you may in any way obtain. Such information might be more valuable before the 1st of January than afterward.

While there is nothing in this letter which I shall dread to see in history, it is, perhaps, better for the present that its existence should not become public. I therefore have to request that you will regard it as confidential.

Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln.

MRS. ABRAHAM LINCOLN (MARY TODD).

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, December 21, 1862.

Mrs. A. Lincoln, Continental Hotel.

Do not come on the night train. It is too cold. Come in the morning. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, June 9, 1863.

Mrs. Lincoln, Philadelphia.

Think you had better put "Tad's" pistol away. I had an ugly dream about him.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, June 16, 1863.

Mrs. Lincoln, Philadelphia, Pa.

It is a matter of choice with yourself whether you come home. There is no reason why you should not, that did not exist when you went

away. As bearing on the question of your coming home, I do not think the raid into Pennsylvania amounts to anything at all.

A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, August 8, 1863.

My dear Wife: All as well as usual, and no particular trouble anyway. I put the money into a Treasury at five per cent., with the privilege of withdrawing it any time upon thirty days' notice. I suppose you are glad to learn this. Tell dear Tad poor "Nanny Goat" is lost, and Mrs. Cuthbert and I are in distress about it. The day you left, Nanny was found resting herself and chewing her little cud on the middle of Tad's bed; but now she's gone! The gardener kept complaining that she destroyed the flowers, till it was concluded to bring her down to the White House. This was done, and the second day she had disappeared and has not been heard of since. This is the last we know of poor "Nanny."

The weather continues dry and excessively warm here. Nothing very important occurring. The election in Kentucky has gone very strongly right. Old Mr. Wickliffe got ugly, as you know: ran for Governor, and is terribly beaten. Upon Mr. Crittenden's death, Brutus Clay, Cassius's brother, was put on the track for Congress, and is largely elected. Mr. Menzies, who, as we thought, behaved very badly last session of Congress, is largely beaten in the district opposite Cincinnati, by Green Clay Smith, Cassius Clay's nephew. But enough.

Affectionately, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., September 21, 1863.

Mrs. A. Lincoln, Fifth Avenue Hotel, New York.

The air is so clear and cool and apparently healthy that I would be glad for you to come. Nothing very particular but I would be glad to see you and Tad. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, September 22, 1863.

Mrs. A. Lincoln, New York.

Did you receive my despatch of yesterday? Mrs. Cuthbert did not correctly understand me. I directed her to tell you to use your own pleasure whether to stay or come, and I did not say it is sickly and that you should on no account come. So far as I see or know, it was never healthier, and I really wish to see you. Answer this on receipt. A. Lincoln.

On September 24, 1863, the President communicated to his wife, with other war news, the information that her brother-in-law Helm, a brigadier-general in the Confederate army, had been killed in the battle of Chickamauga.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, April 28, 1864.

Mrs. A. Lincoln, Metropolitan Hotel, New York.

The draft will go to you. Tell Tad the goats and father are very well, especially the goats.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, June 24, 1864.
Mrs. A. Lincoln, Boston, Massachusetts.

All well and very warm. Tad and I have been to General Grant's army. Returned yesterday safe and sound. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., June 29, 1864.
Mrs. A. Lincoln, New York.

All well. Tom is moving things out.
A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., August 31, 1864.
Mrs. A. Lincoln, Manchester, Vermont.

All reasonably well. Bob not here yet. How is dear Tad? A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, September 8, 1864.
Mrs. A. Lincoln, Manchester, Vermont.

All well, including Tad's pony and the goats. Mrs. Colonel Dimmick died night before last. Bob left Sunday afternoon. Said he did not know whether he should see you.
A. Lincoln.

City Point, Va., April 2, 1865.
Mrs. Lincoln.

At 4.30 p. m. to-day General Grant telegraphs that he has Petersburg completely enveloped from river below to river above, and has captured since he started last Wednesday, about 12,000 prison-

ers and 50 guns. He suggests that I shall go out and see him in the morning, which I think I will do. Tad and I are both well, and will be glad to see you and your party here at the time you name. A. Lincoln.

Army of the Potomac.

The defeat of the Army of the Potomac at Fredericksburg, Va., on December 13, 1862, was a severe blow to the *morale* of the soldiers, and the President issued the following congratulations to them to lift up their spirits:

Executive Mansion,
Washington, December 22, 1862.

To the Army of the Potomac: I have just read your commanding general's report of the battle of Fredericksburg. Although you were not successful, the attempt was not an error, nor the failure other than accident. The courage with which you, in an open field, maintained the contest against an intrenched foe, and the consummate skill and success with which you crossed and recrossed the river in the face of the enemy, show that you possess all the qualities of a great army, which will yet give victory to the cause of the country and of popular government.

Condoling with the mourners for the dead, and sympathizing with the severely wounded, I congratulate you that the number of both is comparatively so small.

I tender to you, officers and soldiers, the thanks of the nation. A. Lincoln.

W. B. Franklin and W. F. Smith.

Executive Mansion, December 22, 1862.

Major-General Franklin and Major-General Smith.

Yours of the 20th, suggesting a plan of operations for the Army of the Potomac, is received. I have hastily read the plan, and shall yet try to give it more deliberate consideration, with the aid of military men. Meanwhile let me say it seems to me to present the old questions of preference between the line of the Peninsula and the line you are now upon. The difficulties you point out as pertaining to the Fredericksburg line are obvious and palpable. But now, as heretofore, if you go to James River, a large part of the army must remain on or near the Fredericksburg line, to protect Washington. It is the old difficulty.

When I saw General Franklin at Harrison's Landing on James River last July, I cannot be mistaken in saying that he distinctly advised the bringing of the army away from there.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

For order relating to Franklin of January 25, 1863, see letter to Ambrose E. Burnside.

Miss Fanny McCullough.

Executive Mansion, December 23, 1862.

Dear Fanny: It is with deep regret that I learn of the death of your kind and brave father, and especially that it is affecting your young heart beyond what is common in such cases. In this sad world of ours sorrow comes to all, and to the young it comes with bitterer agony because it takes them unawares. The older have learned

ever to expect it. I am anxious to afford some alleviation to your present distress. Perfect relief is not possible, except with time. You cannot now realize that you will ever feel better. Is not this so? And yet it is a mistake. You are sure to be happy again. To know this, which is certainly true, will make you some less miserable now. I have had experience enough to know what I say, and you need only to believe it to feel better at once. The memory of your dear father, instead of an agony, will yet be a sad, sweet feeling in your heart of a purer and holier sort than you have known before.

Please present my kind regards to your afflicted mother.

Your sincere friend, A. Lincoln.

Compare with letters of condolence to the parents of Colonel Ellsworth and to Mrs. Bixby.

W. S. Rosecrans.[1]

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, January 5, 1863.

Major-General W. S. Rosecrans, Murfreesborough, Tennessee.

Your despatch announcing retreat of enemy has just reached here. God bless you and all

[1] General Rosecrans was a West Point graduate, and, at the outbreak of the war, a prominent engineer. He first served under General McClellan, winning the battle of Rich Mountain, Va., on July 11, 1861. On July 25 he succeeded McClellan in command of the Department of the Ohio. Later he succeeded General Pope in command of the Army of the Mississippi, and won the battles of Iuka, September 19, 1862, and Corinth, October 3 and 4, 1862. On October 27 he became commander of the Department of the Cumberland. On December 31, 1862, and January 1 and 2, 1863, he defeated General Bragg at Murfreesborough, Tenn. (the battle being also known as Stone River).

with you! Please tender to all, and accept for yourself, the nation's gratitude for your and their skill, endurance, and dauntless courage.

A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, February 17, 1863.

Major-General Rosecrans.

My dear Sir: In no other way does the enemy give us so much trouble at so little expense to himself as by the raids of rapidly moving small bodies of troops, largely if not wholly mounted, harassing and discouraging loyal residents, supplying themselves with provisions, clothing, horses, and the like, surprising and capturing small detachments of our forces, and breaking our communications. And this will increase just in proportion as his larger armies shall weaken and wane. Nor can these raids be successfully met by even larger forces of our own of the same kind acting merely on the defensive. I think we should organize proper forces and make counter raids. We should not capture so much of supplies from them as they have done from us, but it would trouble them more to repair railroads and bridges than it does us. What think you of trying to get up such a corps in your army? Could you do it without any or many additional troops (which we have not to give you), provided we furnish horses, suitable arms, and other appointments? Please consider this not as an order, but as a suggestion.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, March 17, 1863.

Major-General Rosecrans.

My dear Sir: I have just received your telegram saying that the "Secretary of War telegraphed after the battle of Stone River: 'Anything you and your command want you can have,'" and then specifying several things you have requested and have not received.

The promise of the Secretary, as you state it, is certainly pretty broad; nevertheless it accords with the feeling of the whole Government here toward you. I know not a single enemy of yours here. Still the promise must have a reasonable construction. We know you will not purposely make an unreasonable request, nor persist in one after it shall appear to be such. Now, as to the matter of a paymaster, you desired one to be permanently attached to your army, and, as I understand, desired that Major Larned should be the man. This was denied you; and you seem to think it was denied partly to disoblige you and partly to disoblige Major Larned—the latter, as you suspect, at the instance of Paymaster-General Andrews. On the contrary, the Secretary of War assures me the request was refused on no personal ground whatever, but because to grant it would derange, and substantially break up, the whole pay-system as now organized, and so organized on very full consideration and sound reason, as believed. There is powerful temptation in money; and it was and is believed that nothing can prevent the paymasters speculating upon the soldiers but a system by which each is to pay certain regiments so soon after he has notice that he is to pay those particular regiments that he has no time or opportunity to lay plans

for speculating upon them. This precaution is all lost if paymasters respectively are to serve permanently with the same regiments, and pay them over and over during the war. No special application of this has been intended to be made to Major Larned or to your army. And as to General Andrews, I have in another connection felt a little aggrieved at what seemed to me his implicit following the advice and suggestions of Major Larned—so ready are we all to cry out and ascribe motives when our own toes are pinched.

Now as to your request that your commission should date from December, 1861. Of course you expected to gain something by this; but you should remember that precisely so much as you should gain by it others would lose by it. If the thing you sought had been exclusively ours, we would have given it cheerfully; but, being the right of other men, we having a merely arbitrary power over it, the taking it from them and giving it to you became a more delicate matter and more deserving of consideration. Truth to speak, I do not appreciate this matter of rank on paper as you officers do. The world will not forget that you fought the battle of Stone River, and it will never care a fig whether you rank General Grant on paper, or he so ranks you.

As to the appointment of an aide contrary to your wishes, I knew nothing of it until I received your despatch; and the Secretary of War tells me he has known nothing of it, but will trace it out. The examination of course will extend to the case of R. S. Thomas, whom you say you wish appointed.

And now be assured you wrong both yourself

and us when you even suspect there is not the best disposition on the part of us all here to oblige you. Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 20, 1863.

Major-General Rosecrans.

Yours of yesterday in relation to Colonel Haggard is received. I am anxious that you shall not misunderstand me. In no case have I intended to censure you or to question your ability. In Colonel Haggard's case I meant no more than to suggest that possibly you might have been mistaken in a point that could [*be*] corrected.

I frequently make mistakes myself in the many things I am compelled to do hastily.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 21, 1863. 4.40 p. m.

Major-General Rosecrans.

For certain reasons it is thought best for Rev. Dr. Jaquess not to come here.

Present my respects to him, and ask him to write me fully on the subject he has in contemplation. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, May 28, 1863.

Major-General Rosecrans, Murfreesborough, Tennessee.

I would not push you to any rashness, but I am very anxious that you do your utmost, short of rashness, to keep Bragg from getting off to help Johnston against Grant. A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, May 28, 1863.

Major-General Rosecrans.

My dear Sir: I have but a slight personal acquaintance with Colonel Jaquess, though I know him very well by character.

Such a mission as he proposes I think promises good, if it were free from difficulties, which I fear it cannot be.

First. He cannot go with any government authority whatever. This is absolute and imperative.

Secondly. If he goes without authority, he takes a great deal of personal risk—he may be condemned and executed as a spy.

If, for any reason, you think fit to give Colonel Jaquess a furlough, and any authority from me for that object is necessary, you hereby have it for any length of time you see fit.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, August 10, 1863.

My dear General Rosecrans.

Yours of the 1st was received two days ago. I think you must have inferred more than General Halleck has intended, as to any dissatisfaction of mine with you. I am sure you, as a reasonable man, would not have been wounded could you have heard all my words and seen all my thoughts in regard to you. I have not abated in my kind feeling for you and confidence in you. I have seen most of your despatches to General Halleck—probably all of them. After Grant invested Vicksburg I was very anxious lest Johnston should overwhelm him from the outside, and when it appeared certain that part of Bragg's force had gone and was going to

Johnston, it did seem to me it was exactly the proper time for you to attack Bragg with what force he had left. In all kindness let me say it so seems to me yet. Finding from your despatches to General Halleck that your judgment was different, and being very anxious for Grant, I, on one occasion, told General Halleck I thought he should direct you to decide at once to immediately attack Bragg or to stand on the defensive and send part of your force to Grant. He replied he had already so directed in substance. Soon after, despatches from Grant abated my anxiety for him, and in proportion abated my anxiety about any movement of yours. When afterward, however, I saw a despatch of yours arguing that the right time for you to attack Bragg was not before, but would be after, the fall of Vicksburg, it impressed me very strangely, and I think I so stated to the Secretary of War and General Halleck. It seemed no other than the proposition that you could better fight Bragg when Johnston should be at liberty to return and assist him than you could before he could so return to his assistance.

Since Grant has been entirely relieved by the fall of Vicksburg, by which Johnston is also relieved, it has seemed to me that your chance for a stroke has been considerably diminished, and I have not been pressing you directly or indirectly. True, I am very anxious for East Tennessee to be occupied by us; but I see and appreciate the difficulties you mention. The question occurs, Can the thing be done at all? Does preparation advance at all? Do you not consume supplies as fast as you get them forward? Have you more animals to-

day than you had at the battle of Stone River? And yet have not more been furnished you since then than your entire present stock? I ask the same questions as to your mounted force.

Do not misunderstand: I am not casting blame upon you; I rather think by great exertion you can get to East Tennessee; but a very important question is, Can you stay there? I make no order in the case—that I leave to General Halleck and yourself.

And now be assured once more that I think of you in all kindness and confidence, and that I am not watching you with an evil eye.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, August 31, 1863.

My dear General Rosecrans.

Yours of the 22d was received yesterday. When I wrote you before, I did [*not*] intend, nor do I now, to engage in an argument with you on military questions. You had informed me you were impressed through General Halleck that I was dissatisfied with you; and I could not bluntly deny that I was without unjustly implicating him. I therefore concluded to tell you the plain truth, being satisfied the matter would thus appear much smaller than it would if seen by mere glimpses. I repeat that my appreciation of you has not abated. I can never forget whilst I remember anything that about the end of last year and beginning of this, you gave us a hard-earned victory, which, had there been a defeat instead, the nation could scarcely have lived over.

Neither can I forget the check you so oppor-

tunely gave to a dangerous sentiment which was spreading in the North.

Yours as ever, A. Lincoln.

On September 9, 1863, General Rosecrans occupied Chattanooga. He was defeated at Chickamauga September 18–20.

Washington, September 21, 1863. 12.55 p.m.
Major-General Rosecrans, Chattanooga.

Be of good cheer. We have unabated confidence in you, and in your soldiers and officers. In the main you must be the judge as to what is to be done. If I were to suggest, I would say, save your army by taking strong positions until Burnside joins you, when, I hope, you can turn the tide. I think you had better send a courier to Burnside to hurry him up. We cannot reach him by telegraph. We suppose some force is going to you from Corinth, but for want of communication we do not know how they are getting along. We shall do our utmost to assist you. Send us your present positions.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, September 23, 1863. 9.15 a.m.
Major-General Rosecrans, Chattanooga, Tennessee.

Below is Bragg's despatch as found in the Richmond papers. You see he does not claim so many prisoners or captured guns as you were inclined to concede. He also confesses to heavy loss. An exchanged general of ours leaving Richmond yesterday says two of Longstreet's divisions and his entire artillery and two of

Pickett's brigades and Wise's legion have gone to Tennessee. He mentions no other.

Chickamauga River,
September 20 (via Ringgold, 21st).

General Cooper, Adjutant-General:

After two days' hard fighting we have driven the enemy, after a desperate resistance, from several positions, and now hold the field; but he still confronts us. The losses are heavy on both sides, especially in our officers. We have taken over twenty pieces of artillery and some 2,500 prisoners.

Braxton Bragg.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department,
September 24, 1863. 10 a. m.

Major-General Rosecrans, Chattanooga, Tennessee.

Last night we received the rebel accounts, through Richmond papers, of your late battle. They give Major-General Hood as mortally wounded. . . . With Burnside, Sherman, and from elsewhere we shall get to you from forty to sixty thousand additional men. A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, September 28, 1863.

My dear General Rosecrans.

We are sending you two small corps, one under General Howard and one under General Slocum, and the whole under General Hooker.

Unfortunately the relations between Generals Hooker and Slocum are not such as to promise good, if their present relative positions remain. Therefore, let me beg—almost enjoin upon you—that on their reaching you, you will make a transposition by which General Slocum with his

corps may pass from under the command of General Hooker, and General Hooker, in turn, receive some other equal force. It is important for this to be done, though we could not well arrange it here. Please do it.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department,
October 4, 1863. 11.30 a. m.

Major-General Rosecrans, Chattanooga, Tennessee.

Yours of yesterday received. If we can hold Chattanooga and East Tennessee, I think the rebellion must dwindle and die. I think you and Burnside can do this, and hence doing so is your main object. Of course to greatly damage or destroy the enemy in your front would be a greater object, because it would include the former and more, but it is not so certainly within your power. I understand the main body of the enemy is very near you, so near that you could "board at home," so to speak, and menace or attack him any day. Would not the doing of this be your best mode of counteracting his raid on your communications? But this is not an order. I intend doing something like what you suggest whenever the case shall appear ripe enough to have it accepted in the true understanding rather than as a confession of weakness and fear. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram in Cipher.*]

War Department,
October 12, 1863. 8.35 a. m.

Major-General Rosecrans, Chattanooga, Tennessee.

As I understand, Burnside is menaced from the west, and so cannot go to you without surrendering East Tennessee. I now think the enemy will not attack Chattanooga and I think you will have to look out for his making a concentrated drive at Burnside. You and Burnside now have him by the throat; and he must break your hold or perish. I therefore think you better try to hold the road up to Kingston, leaving Burnside to what is above there. Sherman is coming to you, though gaps in the telegraph prevent our knowing how far he is advanced. He and Hooker will so support you on the west and northwest as to enable you to look east and northeast. This is not an order. General Halleck will give his views. A. Lincoln.

General Rosecrans was assigned to the Department of the Missouri in January, 1864.

Executive Mansion, March 10, 1864.

Major-General Rosecrans.

Please carefully examine and consider the question whether, on the whole, it would be advantageous to our military operations for the United States to furnish iron for completing the southwest branch of the Pacific Railroad, all or any part of the way from Rolla to Springfield, Missouri, so fast as the company shall do all the other work for the completion, and to receive pay for said iron in transportation upon said

newly made part of said road; and if your opinion shall be in the affirmative, make a contract with the company to that effect, subject to my approval or rejection. In any event, report the main facts, together with your reasoning, to me.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, April 4, 1864.

Major-General Rosecrans.

My dear Sir: This is rather more social than official; containing suggestions rather than orders. I somewhat dread the effect of your Special Order No. 61, dated March 7, 1864. I have found that men who have not even been suspected of disloyalty are very averse to taking an oath of any sort as a condition to exercising an ordinary right of citizenship. The point will probably be made that while men may, without an oath, assemble in a noisy political meeting, they must take the oath to assemble in a religious meeting. It is said, I know not whether truly, that in some parts of Missouri assassinations are systematically committed upon returned rebels who wish to ground arms and behave themselves. This should not be. Of course I have not heard that you give countenance to or wink at such assassinations. Again, it is complained that the enlistment of negroes is not conducted in as orderly a manner and with as little collateral provocation as it might be. So far you have got along in the Department of the Missouri rather better than I dared to hope, and I congratulate you and myself upon it.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, June 8, 1864.

Major-General Rosecrans, St. Louis, Missouri.

Yours of to-day received. I am unable to conceive how a message can be less safe by the express than by a staff-officer. If you send a verbal message, the messenger is one additional person let into the secret. A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, September 26, 1864.

Major-General Rosecrans.

One cannot always safely disregard a report, even which one may not believe. I have a report that you incline to deny the soldiers the right of attending the election in Missouri, on the assumed ground that they will get drunk and make a disturbance. Last year I sent General Schofield a letter of instruction, dated October 1, 1863, which I suppose you will find on the files of the department, and which contains among other things the following: "At elections see that those, and only those, are allowed to vote who are entitled to do so by the laws of Missouri, including as of those laws the restrictions laid by the Missouri convention upon those who may have participated in the rebellion." This I thought right then, and think right now; and, I may add, I do not remember that either party complained after the election of General Schofield's action under it. Wherever the law allows soldiers to vote, their officers must also allow it. Please write me on this subject.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, November 19, 1864.
Major-General Rosecrans.

A Major Wolf, as it seems, was under sentence in your department to be executed in retaliation for the murder of a Major Wilson, and I, without any particular knowledge of the facts, was induced by appeals for mercy to order the suspension of his execution till further order. Understanding that you so desire, this letter places the case again within your control, with the remark only that I wish you to do nothing merely for revenge, but that what you may do shall be solely done with reference to the security of the future. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Caleb Russell and Sallie A. Fenton.

Washington, January 5, 1863.
My Good Friends:

The Honorable Senator Harlan has just placed in my hands your letter of the 27th of December, which I have read with pleasure and gratitude.

It is most cheering and encouraging for me to know that in the efforts which I have made and am making for the restoration of a righteous peace to our country, I am upheld and sustained by the good wishes and prayers of God's people. No one is more deeply than myself aware that without His favor our highest wisdom is but as foolishness and that our most strenuous efforts would avail nothing in the shadow of His displeasure.

I am conscious of no desire for my country's welfare that is not in consonance with His will, and of no plan upon which we may not ask His

blessing. It seems to me that if there be one subject upon which all good men may unitedly agree, it is imploring the gracious favor of the God of Nations upon the struggles our people are making for the preservation of their precious birthright of civil and religious liberty.

Very truly your friend, A. Lincoln.

Green Adams.

Executive Mansion, January 7, 1863.

Hon. Green Adams.

My dear Sir: In answer to your inquiries of this morning, I have to say that I am very anxious to have the special force in Kentucky raised and armed. But the changed conduct toward me of some of her members of Congress, and the ominous outgivings as to what the governor and legislature of Kentucky intend doing, admonish me to consider whether any additional arms I may send there are not to be turned against the Government. I hope this may clear up on the right side. So far as I can see, Kentucky's sons in the field are acting loyally and bravely. God bless them! I cannot help thinking the mass of her people feel the same way.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

B. Gratz Brown.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C.,
January 7, 1863. 5.30 p. m.

Hon. B. Gratz Brown, Jefferson City, Missouri.

Yours of to-day just received. The Administration takes no part between its friends in

Missouri, of whom I, at least, consider you one; and I have never before had an intimation that appointees there were interfering, or were inclined to interfere. A. Lincoln.

Fitz-John Porter.[1]

See letter of November 5, 1862, to George B. McClellan.

[*Instruction to the Judge-Advocate-General.*]

War Department, January 12, 1863.

The Judge-Advocate-General is instructed to revise the proceedings of the court-martial in the case of Major-General Fitz-John Porter, and to report fully upon any legal questions that may have arisen in them, and upon the bearing of the testimony in reference to the charges and specifications exhibited against the accused, and upon which he was tried. Abraham Lincoln.

[*Indorsement on the Proceedings and Sentence of the Fitz-John Porter Court-Martial.*]

Headquarters of the Army,
Washington, January 13, 1863.

In compliance with the Sixty-fifth Article of War, these whole proceedings are transmitted to the Secretary of War, to be laid before the President of the United States.

H. W. Halleck, General-in-chief.

[1] General Fitz-John Porter was charged by his superior general, John Pope, with disobeying orders at the Second Battle of Bull Run, August 28 and 29, 1862. For this he was deprived of command, but restored, and he served in the Antietam campaign. In November, however, he was court-martialed. In 1886 he was restored by Congress to the army with the rank of colonel.

January 21, 1863.

The foregoing proceedings, findings, and sentence in the foregoing case of Major-General Fitz-John Porter are approved and confirmed, and it is ordered that the said Fitz-John Porter be, and he hereby is, cashiered and dismissed from the service of the United States as a major-general of volunteers, and as colonel and brevet brigadier-general in the regular service of the United States, and forever disqualified from holding any office of trust or profit under the Government of the United States.

Abraham Lincoln.

Working-men of Manchester, England.

Executive Mansion, January 19, 1863.

To the Working-men of Manchester: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the address and resolutions which you sent me on the eve of the new year. When I came, on the 4th of March, 1861, through a free and constitutional election to preside in the Government of the United States, the country was found at the verge of civil war. Whatever might have been the cause, or whosoever the fault, one duty, paramount to all others, was before me, namely, to maintain and preserve at once the Constitution and the integrity of the Federal Republic. A conscientious purpose to perform this duty is the key to all the measures of administration which have been and to all which will hereafter be pursued. Under our frame of government and my official oath, I could not depart from this purpose if I would. It is not always in the power of governments to enlarge or restrict the

scope of moral results which follow the policies that they may deem it necessary for the public safety from time to time to adopt.

I have understood well that the duty of self-preservation rests solely with the American people; but I have at the same time been aware that favor or disfavor of foreign nations might have a material influence in enlarging or prolonging the struggle with disloyal men in which the country is engaged. A fair examination of history has served to authorize a belief that the past actions and influences of the United States were generally regarded as having been beneficial toward mankind. I have, therefore, reckoned upon the forbearance of nations. Circumstances —to some of which you kindly allude—induce me especially to expect that if justice and good faith should be practised by the United States, they would encounter no hostile influence on the part of Great Britain. It is now a pleasant duty to acknowledge the demonstration you have given of your desire that a spirit of amity and peace toward this country may prevail in the councils of your Queen, who is respected and esteemed in your own country only more than she is by the kindred nation which has its home on this side of the Atlantic.

I know and deeply deplore the sufferings which the working-men at Manchester, and in all Europe, are called to endure in this crisis. It has been often and studiously represented that the attempt to overthrow this Government, which was built upon the foundation of human rights, and to substitute for it one which should rest exclusively on the basis of human slavery, was likely to obtain the favor of Europe. Through

the action of our disloyal citizens, the working-men of Europe have been subjected to severe trials, for the purpose of forcing their sanction to that attempt. Under the circumstances, I cannot but regard your decisive utterances upon the question as an instance of sublime Christian heroism which has not been surpassed in any age or in any country. It is indeed an energetic and reinspiring assurance of the inherent power of truth, and of the ultimate and universal triumph of justice, humanity, and freedom. I do not doubt that the sentiments you have expressed will be sustained by your great nation; and, on the other hand, I have no hesitation in assuring you that they will excite admiration, esteem, and the most reciprocal feelings of friendship among the American people. I hail this interchange of sentiment, therefore, as an augury that whatever else may happen, whatever misfortune may befall your country or my own, the peace and friendship which now exist between the two nations will be, as it shall be my desire to make them, perpetual. Abraham Lincoln.

See letter to Working-men of London.

Joseph Hooker.

See letter of January 19, 1861, to J. K. F. Mansfield; of November 5, 1862, to George B. McClellan; and of January 25, 1863, to Ambrose E. Burnside.

Executive Mansion, January 26, 1863.

Major-General Hooker.

General: I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appear to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know

that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable if not an indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during General Burnside's command of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it; and now beware of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

On receiving this letter Hooker said of the President: "He talks to me like a father; I shall not answer this letter until I have won him a great victory."

[*Indorsement on General J. Hooker's Plan of Campaign against Richmond.*]

April 11, 1863.

My opinion is that just now, with the enemy directly ahead of us, there is no eligible route for us into Richmond; and consequently a question of preference between the Rappahannock route and the James River route is a contest about nothing. Hence our prime object is the enemy's army in front of us, and is not with or about Richmond at all, unless it be incidental to the main object.

What then? The two armies are face to face, with a narrow river between them. Our communications are shorter and safer than are those of the enemy. For this reason we can, with equal powers, fret him more than he can us. I do not think that by raids toward Washington he can derange the Army of the Potomac at all. He has no distant operations which can call any of the Army of the Potomac away; we have such operations which may call him away, at least in part. While he remains intact I do not think we should take the disadvantage of attacking him in his intrenchments; but we should continually harass and menace him, so that he shall have no leisure nor safety in sending away detachments. If he weakens himself, then pitch into him.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C.,
April 15, 1863. 10.15 p. m.

Major-General Hooker.

It is now 10.15 p. m. An hour ago I received your letter of this morning, and a few moments later your despatch of this evening. The latter gives me considerable uneasiness. The rain and mud of course were to be calculated upon. General S. is not moving rapidly enough to make the expedition come to anything. He has now been out three days, two of which were unusually fair weather, and all three without hindrance from the enemy, and yet he is not twenty-five miles from where he started. To reach his point he still has sixty to go, another river (the Rapidan) to cross, and will be hindered by the enemy. By arithmetic, how many days will it take him to do it? I do not know that any better can be done, but I greatly fear it is another failure already. Write me often. I am very anxious.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

On May 2–4 Hooker was beaten at Chancellorsville, Va.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., May 6, 1863. 12.25 p.m.

Major-General Hooker.

We have through General Dix the contents of Richmond papers of the 5th. General Dix's despatch in full is going to you by Captain Fox of the navy. The substance is General Lee's despatch of the 3d (Sunday), claiming that he had beaten you, and that you were then retreating across the Rappahannock, distinctly stating that

two of Longstreet's divisions fought you on Saturday, and that General [*E. F.*] Paxton was killed, Stonewall Jackson severely wounded, and Generals Heth and A. P. Hill slightly wounded. The Richmond papers also stated, upon what authority not mentioned, that our cavalry have been at Ashland, Hanover Court House, and other points, destroying several locomotives and a good deal of other property, and all the railroad bridges to within five miles of Richmond.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., May 6, 1863. 12.30 p.m.

General Hooker.

Just as I had telegraphed you contents of Richmond papers showing that our cavalry had not failed, I received General Butterfield's of 11 a. m. yesterday. This, with the great rain of yesterday and last night securing your right flank, I think puts a new face upon your case; but you must be the judge. A. Lincoln.

Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
May 7, 1863.

Major-General Hooker.

My dear Sir: The recent movement of your army is ended without effecting its object, except, perhaps, some important breakings of the enemy's communications. What next? If possible, I would be very glad of another movement early enough to give us some benefit from the fact of the enemy's communication being broken; but neither for this reason nor any other do I wish anything done in desperation or rashness. An early movement would also help to supersede the

bad moral effect of the recent one, which is said to be considerably injurious. Have you already in your mind a plan wholly or partially formed? If you have, prosecute it without interference from me. If you have not, please inform me, so that I, incompetent as I may be, can try and assist in the formation of some plan for the army.

Yours as ever, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., May 8, 1863. 4 p. m.

Major-General Hooker.

The news is here of the capture by our forces of Grand Gulf—a large and very important thing. General Willich, an exchanged prisoner just from Richmond, has talked with me this morning. He was there when our cavalry cut the roads in that vicinity. He says there was not a sound pair of legs in Richmond, and that our men, had they known it, could have safely gone in and burned everything and brought in Jeff Davis. We captured and paroled 300 or 400 men. He says as he came to City Point there was an army three miles long (Longstreet's, he thought) moving toward Richmond.

Milroy has captured a despatch of General Lee, in which he says his loss was fearful in his last battle with you. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., May 13, 1863. 1 p. m.

Major-General Hooker.

If it will not interfere with the service, nor personally incommode you, please come up and see me this evening. A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, May 14, 1863.
Major-General Hooker, Commanding.

My dear Sir: When I wrote on the 7th, I had an impression that possibly by an early movement you could get some advantage from the supposed facts that the enemy's communications were disturbed, and that he was somewhat deranged in position. That idea has now passed away, the enemy having reëstablished his communications, regained his positions, and actually received reinforcements. It does not now appear probable to me that you can gain anything by an early renewal of the attempt to cross the Rappahannock. I therefore shall not complain if you do no more for a time than to keep the enemy at bay and out of other mischief by menaces and occasional cavalry raids, if practicable, and to put your own army in good condition again. Still, if in your own clear judgment you can renew the attack successfully, I do not mean to restrain you. Bearing upon this last point, I must tell you that I have some painful intimations that some of your corps and division commanders are not giving you their entire confidence. This would be ruinous, if true, and you should therefore, first of all, ascertain the real facts beyond all possibility of doubt.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, June 5, 1863. 4 p. m.
Major-General Hooker.

Yours of to-day was received an hour ago. So much of professional military skill is requisite to answer it, that I have turned the task over to General Halleck. He promises to perform it

with his utmost care. I have but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you, and that is, in case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I would by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, it would fight in intrenchments and have you at disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting an advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other. If Lee would come to my side of the river, I would keep on the same side, and fight him or act on the defense, according as might be my estimate of his strength relatively to my own. But these are mere suggestions which I desire to be controlled by the judgment of yourself and General Halleck.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, June 10, 1863. 6.40 p. m.

Major-General Hooker.

Your long despatch of to-day is just received. If left to me, I would not go south of the Rappahannock upon Lee's moving north of it. If you had Richmond invested to-day, you would not be able to take it in twenty days; meanwhile your communications, and with them your army, would be ruined. I think Lee's army, and not Richmond is your true objective point. If he comes toward the upper Potomac, follow on his flank and on his inside track, shortening your

lines while he lengthens his. Fight him, too, when opportunity offers. If he stays where he is, fret him and fret him. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram in Cipher.*]

Executive Mansion, June 13, 1863.

Major-General Hooker.

I was coming down this afternoon, but if you would prefer I should not, I shall blame you if you do not tell me so. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, June 14, 1863. 5.50 p. m.

Major-General Hooker.

So far as we can make out here, the enemy have Milroy surrounded at Winchester and Tyler at Martinsburg. If they could hold out a few days, could you help them? If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg and the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could you not break him?

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, June 14, 1863. 11.55 p. m.

Major-General Hooker.

Yours of 11.30 [*11.15*] just received. You have nearly all the elements for forming an opinion whether Winchester is surrounded that I have. I really fear—almost believe—it is. . . . It is quite certain that a considerable force of the enemy is thereabout, and I fear it is an overwhelming one compared with Milroy's. I am unable to give you any more certain opinions.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, June 15, 1863. 8.30 p. m.
Major-General Hooker, Fairfax Station.

The facts are now known here that Winchester and Martinsburg were both besieged yesterday. The troops from Martinsburg have got into Harper's Ferry without loss. Those from Winchester are also in, having lost in killed, wounded, and missing about one-third of their number. Of course, the enemy holds both places, and I think the report is authentic that he is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport. We have not heard of his yet appearing at Harper's Ferry or on the river anywhere below. I would like to hear from you. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, June 16, 1863. 10 p. m.
Major-General Hooker.

To remove all misunderstanding, I now place you in the strict military relation to General Halleck of a commander of one of the armies to the general-in-chief of all the armies. I have not intended differently, but as it seems to be differently understood I shall direct him to give you orders, and you to obey them. A. Lincoln.

[*Private.*]

Executive Mansion, June 16, 1863.
My dear General.

I send you this by the hand of Captain Dahlgren. Your despatch of 11.30 a. m. to-day is just received. When you say I have long been aware that you do not enjoy the confidence of

the major-general commanding, you state the case much too strongly.

You do not lack his confidence in any degree to do you any harm. On seeing him, after telegraphing you this morning, I found him more nearly agreeing with you than I was myself. Surely you do not mean to understand that I am withholding my confidence from you when I happen to express an opinion (certainly never discourteously) differing from one of your own.

I believe Halleck is dissatisfied with you to this extent only, that he knows that you write and telegraph ("report," as he calls it) to me. I think he is wrong to find fault with this; but I do not think he withholds any support from you on account of it. If you and he would use the same frankness to one another, and to me, that I use to both of you, there would be no difficulty. I need and must have the professional skill of both, and yet these suspicions tend to deprive me of both.

I believe you are aware that since you took command of the army I have not believed you had any chance to effect anything till now. As it looks to me, Lee's now returning toward Harper's Ferry gives you back the chance that I thought McClellan lost last fall. Quite possibly I was wrong both then and now; but, in the great responsibility resting upon me, I cannot be entirely silent. Now, all I ask is that you will be in such mood that we can get into our action the best cordial judgment of yourself and General Halleck, with my poor mite added, if indeed he and you shall think it entitled to any consideration at all. Yours as ever, A. Lincoln.

THURLOW WEED.

Washington, January 29, 1863.

Hon. Thurlow Weed.

Dear Sir: Your valedictory to the patrons of the Albany *Evening Journal* brings me a good deal of uneasiness. What does it mean?

Truly yours, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, October 14, 1863.

Hon. Thurlow Weed.

My dear Sir: I have been brought to fear recently that somehow, by commission or omission, I have caused you some degree of pain. I have never entertained an unkind feeling or a disparaging thought toward you; and if I have said or done anything which has been construed into such unkindness or disparagement, it has been misconstrued. I am sure if we could meet we would not part with any unpleasant impression on either side.

Yours as ever, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, March 25, 1864.

Hon. Thurlow Weed.

My dear Sir: I have been both pained and surprised recently at learning that you are wounded because a suggestion of yours as to the mode of conducting our national difficulty has not been followed—pained because I very much wish you to have no unpleasant feeling proceeding from me, and surprised, because my impression is that I have seen you since the last message issued, apparently feeling very cheerful and happy. How is this?

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, March 15, 1865.

Dear Mr. Weed:

Every one likes a compliment. Thank you for yours on my little notification speech and on the recent inaugural address. I expect the latter to wear as well as—perhaps better than—anything I have produced; but I believe it is not immediately popular. Men are not flattered by being shown that there has been a difference of purpose between the Almighty and them. To deny it, however, in this case, is to deny that there is a God governing the world. It is a truth which I thought needed to be told, and, as whatever of humiliation there is in it falls most directly on myself, I thought others might afford for me to tell it. Truly yours, A. Lincoln.

Working-men of London, England.

Executive Mansion, February 2, 1863.

To the Working-men of London: I have received the New Year's address which you have sent me, with a sincere appreciation of the exalted and humane sentiments by which it was inspired.

As these sentiments are manifestly the enduring support of the free institutions of England, so I am sure also that they constitute the only reliable basis for free institutions throughout the world.

The resources, advantages, and powers of the American people are very great, and they have consequently succeeded to equally great responsibilities. It seems to have devolved upon them to test whether a government established on the principles of human freedom can be maintained

against an effort to build one upon the exclusive foundation of human bondage. They will rejoice with me in the new evidences which your proceedings furnish that the magnanimity they are exhibiting is justly estimated by the true friends of freedom and humanity in foreign countries.

Accept my best wishes for your individual welfare, and for the welfare and happiness of the whole British people.

Abraham Lincoln.

See letter to Working-men of Manchester, England.

Alexander Reed.

Executive Mansion, February 22, 1863.

Rev. Alexander Reed.

My dear Sir: Your note, by which you, as general superintendent of the United States Christian Commission, invite me to preside at a meeting to be held this day at the hall of the House of Representatives in this city, is received.

While, for reasons which I deem sufficient, I must decline to preside, I cannot withhold my approval of the meeting and its worthy objects. Whatever shall be sincerely, and in God's name, devised for the good of the soldier and seaman in their hard spheres of duty, can scarcely fail to be blest. And whatever shall tend to turn our thoughts from the unreasoning and uncharitable passions, prejudices, and jealousies incident to a great national trouble such as ours, and to fix them upon the vast and long-enduring consequences, for weal or for woe, which are to result from the struggle, and especially to strengthen our reliance on the Supreme Being for the final

triumph of the right, cannot but be well for us all.

The birthday of Washington and the Christian Sabbath coinciding this year, and suggesting together the highest interests of this life and of that to come, is most propitious for the meeting proposed.

Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln.

Henry Winter Davis.

Executive Mansion, March 18, 1863.

Hon. Henry Winter Davis.

My dear Sir: There will be in the new House of Representatives, as there were in the old, some members openly opposing the war, some supporting it unconditionally, and some supporting it with "buts," and "ifs," and "ands." They will divide on the organization of the House—on the election of a Speaker. As you ask my opinion, I give it, that the supporters of the war should send no man to Congress who will not pledge himself to go into caucus with the unconditional supporters of the war, and to abide the action of such caucus and vote for the person therein nominated for Speaker. Let the friends of the Government first save the Government, and then administer it to their own liking. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

P. S. This is not for publication, but to prevent misunderstanding of what I verbally said to you yesterday. A. L.

Horatio Seymour.[1]

[*Private and Confidential.*]

Executive Mansion, March 23, 1863.

His Excellency Governor Seymour.

Dear Sir: You and I are substantially strangers, and I write this chiefly that we may become better acquainted. I, for the time being, am at the head of a nation that is in great peril, and you are at the head of the greatest State of that nation. As to maintaining the nation's life and integrity, I assume and believe there cannot be a difference of purpose between you and me. If we should differ as to the means, it is important that such difference should be as small as possible; that it should not be enhanced by unjust suspicions on one side or the other. In the performance of my duty the coöperation of your State, as that of others, is needed—in fact, is indispensable. This alone is a sufficient reason why I should wish to be at a good understanding with you. Please write me at least as long a letter as this, of course saying in it just what you think fit.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

During the absence of the New York militia at Gettysburg, draft riots broke out in the city. The Governor hastened thither and addressed the mob, promising that their grievances would be redressed. He then

[1] Seymour was elected Governor of New York in 1862. In his inaugural message of January 7, 1863, he declared that "the mischievous opinion that . . . the North must subjugate and destroy the South to save our Union has weakened the hopes of our citizens at home, and destroyed confidence in our success abroad." Lincoln set about seeking the confidence of this powerful executive.

wrote the President asking to have the draft stopped that New York might fill her quota with volunteers.

Executive Mansion, August 7, 1863.

His Excellency Horatio Seymour, Governor of New York.

Your communication of the third instant has been received and attentively considered.

I cannot consent to suspend the draft in New York, as you request, because, among other reasons, time is too important. . . .

I do not object to abide a decision of the United States Supreme Court, or of the judges thereof, on the constitutionality of the draft law. In fact, I should be willing to facilitate the obtaining of it, but I cannot consent to lose the time while it is being obtained. We are contending with an enemy, who, as I understand, drives every able-bodied man he can reach into his ranks, very much as a butcher drives bullocks into a slaughter-pen. No time is wasted, no argument is used. This produces an army which will soon turn upon our now victorious soldiers, already in the field, if they shall not be sustained by recruits as they should be. It produces an army with a rapidity not to be matched by our side, if we first waste time to reëxperiment with the volunteer system already deemed by Congress, and palpably, in fact, so far exhausted as to be inadequate, and then more time to obtain a court decision as to whether a law is constitutional which requires a part of those not now in the service to go to the aid of those who are already in it, and still more time to determine with absolute certainty that we get those who are to go in the precisely legal proportion to

those who are not to go. My purpose is to be in my action just and constitutional, and yet practical, in performing the important duty with which I am charged, of maintaining the unity and the free principles of our common country.

Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, August 16, 1863.

Governor Seymour, New York.

Your despatch of this morning is just received, and I fear I do not perfectly understand it.

My view of the principle is that every soldier obtained voluntarily leaves one less to be obtained by draft. The only difficulty is in applying the principle properly. Looking to time, as heretofore, I am unwilling to give up a drafted man now, even for the certainty, much less for the mere chance of getting a volunteer hereafter. Again, after the draft in any district, would it not make trouble to take any drafted man out and put a volunteer in, for how shall it be determined which drafted man is to have the privilege of thus going out, to the exclusion of all the others? And even before the draft in any district the quota must be fixed; and the draft might be postponed indefinitely if every time a volunteer is offered the officers must stop and reconstruct the quota. At least I fear there might be this difficulty; but, at all events, let credits for volunteers be given up to the last moment, which will not produce confusion or delay. That the principle of giving credits for volunteers shall be applied by districts seems fair and proper, though I do not know how far by present statistics it is practicable. When for any cause a fair credit is not given at one time, it

should be given as soon thereafter as practicable. My purpose is to be just and fair, and yet to not lose time. A. Lincoln.

See letter of August 26, 1863, to Edwin M. Stanton, and of February 27, 1864.

On July 5, 1864, upon the invasion of Maryland by General Jubal A. Early, the President wrote Governor Seymour calling on him for 12,000 militia for one hundred days' service.

J. E. Bouligny.

Executive Mansion, April 14, 1863.

Hon. J. E. Bouligny.

My dear Sir: I did not certainly know the object of your call yesterday, but I had a strong impression in regard to it. When our national troubles began, you and I were not personally acquainted, but all I heard of you placed you in my estimation foremost among Louisianians as a friend of the Union. I intended to find you a position, and I did not conceal my inclination to do so. When, last autumn, you bore a letter from me to some parties at New Orleans, you seemed to expect, and consequently I did expect, you would return here as a member of one or the other branch of Congress. But you were not so returned, and this negative evidence, with other of like character, brings me to think that the Union people there for some reason prefer others for the places there. Add to this that the head of the department here in which finding a place for you was contemplated, is not satisfied for the appointment to be made, and it presents, as you see, an embarrassing case for me. My

personal feelings for Mr. Bouligny are not less kind than heretofore.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

On being appealed to by a member of one of the warring Union factions in Missouri, who asked: "Shall we be sustained by you?" the President, on April 16, 1863, replied: "I have stoutly tried to keep out of the quarrel, and so mean to do."

F. L. Capen.

[*Indorsement on Letter.*]

It seems to me Mr. Capen knows nothing about the weather in advance. He told me three days ago that it would not rain again till the 30th of April or 1st of May. It is raining now, and has been for ten hours. I cannot spare any more time to Mr. Capen. A. Lincoln.

April 28, 1863.

John M. Schofield.

Executive Mansion, May 27, 1863.

General John M. Schofield.

My dear Sir: Having relieved General Curtis and assigned you to the command of the Department of the Missouri, I think it may be of some advantage for me to state to you why I did it. I did not relieve General Curtis because of any full conviction that he had done wrong by commission or omission. I did it because of a conviction in my mind that the Union men of Missouri, constituting, when united, a vast majority of the whole people, have entered into a pestilent factional quarrel among themselves—General Curtis, perhaps not of choice, being the

head of one faction and Governor Gamble that of the other. After months of labor to reconcile the difficulty, it seemed to grow worse and worse, until I felt it my duty to break it up somehow; and as I could not remove Governor Gamble, I had to remove General Curtis. Now that you are in the position I wish you to undo nothing merely because General Curtis or Governor Gamble did it, but to exercise your own judgment, and do right for the public interest. Let your military measures be strong enough to repel the invader and keep the peace, and not so strong as to unnecessarily harass and persecute the people. It is a difficult rôle, and so much greater will be the honor if you perform it well. If both factions, or neither, shall abuse you, you will probably be about right. Beware of being assailed by one and praised by the other.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, June 22, 1863.

General John M. Schofield.

My dear Sir: Your despatch, asking in substance whether, in case Missouri shall adopt gradual emancipation, the General Government will protect slave-owners in that species of property during the short time it shall be permitted by the State to exist within it, has been received. Desirous as I am that emancipation shall be adopted by Missouri, and believing as I do that gradual can be made better than immediate for both black and white, except when military necessity changes the case, my impulse is to say that such protection would be given. I cannot know exactly what shape an act of emancipation may take. If the period from the initiation to

the final end should be comparatively short, and the act should prevent persons being sold during that period into more lasting slavery, the whole would be easier. I do not wish to pledge the General Government to the affirmative support of even temporary slavery beyond what can be fairly claimed under the Constitution. I suppose, however, this is not desired, but that it is desired for the military force of the United States, while in Missouri, to not be used in subverting the temporarily reserved legal rights in slaves during the progress of emancipation. This I would desire also. I have very earnestly urged the slave States to adopt emancipation; and it ought to be, and is, an object with me not to overthrow or thwart what any of them may in good faith do to that end. You are therefore authorized to act in the spirit of this letter in conjunction with what may appear to be the military necessities of your department. Although this letter will become public at some time, it is not intended to be made so now.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

See letter of July 23, 1863, to Hamilton R. Gamble.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C.,
August 27, 1863. 8.30 a. m.

General Schofield, St. Louis.

I have just received the despatch which follows from two very influential citizens of Kansas, whose names I omit. The severe blow they have received naturally enough makes them intemperate even without there being any just cause for blame. Please do your utmost to give

them future security and to punish their invaders. A. Lincoln.

On September 30, 1863, the President wrote General Schofield, at Saint Louis, Mo., enclosing a despatch which stated that Union men were being driven out of Missouri.

The President asked General Schofield to look into the matter, "and if true, in whole or part, put a stop to it."

Executive Mansion, October 1, 1863.

General John M. Schofield,

There is no organized military force in avowed opposition to the General Government now in Missouri, and if any such shall reappear, your duty in regard to it will be too plain to require any special instruction. Still, the condition of things both there and elsewhere is such as to render it indispensable to maintain for a time the United States military establishment in that State, as well as to rely upon it for a fair contribution of support to that establishment generally. Your immediate duty in regard to Missouri now is to advance the efficiency of that establishment, and to so use it as far as practicable to compel the excited people there to leave one another alone. Under your recent order, which I have approved, you will only arrest individuals and suppress assemblies or newspapers when they may be working palpable injury to the military in your charge, and in no other case will you interfere with the expression of opinion in any form or allow it to be interfered with violently by others. In this you have a discretion to exercise with great caution, calmness, and forbearance. With the matters of removing the inhabitants of certain counties *en masse,* and

of removing certain individuals from time to time who are supposed to be mischievous, I am not now interfering, but am leaving to your own discretion. Nor am I interfering with what may still seem to you to be necessary restrictions upon trade and intercourse. I think proper, however, to enjoin upon you the following:

Allow no part of the military under your command to be engaged in either returning fugitive slaves or in forcing or enticing slaves from their homes, and, so far as practicable, enforce the same forbearance upon the people.

Report to me your opinion upon the availability for good of the enrolled militia of the State.

Allow no one to enlist colored troops except upon orders from you or from here, through you.

Allow no one to assume the functions of confiscating property under the law of Congress, or otherwise, except upon orders from here.

At elections see that those, and only those, are allowed to vote who are entitled to do so by the laws of Missouri, including, as of those laws, the restriction laid by the Missouri convention upon those who may have participated in the rebellion.

So far as practicable, you will, by means of your military force, expel guerrillas, marauders, and murderers, and all who are known to harbor, aid, or abet them. But in like manner you will repress assumptions of unauthorized individuals to perform the same service because, under pretense of doing this, they become marauders and murderers themselves.

To now restore peace, let the military obey orders, and those not of the military leave each

other alone, thus not breaking the peace themselves.

In giving the above directions, it is not intended to restrain you in other expedient and necessary matters not falling within their range.

Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln.

See letter of October 5, 1863, to Charles D. Drake.

[*Private and Confidential.*]

Executive Mansion, October 28, 1863.

General John M. Schofield.

There have recently reached the War Department, and thence been laid before me, from Missouri, three communications, all similar in import and identical in object. . . . The general statements of the whole are that the Federal and State authorities are arming the disloyal and disarming the loyal, and that the latter will all be killed or driven out of the State unless there shall be a change. . . . These papers contain altogether thirty-one manuscript pages, and one newspaper *in extenso,* and yet I do not find it anywhere charged in them that any loyal man has been harmed by reason of being disarmed, or that any disloyal one has harmed anybody by reason of being armed by the Federal or State Government. Of course, I have not had time to carefully examine all; but I have had most of them examined and briefed by others, and the result is as stated. The remarkable fact that the actual evil is yet only anticipated—inferred—induces me to suppose I understand the case; but I do not state my impression, because I might be mistaken, and because your duty and mine is plain in any event. The locality of

nearly all this seems to be St. Joseph and Buchanan County. I wish you to give special attention to this region, particularly on election day. Prevent violence from whatever quarter, and see that the soldiers themselves do no wrong. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

See letter of September 26, 1864, to W. S. Rosecrans.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., November 10, 1863.

General Schofield, Saint Louis, Mo.

I see a despatch here from Saint Louis, which is a little difficult for me to understand. It says "General Schofield has refused leave of absence to members in military service to attend the legislature. All such are radical and administration men. The election of two Senators from this place on Thursday will probably turn upon this thing." What does this mean? Of course members of the legislature must be allowed to attend its sessions. But how is there a session before the recent election returns are in? And how is it to be at "this place"—and that is Saint Louis? Please inform me. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, November 11, 1863.

General Schofield, Saint Louis, Mo.

I believe the Secretary of War has telegraphed you about members of the legislature. At all events, allow those in the service to attend the session, and we can afterward decide whether they can stay through the entire session.

A. Lincoln.

William Cullen Bryant.

Washington, May 14, 1863.

Mr. W. C. Bryant.

My dear Sir: Yours, requesting that General Sigel may be again assigned to command, is received. Allow me to briefly explain. I kept General Sigel in command for several months, he requesting to resign or to be relieved. At length, at his urgent and repeated solicitation, he was relieved. Now it is inconvenient to assign him a command without relieving or depriving some other officer who is not asking and perhaps would object to being so disposed of.

This is one of a class of cases, and you perceive how embarrassing they are.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

On June 27, 1864, the President answered a complaint of Mr. Bryant that a certain Mr. Henderson had been removed from office and arrested. Said the President:

I shall be very glad indeed if he shall, as you anticipate, establish his innocence; or, to state it more strongly and properly, "if the Government shall fail to establish his guilt." I believe, however, the man who made the affidavit was of as spotless reputation as Mr. Henderson, until he was arrested on what his friends insist was outrageously insufficient evidence. I know the entire city government of Washington, with many other respectable citizens, appealed to me in his behalf as a greatly injured gentleman.

While the subject is up, may I ask whether the *Evening Post* has not assailed me for supposed too lenient dealing with persons charged

with fraud and crime? And that in cases of which the *Post* could know but little of the facts? I shall certainly deal as leniently with Mr. Henderson as I have felt it my duty to deal with others, notwithstanding any newspaper assaults.

Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln.

H. T. Blow and Others.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, May 15, 1863.

Hon. H. T. Blow, C. D. Drake, and Others, St. Louis, Missouri.

Your despatch of to-day is just received. It is very painful to me that you in Missouri cannot or will not settle your factional quarrel among yourselves. I have been tormented with it beyond endurance for months by both sides. Neither side pays the least respect to my appeals to your reason. I am now compelled to take hold of the case. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, July 13, 1863.

Hon. H. T. Blow, St. Louis, Mo.

I saw your despatch to the Secretary of War. The publication of a letter without the leave of the writer or the receiver I think cannot be justified, but in this case I do not think it of sufficient consequence to justify an arrest; and again, the arrest being, through a parole, merely nominal, does not deserve the importance sought to be attached to it. Cannot this small matter be dropped on both sides without further difficulty? A. Lincoln.

F. J. Herron.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, May 17, 1863.

Major-General F. J. Herron, Rolla, Missouri.

Your despatch threatening to resign rather than to serve under General Schofield has been received and shown to the President. He directs me to say that he is unaware of any valid objection to General Schofield, he having recently commanded the Department of the Missouri, giving almost universal satisfaction so far as the President ever heard. He directs me to add that he has appreciated the services of General Herron and rewarded them by rapid promotions; but that, even in him, insubordination will be met as insubordination, and that your resignation will be acted upon as circumstances may require whenever it is tendered.

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

Charles Sumner.[1]

Executive Mansion, June 1, 1863.

Hon. Charles Sumner.

My dear Sir: In relation to the matter spoken of Saturday morning and this morning—to wit, the raising of colored troops in the North, with the understanding that they shall be commanded by General Frémont—I have to say:

That while it is very objectionable, as a general rule, to have troops raised on any special

[1] Senator Sumner represented the extreme abolitionist sentiment in the Union, and throughout the war was the consistent advocate of emancipation and other interests of the negro.

terms, such as to serve only under a particular commander or only at a particular place or places, yet I would forego the objection in this case upon a fair prospect that a large force of this sort could thereby be the more rapidly raised.

That being raised, say to the number of ten thousand, I would very cheerfully send them to the field under General Frémont, assigning him a department, made or to be made, with such white force also as I might be able to put in.

That with the best wishes toward General Frémont, I cannot now give him a department, because I have not spare troops to furnish a new department, and I have not, as I think, justifiable ground to relieve the present commander of any old one. In the raising of the colored troops, the same consent of governors would have to be obtained as in case of white troops, and the Government would make the same provision for them during organization as for white troops.

It would not be a point with me whether General Frémont should take charge of the organization, or take charge of the force only after the organization.

If you think fit to communicate this to General Frémont, you are at liberty to do so.[1]

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Democratic Meeting at Albany.

Clement L. Vallandigham, ex-member of Congress from Ohio, had been sent South for speaking against the prosecution of the war. Democratic meetings were held throughout the North to protest against this action.

[1] General Frémont declined the command. Had he accepted it before the close of the war he would have commanded 200,000 troops, an army second only to Grant's.

One was held at Albany, N. Y., on May 16, which passed denunciatory resolutions, and sent them to the President. To these he replied as follows:

Executive Mansion, June 12, 1863.

Hon. Erastus Corning and Others.

Gentlemen: Your letter of May 19, inclosing the resolutions of a public meeting held at Albany, New York, on the 16th of the same month, was received several days ago.

The resolutions, as I understand them, are resolvable into two propositions—first, the expression of a purpose to sustain the cause of the Union, to secure peace through victory, and to support the Administration in every constitutional and lawful measure to suppress the rebellion; and, secondly, a declaration of censure upon the Administration for supposed unconstitutional action, such as the making of military arrests. And from the two propositions a third is deduced, which is that the gentlemen composing the meeting are resolved on doing their part to maintain our common government and country, despite the folly or wickedness, as they may conceive, of any administration. This position is eminently patriotic, and as such I thank the meeting, and congratulate the nation for it. My own purpose is the same; so that the meeting and myself have a common object, and can have no difference, except in the choice of means or measures for effecting that object.

And here I ought to close this paper, and would close it if there were no apprehension that more injurious consequences than any merely personal to myself might follow the censures systematically cast upon me for doing what, in my view of duty, I could not forbear.

The resolutions promise to support me in every constitutional and lawful measure to suppress the rebellion; and I have not knowingly employed, nor shall knowingly employ, any other. But the meeting, by their resolutions, assert and argue that certain military arrests, and proceedings following them, for which I am ultimately responsible, are unconstitutional. I think they are not. The resolutions quote from the Constitution the definition of treason, and also the limiting safeguards and guarantees therein provided for the citizen on trials for treason, and on his being held to answer for capital or otherwise infamous crimes, and in criminal prosecutions his right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury. They proceed to resolve "that these safeguards of the rights of the citizen against the pretensions of arbitrary power were intended more especially for his protection in times of civil commotion." And, apparently to demonstrate the proposition, the resolutions proceed: "They were secured substantially to the English people after years of protracted civil war, and were adopted into our Constitution at the close of the Revolution." Would not the demonstration have been better if it could have been truly said that these safeguards had been adopted and applied during the civil wars and during our Revolution, instead of after the one and at the close of the other? I, too, am devotedly for them after civil war, and before civil war, and at all times, "except when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require" their suspension. The resolutions proceed to tell us that these safeguards "have stood the test of seventy-six years of trial under

our republican system, under circumstances which show that while they constitute the foundation of all free government, they are the elements of the enduring stability of the republic." No one denies that they have so stood the test up to the beginning of the present rebellion, if we except a certain occurrence at New Orleans hereafter to be mentioned; nor does any one question that they will stand the same test much longer after the rebellion closes. But these provisions of the Constitution have no application to the case we have in hand, because the arrests complained of were not made for treason—that is, not for the treason defined in the Constitution, and upon the conviction of which the punishment is death—nor yet were they made to hold persons to answer for any capital or otherwise infamous crimes; nor were the proceedings following, in any constitutional or legal sense, "criminal prosecutions." The arrests were made on totally different grounds, and the proceedings following accorded with the grounds of the arrests. Let us consider the real case with which we are dealing, and apply to it the parts of the Constitution plainly made for such cases.

Prior to my installation here it had been inculcated that any State had a lawful right to secede from the national Union, and that it would be expedient to exercise the right whenever the devotees of the doctrine should fail to elect a president to their own liking. I was elected contrary to their liking; and, accordingly, so far as it was legally possible, they had taken seven States out of the Union, had seized many of the United States forts, and had fired upon the United States flag, all before I was inau-

gurated, and, of course, before I had done any official act whatever. The rebellion thus begun soon ran into the present civil war; and, in certain respects, it began on very unequal terms between the parties. The insurgents had been preparing for it more than thirty years, while the Government had taken no steps to resist them. The former had carefully considered all the means which could be turned to their account. It undoubtedly was a well-pondered reliance with them that in their own unrestricted effort to destroy Union, Constitution, and law all together, the Government would, in great degree, be restrained by the same Constitution and law from arresting their progress. Their sympathizers pervaded all departments of the Government and nearly all communities of the people. From this material under cover of "liberty of speech," "liberty of the press," and *"habeas corpus,"* they hoped to keep on foot amongst us a most efficient corps of spies, informers, suppliers, and aiders and abettors of their cause in a thousand ways. They knew that in times such as they were inaugurating, by the Constitution itself the *"habeas corpus"* might be suspended; but they also knew they had friends who would make a question as to who was to suspend it; meanwhile their spies and others might remain at large to help on their cause. Or if, as has happened, the Executive should suspend the writ without ruinous waste of time, instances of arresting innocent persons might occur, as are always likely to occur in such cases; and then a clamor could be raised in regard to this, which might be at least of some service to the insurgent cause. It needed

no very keen perception to discover this part of the enemy's programme, so soon as by open hostilities their machinery was fairly put in motion. Yet, thoroughly imbued with a reverence for the guaranteed rights of individuals, I was slow to adopt the strong measures which by degrees I have been forced to regard as being within the exceptions of the Constitution, and as indispensable to the public safety. Nothing is better known to history than that the courts of justice are utterly incompetent in such cases. Civil courts are organized chiefly for trials of individuals, or, at most, a few individuals acting in concert—and this in quiet times, and on charges of crimes well defined in the law. Even in times of peace bands of horse-thieves and robbers frequently grow too numerous and powerful for the ordinary courts of justice. But what comparison, in numbers, have such bands ever borne to the insurgent sympathizers even in many of the loyal States? Again, a jury too frequently has at least one member more ready to hang the panel than to hang the traitor. And yet again, he who dissuades one man from volunteering, or induces one soldier to desert, weakens the Union cause as much as he who kills a Union soldier in battle. Yet this dissuasion or inducement may be so conducted as to be no defined crime of which any civil court would take cognizance.

Ours is a case of rebellion—so called by the resolutions before me—in fact, a clear, flagrant, and gigantic case of rebellion; and the provision of the Constitution that "the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion,

the public safety may require it," is the provision which specially applies to our present case. This provision plainly attests the understanding of those who made the Constitution that ordinary courts of justice are inadequate to "cases of rebellion"—attests their purpose that, in such cases, men may be held in custody whom the courts, acting on ordinary rules, would discharge. *Habeas corpus* does not discharge men who are proved to be guilty of defined crime; and its suspension is allowed by the Constitution on purpose that men may be arrested and held who cannot be proved to be guilty of defined crime, "when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it."

This is precisely our present case—a case of rebellion wherein the public safety does require the suspension. Indeed, arrests by process of courts and arrests in cases of rebellion do not proceed altogether upon the same basis. The former is directed at the small percentage of ordinary and continuous perpetration of crime, while the latter is directed at sudden and extensive uprisings against the Government, which, at most, will succeed or fail in no great length of time. In the latter case arrests are made not so much for what has been done, as for what probably would be done. The latter is more for the preventive and less for the vindictive than the former. In such cases the purposes of men are much more easily understood than in cases of ordinary crime. The man who stands by and says nothing when the peril of his government is discussed, cannot be misunderstood. If not hindered, he is sure to help the enemy; much more if he talks ambiguously—talks for

his country with "buts," and "ifs" and "ands." Of how little value the constitutional provision I have quoted will be rendered if arrests shall never be made until defined crimes shall have been committed, may be illustrated by a few notable examples: General John C. Breckinridge, General Robert E. Lee, General Joseph E. Johnston, General John B. Magruder, General William B. Preston, General Simon B. Buckner, and Commodore Franklin Buchanan, now occupying the very highest places in the rebel war service, were all within the power of the Government since the rebellion began, and were nearly as well known to be traitors then as now. Unquestionably if we had seized and held them, the insurgent cause would be much weaker. But no one of them had then committed any crime defined in the law. Every one of them, if arrested, would have been discharged on *habeas corpus* were the writ allowed to operate. In view of these and similar cases, I think the time not unlikely to come when I shall be blamed for having made too few arrests rather than too many.

By the third resolution the meeting indicate their opinion that military arrests may be constitutional in localities where rebellion actually exists, but that such arrests are unconstitutional in localities where rebellion or insurrection does not actually exist. They insist that such arrests shall not be made "outside of the lines of necessary military occupation and the scenes of insurrection." Inasmuch, however, as the Constitution itself makes no such distinction, I am unable to believe that there is any such constitutional distinction. I concede that the class of

arrests complained of can be constitutional only when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require them; and I insist that in such cases they are constitutional wherever the public safety does require them, as well in places to which they may prevent the rebellion extending, as in those where it may be already prevailing; as well where they may restrain mischievous interference with the raising and supplying of armies to suppress the rebellion, as where the rebellion may actually be; as well where they may restrain the enticing men out of the army, as where they would prevent mutiny in the army; equally constitutional at all places where they will conduce to the public safety as against the dangers of rebellion or invasion. Take the particular case mentioned by the meeting. It is asserted in substance, that Mr. Vallandigham was, by a military commander, seized and tried "for no other reason than words addressed to a public meeting in criticism of the course of the Administration, and in condemnation of the military orders of the general." Now, if there be no mistake about this, if this assertion is the truth, and the whole truth, if there was no other reason for the arrest, then I concede that the arrest was wrong. But the arrest as I undersand, was made for a very different reason. Mr. Vallandigham avows his hostility to the war on the part of the Union; and his arrest was made because he was laboring, with some effect, to prevent the raising of troops, to encourage desertions from the army, and to leave the rebellion without an adequate military force to suppress it. He was not arrested because he was damaging the political prospects

of the Administration or the personal interests of the commanding general, but because he was damaging the army, upon the existence and vigor of which the life of the nation depends. He was warring upon the military, and this gave the military constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands upon him. If Mr. Vallandigham was not damaging the military power of the country, then his arrest was made on mistake of fact, which I would be glad to correct on reasonably satisfactory evidence.

I understand the meeting whose resolutions I am considering to be in favor of suppressing the rebellion by military force—by armies. Long experience has shown that armies cannot be maintained unless desertion shall be punished by the severe penalty of death. The case requires, and the law and the Constitution sanction, this punishment. Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by getting a father, or brother, or friend into a public meeting, and there working upon his feelings till he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked administration of a contemptible government, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think that, in such a case, to silence the agitator and save the boy is not only constitutional, but withal a great mercy.

If I be wrong on this question of constitutional power, my error lies in believing that certain proceedings are constitutional when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires them, which would not be constitutional

when, in absence of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does not require them: in other words, that the Constitution is not in its application in all respects the same in cases of rebellion or invasion involving the public safety, as it is in times of profound peace and public security. The Constitution itself makes the distinction, and I can no more be persuaded that the Government can constitutionally take no strong measures in time of rebellion, because it can be shown that the same could not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I can be persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man because it can be shown to not be good food for a well one. Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended by the meeting, that the American people will by means of military arrests during the rebellion lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of evidence, trial by jury, and *habeas corpus* throughout the indefinite peaceful future which I trust lies before them, any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during temporary illness as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life.

In giving the resolutions that earnest consideration which you request of me, I cannot overlook the fact that the meeting speak as "Democrats." Nor can I, with full respect for their known intelligence, and the fairly presumed deliberation with which they prepared their resolutions, be permitted to suppose that this occurred by accident, or in any way other than that they preferred to designate themselves "Democrats" rather than "American citizens." In this time

of national peril I would have preferred to meet you upon a level one step higher than any party platform, because I am sure that from such more elevated position we could do better battle for the country we all love than we possibly can from those lower ones where, from the force of habit, the prejudices of the past, and selfish hopes of the future, we are sure to expend much of our ingenuity and strength in finding fault with and aiming blows at each other. But since you have denied me this, I will yet be thankful for the country's sake that not all Democrats have done so. He on whose discretionary judgment Mr. Vallandigham was arrested and tried is a Democrat having no old party affinity with me, and the judge who rejected the constitutional view expressed in these resolutions, by refusing to discharge Mr. Vallandigham on *habeas corpus,* is a Democrat of better days than these, having received his judicial mantle at the hands of President Jackson. And still more, of all those Democrats who are nobly exposing their lives and shedding their blood on the battle-field, I have learned that many approve the course taken with Mr. Vallandigham, while I have not heard of a single one condemning it. I cannot assert that there are none such. And the name of President Jackson recalls an instance of pertinent history. After the battle of New Orleans, and while the fact that the treaty of peace had been concluded was well known in the city, but before official knowledge of it had arrived, General Jackson still maintained martial or military law. Now that it could be said the war was over, the clamor against martial law, which had existed from the first, grew more furious.

Among other things, a Mr. Louaillier published a denunciatory newspaper article. General Jackson arrested him. A lawyer by the name of Morel procured the United States Judge Hall to order a writ of *habeas corpus* to release Mr. Louaillier. General Jackson arrested both the lawyer and the judge. A Mr. Hollander ventured to say of some part of the matter that "it was a dirty trick." General Jackson arrested him. When the officer undertook to serve the writ of *habeas corpus,* General Jackson took it from him, and sent him away with a copy. Holding the judge in custody a few days, the general sent him beyond the limits of his encampment, and set him at liberty with an order to remain till the ratification of peace should be regularly announced, or until the British should have left the southern coast. A day or two more elapsed, the ratification of the treaty of peace was regularly announced, and the judge and others were fully liberated. A few days more and the judge called General Jackson into court and fined him $1,000 for having arrested him and the others named. The general paid the fine, and then the matter rested for nearly thirty years, when Congress refunded principal and interest. The late Senator Douglas, then in the House of Representatives, took a leading part in the debates in which the constitutional question was much discussed. I am not prepared to say whom the journals would show to have voted for the measure.

It may be remarked—first, that we had the same Constitution then as now; secondly, that we then had a case of invasion, and now we have a case of rebellion; and, thirdly, that the

permanent right of the people to public discussion, the liberty of speech and of the press, the trial by jury, the law of evidence, and the *habeas corpus,* suffered no detriment whatever by that conduct of General Jackson, or its subsequent approval by the American Congress.

And yet, let me say that in my own discretion, I do not know whether I would have ordered the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham. While I cannot shift the responsibility from myself, I hold that, as a general rule, the commander in the field is the better judge of the necessity in any particular case. Of course I must practise a general directory and revisory power in the matter.

One of the resolutions expresses the opinion of the meeting that arbitrary arrests will have the effect to divide and distract those who should be united in suppressing the rebellion, and I am specifically called on to discharge Mr. Vallandigham. I regard this as, at least, a fair appeal to me on the expediency of exercising a constitutional power which I think exists. In response to such appeal I have to say, it gave me pain when I learned that Mr. Vallandigham had been arrested (that is, I was pained that there should have seemed to be a necessity for arresting him), and that it will afford me great pleasure to discharge him so soon as I can by any means believe the public safety will not suffer by it.

I further say that, as the war progresses, it appears to me, opinion and action, which were in great confusion at first, take shape and fall into more regular channels, so that the necessity for strong dealing with them gradually de-

creases. I have every reason to desire that it should cease altogether, and far from the least is my regard for the opinions and wishes of those who, like the meeting at Albany, declare their purpose to sustain the Government in every constitutional and lawful measure to suppress the rebellion. Still, I must continue to do so much as may seem to be required by the public safety. A. Lincoln.

Israel D. Andrews.

[*Memorandum.*]

Executive Mansion, June 17, 1863.

Mr. Israel D. Andrews appeals to me, saying he is suffering injury by something I have said of him. I really know very little of Mr. Andrews. As well as I can remember, I was called on by one or two persons asking me to give him or aid him in getting some public employment; and as a reason for declining I stated that I had a very unfavorable opinion of him, chiefly because I had been informed that, in connection with some former service of his to the Government, he had presented an enormous and unjustifiable claim, which I understood he was still pressing the Government to pay. I certainly did not pretend to know anything of the matter personally; and I say now, I do not personally know anything which should detract from Mr. Andrews's character. A. Lincoln.

David Tod.[1]

[*Cipher Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, June 18, 1863.

Governor D. Tod, Columbus, Ohio.

Yours received. I deeply regret that you were not renominated, not that I have aught against Mr. Brough. On the contrary like yourself, I say hurrah for him. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, June 30, 1864.

Hon. David Tod, Youngstown, Ohio.

I have nominated you to be Secretary of the Treasury, in place of Governor Chase, who has resigned. Please come without a moment's delay. A. Lincoln.

E. E. Malhiot and Others.

On June 19, 1863, the President replied to a letter of E. E. Malhiot, Bradish Johnson, and Thomas Cottman, a committee appointed by Louisiana planters to secure Federal recognition of a loyal State government, as follows:

Since receiving the letter, reliable information has reached me that a respectable portion of the Louisiana people desire to amend their State constitution, and contemplate holding a State

[1] David Tod was Governor of Ohio from 1862 to 1864. In the fall of 1863 the Peace Democrats nominated for Governor Clement L. Vallandigham as a protest against the Government's procedure in arresting him, and the Republicans thought it wise to oppose him with a War Democrat, so John Brough was chosen to make the run. Governor Tod declined the President's offer of Secretaryship of the Treasury.

convention for that object. This fact alone, as it seems to me, is a sufficient reason why the General Government should not give the committal you seek to the existing State constitution. I may add that while I do not perceive how such committal could facilitate our military operations in Louisiana, I really apprehend it might be so used as to embarrass them.

As to an election to be held next November, there is abundant time without any order or proclamation from me just now. The people of Louisiana shall not lack an opportunity for a fair election for both Federal and State officers by want of anything within my power to give them. Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln.

Ohio Democratic State Convention.

Washington, D. C., June 29, 1863.

Messrs. M. Birchard [and Others].

Gentlemen: The resolutions of the Ohio Democratic State convention, which you present me, together with your introductory and closing remarks, being in position and argument mainly the same as the resolutions of the Democratic meeting at Albany, New York, I refer you to my response to the latter as meeting most of the points in the former.

This response you evidently used in preparing your remarks, and I desire no more than that it be used with accuracy. In a single reading of your remarks, I only discovered one inaccuracy in matter which I suppose you took from that paper. It is where you say: "The undersigned are unable to agree with you in the opinion you have expressed that the Constitution

is different in time of insurrection or invasion from what it is in time of peace and public security."

A recurrence to the paper will show you that I have not expressed the opinion you suppose. I expressed the opinion that the Constitution is different in its application in cases of rebellion or invasion, involving the public safety, from what it is in times of profound peace and public security; and this opinion I adhere to, simply because, by the Constitution itself, things may be done in the one case which may not be done in the other.

I dislike to waste a word on a merely personal point, but I must respectfully assure you that you will find yourselves at fault should you ever seek for evidence to prove your assumption that I "opposed, in discussions before the people, the policy of the Mexican War."

You say: "Expunge from the Constitution this limitation upon the power of Congress to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* and yet the other guarantees of personal liberty would remain unchanged." Doubtless, if this clause of the Constitution, improperly called, as I think, a limitation upon the power of Congress, were expunged, the other guarantees would remain the same; but the question is not how those guarantees would stand with that clause out of the Constitution, but how they stand with that clause remaining in it, in case of rebellion or invasion involving the public safety. If the liberty could be indulged of expunging that clause, letter and spirit, I really think the constitutional argument would be with you.

My general view on this question was stated

in the Albany response, and hence I do not state it now. I only add that, as seems to me, the benefit of the writ of *habeas corpus* is the great means through which the guarantees of personal liberty are conserved and made available in the last resort; and corroborative of this view is the fact that Mr. Vallandigham, in the very case in question, under the advice of able lawyers, saw not where else to go but to the *habeas corpus*. But by the Constitution the benefit of the writ of *habeas corpus* itself may be suspended when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.

You ask, in substance, whether I really claim that I may override all the guaranteed rights of individuals, on the plea of conserving the public safety—when I may choose to say the public safety requires it. This question, divested of the phraseology calculated to represent me as struggling for an arbitrary personal prerogative, is either simply a question who shall decide, or an affirmation that nobody shall decide, what the public safety does require in cases of rebellion or invasion.

The Constitution contemplates the question as likely to occur for decision, but it does not expressly declare who is to decide it. By necessary implication, when rebellion or invasion comes, the decision is to be made from time to time; and I think the man whom, for the time, the people have, under the Constitution, made the commander-in-chief of their army and navy, is the man who holds the power and bears the responsibility of making it. If he uses the power justly, the same people will probably justify him; if he abuses it, he is in their hands to be dealt

with by all the modes they have reserved to themselves in the Constitution.

The earnestness with which you insist that persons can only, in times of rebellion, be lawfully dealt with in accordance with the rules for criminal trials and punishments in times of peace, induces me to add a word to what I said on that point in the Albany response.

You claim that men may, if they choose, embarrass those whose duty it is to combat a giant rebellion, and then be dealt with in turn, only as if there were no rebellion. The Constitution itself rejects this view. The military arrests and detentions which have been made, including those of Mr. Vallandigham, which are not different in principle from the others, have been for prevention, and not for punishment—as injunctions to stay injury, as proceedings to keep the peace; and hence, like proceedings in such cases and for like reasons, they have not been accompanied with indictments, or trials by juries, nor in a single case by any punishment whatever, beyond what is purely incidental to the prevention. The original sentence of imprisonment in Mr. Vallandigham's case was to prevent injury to the military service only, and the modification of it was made as a less disagreeable mode to him of securing the same prevention.

I am unable to perceive an insult to Ohio in the case of Mr. Vallandigham. Quite surely nothing of the sort was or is intended. I was wholly unaware that Mr. Vallandigham was, at the time of his arrest, a candidate for the Democratic nomination for governor until so informed by your reading to me the resolutions of the convention. I am grateful to the State of Ohio

for many things, especially for the brave soldiers and officers she has given in the present national trial to the armies of the Union.

You claim, as I understand, that according to my own position in the Albany response, Mr. Vallandigham should be released; and this because, as you claim, he has not damaged the military service by discouraging enlistments, encouraging desertions, or otherwise; and that if he had, he should have been turned over to the civil authorities under the recent acts of Congress. I certainly do not know that Mr. Vallandigham has specifically and by direct language advised against enlistments and in favor of desertion and resistance to drafting.

We all know that combinations, armed in some instances, to resist the arrest of deserters began several months ago; that more recently the like has appeared in resistance to the enrolment preparatory to a draft; and that quite a number of assassinations have occurred from the same animus. These had to be met by military force, and this again has led to bloodshed and death. And now, under a sense of responsibility more weighty and enduring than any which is merely official, I solemnly declare my belief that this hindrance of the military, including maiming and murder, is due to the course in which Mr. Vallandigham has been engaged in a greater degree than to any other cause; and it is due to him personally in a greater degree than to any other one man.

These things have been notorious, known to all, and of course known to Mr. Vallandigham. Perhaps I would not be wrong to say they originated with his special friends and adherents.

With perfect knowledge of them, he has frequently if not constantly made speeches in Congress and before popular assemblies; and if it can be shown that, with these things staring him in the face, he has ever uttered a word of rebuke or counsel against them, it will be a fact greatly in his favor with me, and one of which as yet I am totally ignorant. When it is known that the whole burden of his speeches has been to stir up men against the prosecution of the war, and that in the midst of resistance to it he has not been known in any instance to counsel against such resistance, it is next to impossible to repel the inference that he has counseled directly in favor of it.

With all this before their eyes, the convention you represent have nominated Mr. Vallandigham for governor of Ohio, and both they and you have declared the purpose to sustain the National Union by all constitutional means. But of course they and you in common reserve to yourselves to decide what are constitutional means; and, unlike the Albany meeting, you omit to state or intimate that in your opinion an army is a constitutional means of saving the Union against a rebellion, or even to intimate that you are conscious of an existing rebellion being in progress with the avowed object of destroying that very Union. At the same time your nominee for governor, in whose behalf you appeal, is known to you and to the world to declare against the use of an army to suppress the rebellion. Your own attitude, therefore, encourages desertion, resistance to the draft, and the like, because it teaches those who incline to desert and to escape the draft to believe it is your purpose

to protect them, and to hope that you will become strong enough to do so.

After a short personal intercourse with you, gentlemen of the committee, I cannot say I think you desire this effect to follow your attitude; but I assure you that both friends and enemies of the Union look upon it in this light. It is a substantial hope, and by consequence a real strength to the enemy. If it is a false hope and one which you would willingly dispel, I will make the way exceedingly easy.

I send you duplicates of this letter in order that you, or a majority of you, may, if you choose, indorse your names upon one of them and return it thus indorsed to me with the understanding that those signing are thereby committed to the following propositions and to nothing else:

1. That there is now a rebellion in the United States, the object and tendency of which is to destroy the National Union; and that, in your opinion, an army and navy are constitutional means for suppressing that rebellion;

2. That no one of you will do anything which, in his own judgment, will tend to hinder the increase, or favor the decrease, or lessen the efficiency of the army or navy while engaged in the effort to suppress that rebellion; and

3. That each of you will, in his sphere, do all he can to have the officers, soldiers, and seamen of the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress the rebellion, paid, fed, clad, and otherwise well provided for and supported.

And with the further understanding that upon receiving the letter and names thus indorsed, I will cause them to be published, which publica-

tion shall be, within itself, a revocation of the order in relation to Mr. Vallandigham.[1]

It will not escape observation that I consent to the release of Mr. Vallandigham upon terms not embracing any pledge from him or from others as to what he will or will not do. I do this because he is not present to speak for himself, or to authorize others to speak for him; and because I should expect that on his returning he would not put himself practically in antagonism with the position of his friends. But I do it chiefly because I thereby prevail on other influential gentlemen of Ohio to so define their position as to be of immense value to the army —thus more than compensating for the consequences of any mistake in allowing Mr. Vallandigham to return; so that, on the whole, the public safety will not have suffered by it. Still, in regard to Mr. Vallandigham and all others, I must hereafter, as heretofore, do so much as the public safety may seem to require.

I have the honor to be respectfully yours, etc.,

A. Lincoln.

William Kellogg.

See letter of June 25, 1863, to Salmon P. Chase.

Executive Mansion, June 29, 1863.

Hon. William Kellogg.

My dear Sir: I have received and read your pencil note. I think you do not know how embarrassing your request is.[2] Few things are so

[1] The committee did not accept this proposition, as, indeed, the President did not expect that they would. Governor Brough was elected over Vallandigham by an overwhelming majority.

[2] In reference to trading with the South through the army lines.

troublesome to the Government as the fierceness with which the profits in trading are sought. The temptation is so great that nearly everybody wishes to be in it; and, when in, the question of profit controls all, regardless of whether the cotton-seller is loyal or rebel, or whether he is paid in corn-meal or gunpowder. The officers of the army, in numerous instances, are believed to connive and share the profits, and thus the army itself is diverted from fighting the rebels to speculating in cotton, and steamboats and wagons in the pay of the Government are set to gathering and carrying cotton, and the soldiers to loading cotton-trains and guarding them.

The matter deeply affects the Treasury and War Departments, and has been discussed again and again in the Cabinet. What can and what cannot be done has for the time been settled, and it seems to me I cannot safely break over it. I know it is thought that one case is not much, but how can I favor one and deny another? One case cannot be kept a secret. The authority given would be utterly ineffectual until it is shown, and when shown, everybody knows of it.

The Administration would do for you as much as for any other man; and I personally would do some more than for most others; but really I cannot involve myself and the Government as this would do. Yours as ever, A. Lincoln.

ROBERT H. MILROY.

[*Private.*]

Executive Mansion, June 29, 1863.

Major-General Milroy.

My dear Sir: Your letters to Mr. Blair and to myself are handed to me by him. I have never doubted your courage and devotion to the cause. But you have just lost a division, and, *prima facie*, the fault is upon you; and while that remains unchanged, for me to put you in command again is to justly subject me to the charge of having put you there on purpose to have you lose another. If I knew facts sufficient to satisfy me that you were not in fault or error, the case would be different; but the facts I do know, while they are not at all conclusive (and I hope they may never prove so), tend the other way.

First, I have scarcely seen anything from you at any time that did not contain imputations against your superiors, and a chafing against acting the part they had assigned you. You have constantly urged the idea that you were persecuted because you did not come from West Point, and you repeat it in these letters. This, my dear general, is, I fear, the rock on which you have split.

In the Winchester case you were under General Schenck, and he under General Halleck. I know by General Halleck's order-book that he, on the 11th of June, advised General Schenck to call you in from Winchester to Harper's Ferry; and I have been told, but do not know, that General Schenck gave you the order accordingly on the same day; and I have been told, but do not know, that on receiving it, instead of obeying it,

you sent by mail a written protest against obeying it, which did not reach him until you were actually beleaguered at Winchester.

I say I do not know this. You hate West Point generally and General Halleck particularly; but I do know that it is not his fault that you were at Winchester on the 13th, 14th, and morning of the 15th—the days of your disaster. If General Schenck gave the order on the 11th, as General Halleck advised, it was an easy matter for you to have been off at least on the 12th. The case is inevitably between General Schenck and you.

Neither General Halleck nor any one else, as far as I know, required you to stay and fight 60,000 with 6,000, as you insinuate.

I know General Halleck, through General Schenck, required you to get away, and that in abundant time for you to have done it.

General Schenck is not a West-Pointer, and has no prejudice against you on that score.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

See letter of December 19, 1863, to Ulysses S. Grant.

On October 27, 1863, the President gave an opinion on General Milroy's disaster, for which he had been tried. In this Lincoln said that Milroy's immediate superior, General Schenck, believed the service of the force at Winchester was worth the hazard, and so did not positively order its withdrawal until it was too late. He concluded:

Serious blame is not necessarily due to any serious disaster, and I cannot say that in this case any of the officers are deserving of serious blame. No court-martial is deemed necessary or proper in the case.

Joel Parker.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, June 30, 1863.

Governor Parker, Trenton, N. J.

Your despatch of yesterday received. I really think the attitude of the enemy's army in Pennsylvania presents us the best opportunity we have had since the war began. I think you will not see the foe in New Jersey. I beg you to be assured that no one out of my position can know so well as if he were in it, the difficulties and involvements of replacing General McClellan in command, and this aside from any imputations upon him. Please accept my sincere thanks for what you have done and are doing to get troops forward. A. Lincoln.

Alexander Kelly McClure.[1]

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, June 30, 1863.

A. K. McClure, Philadelphia.

Do we gain anything by opening one leak to stop another? Do we gain anything by quieting one clamor merely to open another, and probably a larger one? A. Lincoln.

S. P. Lee.

When the Confederate Government realized that Vicksburg was doomed, Vice-President Stephens went on a steamer to Fort Monroe bearing proposals of peace from Jefferson Davis, "Commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces of the Confederate States,"

[1] Sent in reply to a letter urging the reinstatement of McClellan after Hooker's resignation.

to Abraham Lincoln, "Commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces of the United States." On July 4, after the victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the President instructed Admiral Lee at Fort Monroe to refuse the request of Mr. Stephens to proceed to Washington with the letter, saying:

[*Telegram.*]

The customary agents and channels are adequate for all needful communication and conference between the United States forces and the insurgents. A. Lincoln.

GEORGE G. MEADE.

On June 23, 1863, General Meade was placed in command of the Army of the Potomac.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., July 7, 1863.

Major-General Meade, Army of the Potomac.

I have received from the President the following note, which I respectfully communicate:

Major-General Halleck.

We have certain information that Vicksburg surrendered to General Grant on the Fourth of July. Now, if General Meade can complete his work so gloriously prosecuted thus far, by the literal or substantial destruction of Lee's army, the rebellion will be over.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

H. W. Halleck, General-in-chief.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., July 8, 1863.

Major-General Meade, Frederick, Maryland.

There is reliable information that the enemy is crossing at Williamsport. The opportunity to

attack his divided forces should not be lost. The President is urgent and anxious that your army should move against him by forced marches.

H. W. Halleck, General-in-chief.

[*Private.*]

Executive Mansion, July 27, 1863.

Major-General Meade.

I have not thrown General Hooker away; and therefore I would like to know whether it would be agreeable to you, all things considered, for him to take a corps under you, if he himself is willing to do so. Write me in perfect freedom, with the assurance that I will not subject you to any embarrassment by making your letter or its contents known to any one. I wish to know your wishes before I decide whether to break the subject to him. Do not lean a hair's breath against your own feelings, or your judgment of the public service, on the idea of gratifying me.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, August 11, 1863.

My dear General Meade.

Yesterday week I made known to General Hooker our brief correspondence in regard to him. He seemed gratified with the kind spirit manifested by both of us; but said he was busy preparing a report and would consider.

Yesterday he called again, and said he would accept the offer if it was still open; would go at once if you desire, but would prefer waiting till the 1st of September, unless there was to be a battle, or you desire him to come sooner. I told him I would write you. Please answer.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

War Department, October 8, 1863.
Major-General Meade, Army of Potomac.

I am appealed to in behalf of August Blittersdorf, at Mitchell's Station, Va., to be shot tomorrow as a deserter. I am unwilling for any boy under eighteen to be shot, and his father affirms that he is yet under sixteen. Please answer. His regiment or company not given me.

A. Lincoln.

In March, 1864, charges were made against General Meade by the *New York Herald* which caused him to ask for a court of inquiry. To this request the President replied on March 29, 1864:

It is quite natural that you should feel some sensibility on the subject; yet I am not impressed, nor do I think the country is impressed, with the belief that your honor demands, or the public interest demands, such an inquiry. The country knows that at all events you have done good service; and I believe it agrees with me that it is much better for you to be engaged in trying to do more, than to be diverted, as you necessarily would be, by a court of inquiry.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Lorenzo Thomas.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, July 8, 1863. 12.30 p. m.
General Lorenzo Thomas, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

Your despatch of this morning to the Secretary of War is before me. The forces you speak of will be of no imaginable service if they cannot go forward with a little more expedition. Lee is

now passing the Potomac faster than the forces you mention are passing Carlisle. Forces now beyond Carlisle to be joined by regiments still at Harrisburg, and the united force again to join Pierce somewhere, and the whole to move down the Cumberland Valley, will, in my unprofessional opinion, be quite as likely to capture the "man in the moon" as any part of Lee's army.

A. Lincoln.

War Department, February 28, 1864.

General L. Thomas, Louisville, Kentucky.

I see your despatch of yesterday to the Secretary of War.

I wish you would go to the Mississippi River at once, and take hold of and be master in the contraband and leasing business. You understand it better than any other man does. Mr. Miller's system doubtless is well intended, but from what I hear I fear that, if persisted in, it would fall dead within its own entangling details. Go there and be the judge. A Mr. Lewis will probably follow you with something from me on this subject, but do not wait for him. Nor is this to induce you to violate or neglect any military order from the general-in-chief or Secretary of War.

A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, March 1, 1864.

General L. Thomas.

This introduces Mr. Lewis, mentioned in my despatch sent you at Louisville some days ago. I have but little personal acquaintance with him; but he has the confidence of several members of Congress here who seem to know him well. He hopes to be useful, without charge to the

Government, in facilitating the introduction of the free-labor system on the Mississippi plantations. He is acquainted with, and has access to, many of the planters who wish to adopt the system. He will show you two letters of mine on this subject, one somewhat general, and the other relating to named persons. They are not different in principle. He will also show you some suggestions coming from some of the planters themselves. I desire that all I promise in these letters, so far as practicable, may be in good faith carried out, and that suggestions from the planters may be heard and adopted, so far as they may not contravene the principles stated, nor justice, nor fairness, to laborers. I do not herein intend to overrule your own mature judgment on any point. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, June 13, 1864.

Major-General Thomas, Louisville, Kentucky.

Complaint is made to me that in the vicinity of Henderson, our militia are seizing negroes and carrying them off without their own consent, and according to no rules whatever, except those of absolute violence. I wish you would look into this and inform me, and see that the making soldiers of negroes is done according to the rules you are acting upon, so that unnecessary provocation and irritation be avoided. A. Lincoln.

Thomas Carney.

Governor Carney and General James G. Blunt had a controversy over military authority in Kansas, in which the President supported the Governor. On July 21, 1863, he wrote him a letter which ended as follows:

It is my purpose to take care that he [*Blunt*] shall not any more take persons charged with civil crimes out of the custody of the courts, and turn them over to mobs to be hanged.

Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln.

[*Indorsement of Letter Dated May 13, 1864.*]

The within letter is, to my mind, so obviously intended as a page for a political record, as to be difficult to answer in a straightforward, businesslike way. The merits of the Kansas people need not to be argued to me. They are just as good as any other loyal and patriotic people, and as such, to the best of my ability I have always treated them, and intend to treat them. It is not my recollection that I said to you Senator Lane would probably oppose raising troops in Kansas because it would confer patronage upon you. What I did say was, that he would probably oppose it because he and you were in a mood of each opposing whatever the other should propose. I did argue generally, too, that in my opinion there is not a more foolish or demoralizing way of conducting a political rivalry than these fierce and bitter struggles for patronage.

As to your demand that I will accept or reject your proposition to furnish troops, made to me yesterday, I have to say I took the proposition under advisement, in good faith, as I believe you know; that you can withdraw it if you wish; but while it remains before me, I shall neither accept nor reject it until, with reference to the public interest, I shall feel that I am ready.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

May 14, 1864.

Oliver O. Howard.

Executive Mansion, July 21, 1863.

My dear General Howard:

Your letter of the 18th is received. I was deeply mortified by the escape of Lee across the Potomac, because the substantial destruction of his army would have ended the war, and because I believed such destruction was perfectly easy—believed that General Meade and his noble army had expended all the skill, and toil, and blood, up to the ripe harvest, and then let the crop go to waste.

Perhaps my mortification was heightened because I had always believed—making my belief a hobby, possibly—that the main rebel army going north of the Potomac could never return, if well attended to; and because I was so greatly flattered in this belief by the operations at Gettysburg. A few days having passed, I am now profoundly grateful for what was done, without criticism for what was not done.

General Meade has my confidence, as a brave and skilful officer and a true man.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

Montgomery Blair.[1]

[1] Montgomery Blair, of Maryland, Lincoln's Postmaster-General, was a son of Francis P. Blair, Sr. He was removed by President Buchanan in 1855 from his position of U. S. solicitor in the Court of Claims because of his opposition to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. In 1857 he acted as counsel for the plaintiff in the Dred Scott case. He stood almost alone in the Cabinet in opposing the surrender of Fort Sumter.

Executive Mansion, July 24, 1863.

Hon. Postmaster-General.

Sir: Yesterday little indorsements of mine went to you in two cases of postmasterships sought for widows whose husbands have fallen in the battles of this war. These cases occurring on the same day brought me to reflect more attentively than I had before done, as to what is fairly due from us here in the dispensing of patronage toward the men who, by fighting our battles, bear the chief burden of saving our country. My conclusion is that, other claims and qualifications being equal, they have the better right; and this is especially applicable to the disabled soldier and the deceased soldier's family. Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, November 2, 1863.

Hon. Montgomery Blair.

My dear Sir: Some days ago I understood you to say that your brother, General Frank Blair, desires to be guided by my wishes as to whether he will occupy his seat in Congress or remain in the field. My wish, then, is compounded of what I believe will be best for the country and best for him, and it is that he will come here, put his military commission in my hands, take his seat, go into caucus with our friends, abide the nominations, help elect the nominees, and thus aid to organize a House of Representatives which will really support the Government in the war. If the result shall be the election of himself as Speaker, let him serve in that position; if not, let him retake his commission and return to the army. For the country this will heal a dangerous schism; for him

it will relieve from a dangerous position. By a misunderstanding, as I think, he is in danger of being permanently separated from those with whom only he can ever have a real sympathy —the sincere opponents of slavery. It will be a mistake if he shall allow the provocations offered him by insincere time-servers to drive him out of the house of his own building. He is young yet. He has abundant talent—quite enough to occupy all his time without devoting any to temper. He is rising in military skill and usefulness. His recent appointment to the command of a corps by one so competent to judge as General Sherman proves this. In that line he can serve both the country and himself more profitably than he could as a member of Congress on the floor. The foregoing is what I would say if Frank Blair were my brother instead of yours. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

General Frank Blair followed this advice to the letter. Failing to be elected Speaker, he reëntered the army, and won fame for himself under Sherman. After the war he joined the Democratic party, becoming its candidate for Vice-President in 1868. This letter of Lincoln's was published some time after its date, and gave great offense to the enemies of the Blairs. Montgomery Blair was very irascible and indiscreet, and these enemies soon found sufficient reasons to urge Lincoln to remove him. This Lincoln did in the following kindly manner:

Executive Mansion, September 23, 1864.

Hon. Montgomery Blair.

My dear Sir: You have generously said to me more than once that whenever your resignation could be a relief to me it was at my disposal. The time has come. You very well know

that this proceeds from no dissatisfaction of mine with you personally or officially. Your uniform kindness has been unsurpassed by that of any friend; and while it is true that the war does not so greatly add to the difficulties of your department as to those of some others, it is yet much to say, as I most truly can, that in the three years and a half during which you have administered the general post-office, I remember no single complaint against you in connection therewith. Yours, A. Lincoln.

Francis P. Blair, Sr.

Executive Mansion, July 30, 1863.

Hon. F. P. Blair.

My dear Sir: Yours of to-day, with inclosure, is received. Yesterday I commenced trying to get up an expedition for Texas.

I shall do the best I can. Meantime I would like to know who is the great man Alexander, that talks so oracularly about "if the President keeps his word" and Banks not having "capacity to run an omnibus on Broadway"? How has this Alexander's immense light been obscured hitherto? Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Mr. Blair conceived the idea that, through his personal acquaintance with many Confederate leaders, he might be able to effect a peace. Without telling President Lincoln of his intention, he asked him for a pass.

[*Pass.*]

Allow the bearer, F. P. Blair, Sr., to pass our lines, go South, and return. A. Lincoln.

December 28, 1864.

Mr. Blair had several interviews with Jefferson Davis and members of his Cabinet, which led to an abortive peace conference on February 3, 1865.

Washington, January 18, 1865.

F. P. Blair, Esq.

Sir: You having shown me Mr. [*Jefferson*] Davis's letter to you of the 12th instant, you may say to him that I have constantly been, am now, and shall continue, ready to receive any agent whom he or any other influential person now resisting the national authority may informally send to me with the view of securing peace to the people of our one common country.

Yours, etc., A. Lincoln.

[*Indorsement.*]

January 28, 1865.

To-day Mr. Blair tells me that on the 21st instant he delivered to Mr. Davis the original of which the within is a copy, and left it with him; that at the time of delivering it Mr. Davis read it over twice in Mr. Blair's presence, at the close of which he (Mr. Blair) remarked that the part about "our one common country" related to the part of Mr. Davis's letter about "the two countries," to which Mr. Davis replied that he so understood it. A. Lincoln.

——— Moulton.

Executive Mansion, July 31, 1863.

My dear Sir: There has been a good deal of complaint against you by your superior officers of the Provost-Marshal-General's Department, and your removal has been strongly urged on

the ground of "persistent disobedience of orders and neglect of duty." Firmly convinced, as I am, of the patriotism of your motives, I am unwilling to do anything in your case which may seem unnecessarily harsh or at variance with the feelings of personal respect and esteem with which I have always regarded you. I consider your services in your district valuable, and should be sorry to lose them. It is unnecessary for me to state, however, that when differences of opinion arise between officers of the Government, the ranking officer must be obeyed. You, of course, recognize as clearly as I do the importance of this rule. I hope you will conclude to go on in your present position under the regulations of the department. I wish you would write to me. I am very truly your friend and obedient servant, A. Lincoln.

STEPHEN A. HURLBUT.

Executive Mansion, July 31, 1863.

My dear General Hurlbut.

The emancipation proclamation applies to Arkansas.[1] I think it is valid in law, and will be so held by the courts. I think I shall not retract or repudiate it. Those who shall have tasted actual freedom I believe can never be slaves or quasi-slaves again. For the rest, I believe some plan substantially being gradual emancipation would be better for both white and black. The Missouri plan, recently adopted, I do not object to on account of the time for ending the institution;[2] but I am sorry the beginning should have

[1] General Hurlbut was in command in this State.

[2] Missouri had decided that all slaves in the State should become free in 1870.

been postponed for seven years, leaving all that time to agitate for the repeal of the whole thing. It should begin at once, giving at least the newborn a vested interest in freedom which could not be taken away. If Senator Sebastian could come with something of this sort from Arkansas, I, at least, should take great interest in his case; and I believe a single individual will have scarcely done the world so great a service. See him, if you can, and read this to him; but charge him to not make it public for the present. Write me again. Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, May 2, 1864.

Major-General Hurlbut.

My dear Sir: General Farnsworth has just been reading to me from your letter to him of the 26th ultimo. I snatch a moment to say that my friendship and confidence for you remain unabated, but that Generals Grant and Thomas cannot be held to their just responsibilities if they are not allowed to control in the class of cases to which yours belongs.

From one standpoint a court of inquiry is most just, but if your case were my own I would not allow Generals Grant and Sherman [*to*] be diverted by it just now.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Private.*]

Executive Mansion, November 14, 1864.

Major-General Hurlbut.

Few things since I have been here have impressed me more painfully than what, for four or five months past, has appeared a bitter mili-

tary opposition to the new State government of Louisiana. I still indulged some hope that I was mistaken in the fact; but copies of a correspondence on the subject between General Canby and yourself, and shown me to-day, dispel that hope. A very fair proportion of the people of Louisiana have inaugurated a new State government, making an excellent new constitution—better for the poor black man than we have in Illinois. This was done under military protection, directed by me, in the belief, still sincerely entertained, that with such a nucleus around which to build we could get the State into position again sooner than otherwise. In this belief a general promise of protection and support, applicable alike to Louisiana and other States, was given in the last annual message. During the formation of the new government and constitution they were supported by nearly every loyal person, and opposed by every secessionist. And this support and this opposition, from the respective standpoints of the parties, was perfectly consistent and logical. Every Unionist ought to wish the new government to succeed; and every disunionist must desire it to fail. Its failure would gladden the heart of Slidell in Europe, and of every enemy of the old flag in the world. Every advocate of slavery naturally desires to see blasted and crushed the liberty promised the black man by the new constitution. But why General Canby and General Hurlbut should join on the same side is to me incomprehensible.

Of course, in the condition of things at New Orleans, the military must not be thwarted by the civil authority; but when the Constitutional Convention, for what it deems a breach of privi-

lege, arrests an editor in no way connected with the military, the military necessity for insulting the convention and forcibly discharging the editor, is difficult to perceive. Neither is the military necessity for protecting the people against paying large salaries fixed by a legislature of their own choosing very apparent. Equally difficult to perceive is the military necessity for forcibly interposing to prevent a bank from loaning its own money to the State. These things, if they have occurred, are, at the best, no better than gratuitous hostility. I wish I could hope that they may be shown to not have occurred. To make assurance against misunderstanding, I repeat that in the existing condition of things in Louisiana, the military must not be thwarted by the civil authority; and I add that on points of difference the commanding general must be judge and master. But I also add that in the exercise of this judgment and control, a purpose, obvious and scarcely unavowed, to transcend all military necessity, in order to crush out the civil government, will not be overlooked.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

J. G. Foster.

Executive Mansion, August 8, 1863.

General Foster.

This will be handed you by Governor Pierpont of Virginia.

He goes, among other things, seeking to adjust a difficulty at Norfolk and Portsmouth. It seems there is a large number of families in Portsmouth who are destitute and whose natural supporters are in the rebel army or have been killed

in it. These destitute families must live somehow, and it seems the city authorities on one side, and our military on the other, are in ruinous conflict about the mode of providing.

Governor Pierpont is a good man, and if you will place him in conference and amicable relations with the military authority in the vicinity, I do not doubt that much good will come of it. Please do it. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

J. M. Fleming and R. Morrow.

Executive Mansion, August 9, 1863.

Messrs. Jno. M. Fleming and R. Morrow.

Gentlemen: The petition of which you were the bearers has just been handed me. Your cards and notes had come to me on two or three successive days before; and I knew then, as well as I do now after reading the petition, what your mission was. I knew it was the same true and painful story which Governor Johnson, Mr. Maynard, Dr. Clements, and others have been telling me for more than two years. I also knew that meeting you could do no good, because I have all the while done, and shall continue to do, the best for you I could and can. I do as much for East Tennessee as I would or could if my own home and family were in Knoxville. The difficulties of getting a Union army into that region, and of keeping it there, are so apparent—so obvious—that none can fail to see them, unless it may be those who are driven mad and blind by their sufferings. Start by whatever route they may, their lines of supply are broken before they get half way. A small force sufficient to beat the enemy now there would be

of no value, because the enemy would reinforce to meet them, until we should have to give back or accumulate so large a force as to be very difficult to supply, and as to ruin us entirely if a great disaster should befall it. I know you are too much distressed to be argued with, and therefore I do not attempt it at length. You know I am not indifferent to your troubles, else I should not, more than a year and a half ago, have made the effort I did to have a railroad built on purpose to relieve you. The Secretary of War, General Halleck, General Burnside, and General Rosecrans are all engaged now in an effort to relieve your section. But, remember, you will probably thwart them if you make this public.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

James H. Hackett.

Executive Mansion, August 17, 1863.

James H. Hackett, Esq.

My dear Sir: Months ago I should have acknowledged the receipt of your book and accompanying kind note; and I now have to beg your pardon for not having done so.

For one of my age I have seen very little of the drama. The first presentation of *Falstaff* I ever saw was yours here, last winter or spring. Perhaps the best compliment I can pay is to say, as I truly can, I am very anxious to see it again. Some of Shakespeare's plays I have never read; while others I have gone over perhaps as frequently as any unprofessional reader. Among the latter are "Lear," "Richard III.," "Henry VIII.," "Hamlet," and especially "Macbeth." I think nothing equals "Macbeth." It is wonderful.

Unlike you gentlemen of the profession I think the soliloquy in "Hamlet" commencing "Oh, my offense is rank," surpasses that commencing "To be or not to be." But pardon this small attempt at criticism. I should like to hear you pronounce the opening speech of Richard III. Will you not soon visit Washington again? If you do, please call and let me make your personal acquaintance.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Private.*]

Executive Mansion, November 2, 1863.

James H. Hackett. . . .

My note to you I certainly did not expect to see in print; yet I have not been much shocked by the newspaper comments upon it. Those comments constitute a fair specimen of what has occurred to me through life. I have endured a great deal of ridicule without much malice; and have received a great deal of kindness, not quite free from ridicule. I am used to it.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

J. G. Blunt.

Executive Mansion, August 18, 1863.

Major-General Blunt. . . .

I regret to find you denouncing so many persons as liars, scoundrels, fools, thieves, and persecutors of yourself. Your military position looks critical, but did anybody force you into it? Have you been ordered to confront and fight 10,000 men with 3,000 men? The Government cannot make men; and it is very easy, when a man has been given the highest commission, for him to turn on those who gave it and vilify them for not giving him a command according to his rank.

My appointment of you first as a brigadier, and then as a major-general, was evidence of my appreciation of your services; and I have since marked but one thing in connection with you with which to be dissatisfied. The sending a military order twenty-five miles outside of your lines, and all military lines, to take men charged with no offense against the military, out of the hands of the courts, to be turned over to a mob to be hanged, can find no precedent or principle to justify it. Judge Lynch sometimes takes jurisdiction of cases which prove too strong for the courts; but this is the first case within my knowledge wherein the court being able to maintain jurisdiction against Judge Lynch, the military has come to the assistance of the latter. I take the facts of this case as you state them yourself, and not from any report of Governor Carney,[1] or other person. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

John P. Usher.

Executive Mansion, August 24, 1863.

Hon. Secretary of the Interior.

Sir: By the within you see the claim of Illinois for the two per cent. on sales of public lands is again presented.

My view of the case is not changed. I believe the law is with the State; and yet I think it is ungracious to be pressing the claim at this time of national trouble.

Nevertheless, I have to ask that you will determine what is your duty according to the law, and then do it. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[1] See letter to Governor Carney.

JAMES C. CONKLING.

[*Private.*]

War Department,
August 26, 1863.

My dear Conkling: I cannot leave here now. Herewith is a letter instead. You are one of the best public readers. I have but one suggestion—read it very slowly. And now God bless you, and all good Union men.

Yours as ever, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, August 26, 1863.

Hon. James C. Conkling.

My dear Sir: Your letter inviting me to attend a mass-meeting of unconditional Union men, to be held at the capital of Illinois on the 3d day of September, has been received. It would be very agreeable to me to thus meet my old friends at my own home, but I cannot just now be absent from here so long as a visit there would require.

The meeting is to be of all those who maintain unconditional devotion to the Union; and I am sure my old political friends will thank me for tendering, as I do, the nation's gratitude to those other noble men whom no partisan malice or partisan hope can make false to the nation's life.

There are those who are dissatisfied with me. To such I would say: You desire peace, and you blame me that we do not have it. But how can we attain it? There are but three conceivable ways: First, to suppress the rebellion by force of arms. This I am trying to do. Are you for it? If you are, so far we are agreed. If you are not for it, a second way is to give

up the Union. I am against this. Are you for it? If you are, you should say so plainly. If you are not for force, nor yet for dissolution, there only remains some imaginable compromise. I do not believe any compromise embracing the maintenance of the Union is now possible. All I learn leads to a directly opposite belief. The strength of the rebellion is its military, its army. That army dominates all the country and all the people within its range. Any offer of terms made by any man or men within that range, in opposition to that army, is simply nothing for the present, because such man or men have no power whatever to enforce their side of a compromise, if one were made with them.

To illustrate: Suppose refugees from the South and peace men of the North get together in convention and frame and proclaim a compromise embracing a restoration of the Union. In what way can that compromise be used to keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania? Meade's army can keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania, and, I think, can ultimately drive it out of existence. But no paper compromise to which the controllers of Lee's army are not agreed can at all affect that army. In an effort at such compromise we should waste time which the enemy would improve to our disadvantage; and that would be all. A compromise, to be effective, must be made either with those who control the rebel army, or with the people first liberated from the domination of that army by the success of our own army. Now, allow me to assure you that no word or intimation from that rebel army, or from any of the men controlling it, in relation to any peace compromise, has ever come to my

knowledge or belief. All charges and insinuations to the contrary are deceptive and groundless. And I promise you that if any such proposition shall hereafter come, it shall not be rejected and kept a secret from you. I freely acknowledge myself the servant of the people, according to the bond of service—the United States Constitution—and that, as such, I am responsible to them.

But to be plain. You are dissatisfied with me about the negro. Quite likely there is a difference of opinion between you and myself upon that subject. I certainly wish that all men could be free, while I suppose you do not. Yet, I have neither adopted nor proposed any measure which is not consistent with even your view, provided you are for the Union. I suggested compensated emancipation, to which you replied you wished not to be taxed to buy negroes. But I had not asked you to be taxed to buy negroes, except in such way as to save you from greater taxation to save the Union exclusively by other means.

You dislike the Emancipation Proclamation, and perhaps would have it retracted. You say it is unconstitutional. I think differently. I think the Constitution invests its commander-in-chief with the law of war in time of war. The most that can be said—if so much—is that slaves are property. Is there—has there ever been—any question that by the law of war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken when needed? And is it not needed whenever taking it helps us, or hurts the enemy? Armies, the world over, destroy enemies' property when they cannot use it; and even destroy their own to

keep it from the enemy. Civilized belligerents do all in their power to help themselves or hurt the enemy, except a few things regarded as barbarous or cruel. Among the exceptions are the massacre of vanquished foes and non-combatants, male and female.

But the proclamation, as law, either is valid or is not valid. If it is not valid, it needs no retraction. If it is valid, it cannot be retracted any more than the dead can be brought to life. Some of you profess to think its retraction would operate favorably for the Union. Why better after the retraction than before the issue? There was more than a year and a half of trial to suppress the rebellion before the proclamation issued; the last one hundred days of which passed under an explicit notice that it was coming, unless averted by those in revolt returning to their allegiance. The war has certainly progressed as favorably for us since the issue of the proclamation as before. I know, as fully as one can know the opinions of others, that some of the commanders of our armies in the field, who have given us our most important successes, believe the emancipation policy and the use of the colored troops constitute the heaviest blow yet dealt to the rebellion, and that at least one of these important successes could not have been achieved when it was but for the aid of black soldiers. Among the commanders holding these views are some who have never had any affinity with what is called Abolitionism, or with Republican party politics, but who hold them purely as military opinions. I submit these opinions as being entitled to some weight against the objections often urged that emancipation

and arming the blacks are unwise as military measures, and were not adopted as such in good faith.

You say you will not fight to free negroes. Some of them seem willing to fight for you; but no matter. Fight you, then, exclusively to save the Union. I issued the proclamation on purpose to aid you in saving the Union. Whenever you shall have conquered all resistance to the Union, if I shall urge you to continue fighting, it will be an apt time then for you to declare you will not fight to free negroes.

I thought that in your struggle for the Union, to whatever extent the negroes should cease helping the enemy, to that extent it weakened the enemy in its resistance to you. Do you think differently? I thought that whatever negroes can be got to do as soldiers, leaves just so much less for white soldiers to do in saving the Union. Does it appear otherwise to you? But negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they do anything for us if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their lives for us they must be prompted by the strongest motive, even the promise of freedom. And the promise, being made, must be kept.

The signs look better. The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea. Thanks to the great Northwest for it. Nor yet wholly to them. Three hundred miles up they met New England, Empire, Keystone, and Jersey, hewing their way right and left. The sunny South, too, in more colors than one, also lent a hand. On the spot, their part of the history was jotted down in black and white. The job was a great national one, and let none be banned who bore an hon-

orable part in it. And while those who have cleared the great river may well be proud, even that is not all. It is hard to say that anything has been more bravely and well done than at Antietam, Murfreesborough, Gettysburg, and on many fields of lesser note. Nor must Uncle Sam's web-feet be forgotten. At all the watery margins they have been present. Not only on the deep sea, the broad bay, and the rapid river, but also up the narrow, muddy bayou, and wherever the ground was a little damp, they have been and made their tracks. Thanks to all: for the great Republic—for the principle it lives by and keeps alive—for man's vast future—thanks to all.

Peace does not appear so distant as it did. I hope it will come soon, and come to stay, and so come as to be worth the keeping in all future time. It will then have been proved that among free men there can be no successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet, and that they who take such appeal are sure to lose their case and pay the cost. And then there will be some black men who can remember that with silent tongue, and clenched teeth, and steady eye, and well-poised bayonet, they have helped mankind on to this great consummation, while I fear there will be some white ones unable to forget that with malignant heart and deceitful speech they strove to hinder it.

Still, let us not be over-sanguine of a speedy final triumph. Let us be quite sober. Let us diligently apply the means, never doubting that a just God, in his own good time, will give us the rightful result.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, September 3, 1863.

Hon. James C. Conkling, Springfield, Ill.

I am mortified this morning to find a letter to you botched up in the Eastern papers, telegraphed from Chicago. How did this happen?

A. Lincoln.

S. W. Crawford.

Washington, D. C., August 28, 1863.

General Crawford, Rappahannock Station, Va.

I regret that I cannot be present to witness the presentation of a sword by the gallant Pennsylvania Reserve Corps to one so worthy to receive it as General Meade. A. Lincoln.

Mrs. Joshua F. Speed.

Washington, D. C., September 16, 1863.

Mrs. J. F. Speed, Louisville, Ky.

Mr. Holman will not be jostled from his place with my knowledge and consent.

A. Lincoln.

Mrs. Hannah Armstrong.[1]

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, September 19, 1863.

Mrs. Hannah Armstrong, Petersburg, Ill.

I have just ordered the discharge of your boy William, as you say, now at Louisville, Ky.

A. Lincoln.

[1] Mrs. Armstrong and her husband Jack were old friends of Lincoln at New Salem, Ill. She had patched Lincoln's trousers, and with her husband had comforted him in his grief over the death of his first love. Their son William had been condemned as a deserter.

Charles D. Drake and Others.

On October 5, 1863, the President answered complaints of Charles D. Drake and others, of St. Louis, made against General Schofield's military administration in Missouri, as follows:

Executive Mansion, October 5, 1863.

Hon. Charles D. Drake and Others, Committee.

Among the reasons given [for removal of General Schofield] enough of suffering and wrong to Union men is certainly, and I suppose truly, stated. Yet the whole case, as presented, fails to convince me that General Schofield or the enrolled militia is responsible for that suffering and wrong. The whole can be explained on a more charitable and, as I think, a more rational hypothesis. We are in civil war. In such cases there always is a main question; but in this case that question is a perplexing compound—Union and slavery. It thus becomes a question not of two sides merely, but of at least four sides, even among those who are for the Union, saying nothing of those who are against it. Thus, those who are for the Union with, but not without, slavery—those for it without, but not with—those for it with or without, but prefer it with—and those for it with or without, but prefer it without.

Among these again is a subdivision of those who are for gradual, but not for immediate, and those who are for immediate, but not for gradual, extinction of slavery. It is easy to conceive that all these shades of opinion, and even more, may be sincerely entertained by honest and truthful men. Yet, all being for the Union, by

reason of these differences each will prefer a different way of sustaining the Union. At once sincerity is questioned, and motives are assailed. Actual war coming, blood grows hot, and blood is spilled. Thought is forced from old channels into confusion. Deception breeds and thrives. Confidence dies and universal suspicion reigns. Each man feels an impulse to kill his neighbor, lest he be first killed by him. Revenge and retaliation follow. And all this, as before said, may be among honest men only; but this is not all. Every foul bird comes abroad and every dirty reptile rises up. These add crime to confusion. Strong measures deemed indispensable, but harsh at best, such men make worse by maladministration. Murders for old grudges, and murders for pelf, proceed under any cloak that will best cover for the occasion. These causes amply account for what has occurred in Missouri, without ascribing it to the weakness or wickedness of any general. The newspaper files, those chroniclers of current events, will show that the evils now complained of were quite as prevalent under Frémont, Hunter, Halleck, and Curtis, as under Schofield. If the former had greater force opposed to them, they also had greater force with which to meet it. When the organized rebel army left the State, the main Federal force had to go also, leaving the department commander at home relatively no stronger than before. Without disparaging any, I affirm with confidence that no commander of that department has, in proportion to his means, done better than General Schofield. . . .

To restrain contraband intelligence and trade, a system of searches, seizures, permits, and passes

had been introduced, I think, by General Frémont. When General Halleck came, he found and continued this system, and added an order, applicable to some parts of the State, to levy and collect contributions from noted rebels, to compensate losses and relieve destitution caused by the rebellion. The action of General Frémont and General Halleck, as stated, constituted a sort of system, which General Curtis found in full operation when he took command of the department. That there was a necessity for something of the sort was clear, but that it could only be justified by stern necessity, and that it was liable to great abuse in administration, was equally clear. Agents to execute it, contrary to the great prayer, were led into temptation. Some might, while others would not, resist that temptation. It was not possible to hold any to a very strict accountability, and those yielding to the temptation would sell permits and passes to those who would pay most and most readily for them; and would seize property and collect levies in the aptest way to fill their own pockets. Money being the object, the man having money, whether loyal or disloyal, would be the victim. This practice doubtless existed to some extent, and it was a real additional evil that it could be and was plausibly charged to exist in greater extent than it did.

When General Curtis took command of the department, Mr. Dick, against whom I never knew anything to allege, had general charge of this system. A controversy in regard to it rapidly grew into almost unmanageable proportions. One side ignored the necessity and magnified the evils of the system, while the other ignored the

evils and magnified the necessity, and each bitterly assailed the motives of the other. I could not fail to see that the controversy enlarged in the same proportion as the professed Union men here distinctly took sides in two opposing political parties. I exhausted my wits, and very nearly my patience also, in efforts to convince both that the evils they charged on each other were inherent in the case, and could not be cured by giving either party a victory over the other. . . .

Imbecility is urged as one cause for removing General Schofield, and the late massacre at Lawrence, Kansas, is pressed as evidence of that imbecility. To my mind that fact scarcely tends to prove the proposition. That massacre is only an example of what Grierson, John [*H.*] Morgan, and many others might have repeatedly done on their respective raids had they chosen to incur the personal hazard and possessed the fiendish hearts to do it.

The charge is made that General Schofield, on purpose to protect the Lawrence murderers, would not allow them to be pursued into Missouri. While no punishment could be too sudden or too severe for those murderers, I am well satisfied that the preventing of the threatened remedial raid into Missouri was the only safe way to avoid an indiscriminate massacre there, including probably more innocent than guilty. Instead of condemning I therefore approve what I understand General Schofield did in that respect.

The charges that General Schofield has purposely withheld protection from loyal people and purposely facilitated the objects of the disloyal

are altogether beyond my power of belief. I do not arraign the veracity of gentlemen as to the facts complained of, but I do more than question the judgment which would infer that those facts occurred in accordance with the purposes of General Schofield.

With my present views, I must decline to remove General Schofield. In this I decide nothing against General Butler.[1] I sincerely wish it were convenient to assign him a suitable command. In order to meet some existing evils I have addressed a letter of instructions to General Schofield, a copy of which I inclose to you.

As to the enrolled militia, I shall endeavor to ascertain better than I now know what is its exact value. Let me say now, however, that your proposal to substitute national forces for the enrolled militia implies that in your judgment the latter is doing something which needs to be done; and if so, the proposition to throw that force away and to supply its place by bringing other forces from the field where they are urgently needed seems to me very extraordinary. Whence shall they come? Shall they be withdrawn from Banks, or Grant, or Steele, or Rosecrans? Few things have been so grateful to my anxious feelings as when, in June last, the local force in Missouri aided General Schofield to so promptly send a large general force to the relief of General Grant, then investing Vicksburg, and menaced from without by General Johnston. Was this all wrong? Should the enrolled militia then have been broken up and General Herron kept from Grant to police Missouri? So far

[1] Benjamin F. Butler, with whom Mr. Drake *et al.* proposed to replace Schofield.

from finding cause to object, I confess to a sympathy for whatever relieves our general force in Missouri and allows it to serve elsewhere. I therefore, as at present advised, cannot attempt the destruction of the enrolled militia of Missouri. I may add that the force being under the national military control, it is also within the proclamation in regard to the *habeas corpus*.

I concur in the propriety of your request in regard to elections, and have, as you see, directed General Schofield accordingly. I do not feel justified to enter upon the broad field you present in regard to the political differences between Radicals and Conservatives. From time to time I have done and said what appeared to me proper to do and say. The public knows it all. It obliges nobody to follow me, and I trust it obliges me to follow nobody. The Radicals and Conservatives each agree with me in some things and disagree in others. I could wish both to agree with me in all things, for then they would agree with each other and would be too strong for any foe from any quarter. They, however, choose to do otherwise; and I do not question their right. I too shall do what seems to be my duty. I hold whoever commands in Missouri or elsewhere responsible to me and not to either Radicals or Conservatives. It is my duty to hear all, but at last I must, within my sphere, judge what to do and what to forbear.

Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln.

John Williams and N. G. Taylor.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, October 17, 1863.

John Williams and N. G. Taylor, Knoxville, Tennessee.

You do not estimate the holding of East Tennessee more highly than I do. There is no absolute purpose of withdrawing our forces from it, and only a contingent one to withdraw them temporarily for the purpose of not losing the position permanently. I am in great hope of not finding it necessary to withdraw them at all, particularly if you raise new troops rapidly for us there.

A. Lincoln.

William B. Thomas.

Executive Mansion, October 17, 1863.

Hon. William B. Thomas, Philadelphia, Pa.

I am grateful for your offer of 100,000 men, but as at present advised I do not consider that Washington is in danger, or that there is any emergency requiring 60 or 90 days men.

A. Lincoln.

Sanitary Fair at Chicago.

Executive Mansion, October 26, 1863.

Ladies having in Charge the Northwestern Fair for the Sanitary Commission, Chicago, Illinois.

According to the request made in your behalf, the original draft of the Emancipation Proclamation is herewith inclosed. The formal words at the top and the conclusion, except the signature, you perceive, are not in my handwriting.

They were written at the State Department, by whom I know not. The printed part was cut from a copy of the preliminary proclamation, and pasted on, merely to save writing. I had some desire to retain the paper; but if it shall contribute to the relief or comfort of the soldiers, that will be better.

Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln.

George H. Boker.

Executive Mansion, October 26, 1863.

George H. Boker, Esq., Secretary.

My dear Sir: It is with heartfelt gratification that I acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 6th, and the accompanying medal, by which I am made an honorary member of the Union League of Philadelphia.

I shall always bear with me the consciousness of having endeavored to do my duty in the trying times through which we are passing, and the generous approval of a portion of my fellow-citizens so intelligent and so patriotic as those composing your association assures me that I have not wholly failed.

I could not ask, and no one could merit, a better reward.

Be kind enough, sir, to convey to the gentlemen whom you represent, the assurance of the grateful appreciation with which I accept the honor you have conferred upon me.

I am very truly your obedient servant,

A. Lincoln.

ELIHU B. WASHBURNE.

[*Private and Confidential.*]

Executive Mansion, October 26, 1863.

Hon. E. B. Washburne.

My dear Sir: Yours of the 12th has been in my hands several days. Inclosed I send the leave of absence for your brother, in as good form as I think I can safely put it. Without knowing whether he would accept it, I have tendered the collectorship at Portland, Maine, to your other brother, the Governor.

Thanks to both you and our friend Campbell for your kind words and intentions. A second term would be a great honor and a great labor, which, together, perhaps I would not decline if tendered. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, December 18, 1863.

Hon. E. B. Washburne.

My dear Sir: The joint resolution of thanks to General Grant and those under his command has been before me, and is approved. If agreeable to you, I shall be glad for you to superintend the getting up of the medal, and the making of the copy to be engrossed on parchment, which I am to transmit to the General.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

THOMAS SWANN.

[*Private.*]

Executive Mansion, October 27, 1863.

Hon. Thomas Swann.

Dear Sir: Your letter, a copy of which is on the other half of this sheet, is received. I trust

there is no just ground for the suspicion you mention; and I am somewhat mortified that there could be any doubt of my views upon the point of your inquiry. I wish all loyal qualified voters in Maryland and elsewhere to have the undisturbed privilege of voting at elections; and neither my authority nor my name can be properly used to the contrary.

Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln.

Publish both letters, if either. A. L.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., July 10, 1864. 9.20 a. m.

Thomas Swann and Others, Baltimore, Maryland.

Yours of last night received. I have not a single soldier but whom is being disposed by the military for the best protection of all. By latest accounts the enemy is moving on Washington.[1] They cannot fly to either place. Let us be vigilant, but keep cool. I hope neither Baltimore nor Washington will be sacked. A. Lincoln.

A. W. Bradford.

Executive Mansion, November 2, 1863.

His Excellency A. W. Bradford, Governor of Maryland.

Sir: Yours of the 31st ult. was received yesterday about noon, and since then I have been giving most earnest attention to the subject-matter of it. At my call General Schenck has attended, and he assures me it is almost certain that

[1] General Jubal A. Early had beaten Lew Wallace at the Monocacy River, Md., on July 9, and was on his way to the capital.

violence will be used at some of the voting places on election day unless prevented by his provost-guards. He says that at some of those places Union voters will not attend at all, or run a ticket, unless they have some assurance of protection. This makes the Missouri case, of my action in regard to which you express your approval.

The remaining point of your letter is a protest against any person offering to vote being put to any test not found in the laws of Maryland. This brings us to a difference between Missouri and Maryland. With the same reason in both States, Missouri has, by law, provided a test for the voter with reference to the present rebellion, while Maryland has not. For example, General Trimble, captured fighting us at Gettysburg, is, without recanting his treason, a legal voter by the laws of Maryland. Even General Schenck's order admits him to vote, if he recants upon oath. I think that is cheap enough. My order in Missouri, which you approve, and General Schenck's order here, reach precisely the same end. Each assures the right of voting to all loyal men, and whether a man is loyal, each allows that man to fix by his own oath. Your suggestion that nearly all the candidates are loyal, I do not think quite meets the case. In this struggle for the nation's life, I cannot so confidently rely on those whose elections may have depended upon disloyal votes. Such men, when elected, may prove true; but such votes are given them in the expectation that they will prove false.

Nor do I think that to keep the peace at the polls, and to prevent the persistently disloyal from voting, constitutes just cause of offense to

Maryland. I think she has her own example for it. If I mistake not, it is precisely what General Dix did when your Excellency was elected governor.

I revoke the first of the three propositions in General Schenck's General Order No. 53; not that it is wrong in principle, but because the military, being of necessity exclusive judges as to who shall be arrested, the provision is too liable to abuse. For the revoked part I substitute the following:

> That all provost-marshals and other military officers do prevent all disturbance and violence at or about the polls, whether offered by such persons as above described, or by any other person or persons whomsoever.

The other two propositions of the order I allow to stand. General Schenck is fully determined, and has my strict orders besides, that all loyal men may vote, and vote for whom they please.

Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln.

John Jacob Astor, Jr., and Others.

[*Private, except to General Dix.*]

Executive Mansion, November 9, 1863.

Messrs. J. J. Astor, Jr., R. B. Roosevelt, and Nathaniel Sands.

Gentlemen: Upon the subject of your letter, I have to say that it is beyond my province to interfere with New York city politics; that I am very grateful to General Dix for the zealous and able military and quasi-civil support he has given the Government during the war, and that if the people of New York should tender him the mayoralty, and he accept it, nothing on that sub-

ject could be more satisfactory to me. In this I must not be understood as saying aught against any one, or as attempting the least degree of dictation in the matter.

To state it in another way, if General Dix's present relation to the General Government lays any restraint upon him in this matter, I wish to remove that restraint.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

B. F. Flanders.

See letters to Salmon P. Chase of May 13, 1863, to Nathaniel P. Banks of August 5, 1863, and November 5, 1863.

Executive Mansion, November 9, 1863.

Hon. B. F. Flanders.

My dear Sir: In a conversation with General Butler, he made a suggestion which impressed me a good deal at the time. It was that, as a preliminary step, a vote be taken, yea or nay, whether there shall be a State convention [1] to repeal the ordinance of secession and remodel the State constitution. I send it merely as a suggestion for your consideration, not having considered it maturely myself.

The point which impressed me was, not so much the questions to be voted on, as the effect of crystallizing, so to speak, in taking such popular vote on any proper question.

In fact, I have always thought the act of secession is legally nothing, and needs no repealing. Turn the thought over in your mind, and see if in your own judgment you can make anything of it. Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

[1] In Louisiana.

E. H. and E. Jameson.

War Department, November 13, 1863.

E. H. and E. Jameson, Jefferson City, Mo.

Yours saying Brown and Henderson are elected senators is received. I understand this is one and one. If so it is knocking heads together to some purpose. A. Lincoln.

Zachariah Chandler.

Executive Mansion, November 20, 1863.

Hon. Zachariah Chandler.

My dear Sir: Your letter of the 15th, marked "private," was received to-day. I have seen Governor Morgan and Thurlow Weed, separately, but not together, within the last ten days; but neither of them mentioned the forthcoming message, or said anything, so far as I can remember, which brought the thought of the message to my mind. I am very glad the elections this autumn have gone favorably, and that I have not, by native depravity or under evil influences, done anything bad enough to prevent the good result. I hope to "stand firm" enough to not go backward, and yet not go forward fast enough to wreck the country's cause.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

E. P. Evans.

Executive Mansion, November 23, 1863.

E. P. Evans, West Union, Adams County, Ohio.

Yours to Governor Chase in behalf of John A. Welch is before me. Can there be a worse

case than to desert and with letters persuading others to desert? I cannot interpose without a better showing than you make. When did he desert? When did he write the letters?

A. Lincoln.

Cooper Institute Committee.

Executive Mansion, December 2, 1863.

George Opdyke and Others.

Gentlemen: Yours of the 28th ultimo, inviting me to be present at a meeting to be held at the Cooper Institute on the 3d instant, to promote the raising of volunteers, is received. Nothing would be more grateful to my feelings, or better accord with my judgment, than to contribute, if I could, by my presence or otherwise, to that eminently patriotic object. Nevertheless, the now early meeting of Congress, together with a temporary illness, render my attendance impossible.

You propose also to celebrate our Western victories. Freed from the apprehension of wounding the just sensibilities of brave soldiers fighting elsewhere, it would be exceedingly agreeable to me to join in a suitable acknowledgment to those of the great West, with whom I was born and have passed my life. And it is exceedingly gratifying that a portion, lately of the Army of the Potomac, but now serving with the great Army of the West, has borne so conspicuous a part in the late brilliant triumphs in Georgia.

Honor to the soldier and sailor everywhere who bravely bears his country's cause. Honor also to the citizen who cares for his brother in the field, and serves, as he best can, the same cause—honor to him, only less than to him who

braves, for the common good, the storms of heaven and the storms of battle.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

John Rogers.

[*Message to Congress.*]

To the Senate and House of Representatives.

In conformity to the law of July 16, 1862, I most cordially recommend that Captain John Rogers, United States Navy, receive a vote of thanks from Congress for the eminent skill and gallantry exhibited by him in the engagement with the rebel armed iron-clad steamer *Fingal,* alias *Atlanta,* whilst in command of the United States iron-clad steamer *Weehawken,* which led to her capture on the 17th of June, 1863, and also for the zeal, bravery, and general good conduct shown by this officer on many occasions.

Abraham Lincoln.

Washington, December 8, 1863.

Thomas Cottman.

Executive Mansion, December 15, 1863.

Dr. Thomas Cottman.

My dear Sir: You were so kind as to say this morning that you desire to return to Louisiana, and to be guided by my wishes, to some extent, in the part you may take in bringing that State to resume her rightful relation to the General Government.

My wishes are in a general way expressed, as well as I can express them, in the proclamation issued on the 8th of the present month, and in that part of the annual message which relates

to that proclamation. It there appears that I deem the sustaining of the Emancipation Proclamation, where it applies, as indispensable; and I add here that I would esteem it fortunate if the people of Louisiana should themselves place the remainder of the State upon the same footing, and then, if in their discretion it should appear best, make some temporary provision for the whole of the freed people, substantially as suggested in the last proclamation.

I have not put forth the plan in that proclamation as a Procrustean bed, to which exact conformity is to be indispensable; and, in Louisiana particularly, I wish that labor already done, which varies from that plan in no important particular, may not be thrown away.

The strongest wish I have, not already publicly expressed, is that in Louisiana and elsewhere all sincere Union men would stoutly eschew cliquism, and, each yielding something in minor matters, all work together. Nothing is likely to be so baleful in the great work before us as stepping aside from the main object to consider who will get the offices if a small matter shall go thus, and who else will get them if it shall go otherwise. It is time now for real patriots to rise above all this. As to the particulars of what I may think best to be done in any State, I have publicly stated certain points which I have thought indispensable to the reëstablishment and maintenance of the national authority; and I go no further than this because I wish to avoid both the substance and the appearance of dictation.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

O. D. Filley.

Executive Mansion, December 22, 1863.

O. D. Filley, St. Louis, Missouri.

I have just looked over a petition signed by some three dozen citizens of St. Louis, and three accompanying letters. . . . the whole relating to the Rev. Dr. McPheeters. The petition prays, in the name of justice and mercy, that I will restore Dr. McPheeters to all his ecclesiastical rights. This gives no intimation as to what ecclesiastical rights are withheld.

Your letter states that Provost-Marshal Dick, about a year ago, ordered the arrest of Dr. McPheeters, pastor of the Vine Street Church, prohibited him from officiating, and placed the management of the affairs of the church out of the control of its chosen trustees; and near the close you state that a certain course "would insure his release." Mr. Ranney's letter says: "Dr. Samuel S. McPheeters is enjoying all the rights of a civilian, but cannot preach the Gospel!!!" Mr. Coalter, in his letter asks: "Is it not a strange illustration of the condition of things, that the question of who shall be allowed to preach in a church in St. Louis shall be decided by the President of the United States?"

Now, all this sounds very strangely; and, withal, a little as if you gentlemen making the application do not understand the case alike; one affirming that the doctor is enjoying all the rights of a civilian, and another pointing out to me what will secure his *release*! On the second day of January last, I wrote to General Curtis in relation to Mr. Dick's order upon Dr. McPheeters; and, as I suppose the doctor is

enjoying all the rights of a civilian, I only quote that part of my letter which relates to the church. It is as follows: "But I must add that the United States Government must not, as by this order, undertake to run the churches. When an individual, in a church or out of it, becomes dangerous to the public interest, he must be checked; but the churches, as such, must take care of themselves. It will not do for the United States to appoint trustees, supervisors, or other agents for the churches."

This letter going to General Curtis, then in command there, I supposed, of course, it was obeyed, especially as I heard no further complaint from Dr. McPheeters or his friends for nearly an entire year. I have never interfered, nor thought of interfering, as to who shall or shall not preach in any church; nor have I knowingly or believingly tolerated any one else to so interfere by my authority. If any one is so interfering by color of my authority, I would like to have it specifically made known to me.

If, after all, what is now sought is to have me put Dr. McPheeters back over the heads of a majority of his own congregation, that, too, will be declined. I will not have control of any church on any side.

Yours respectfully, A. Lincoln.

SAMUEL S. MCPHEETERS.

[*Indorsement on Petition.*]

The assumptions of this paper, so far as I know, or believe, are entirely false. I have never deprived Doctor McPheeters of any ecclesiastical right, or authorized or excused its being

done by any one deriving authority from me. On the contrary, in regard to this very case, I directed a long time ago that Doctor McPheeters was to be arrested, or remain at large, upon the same rule as any one else; and that in no event was any one to interfere, by my authority, as to who should or should not preach in any church. This was done, I think, in a letter, in the nature of an order, to Mr. Dick. The assumption that I am keeping Dr. McPheeters from preaching in his church is monstrous. If any one is doing this, by pretense of my authority, I will thank any one who can to make out and present me a specific case against him. If, after all, the doctor is kept out by the majority of his own parishioners, and my official power is sought to force him in over their heads, I decline that also.

A. Lincoln.

December 22, 1863.

Thomas E. Bramlette.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, January 6, 1864. 2 p. m.

Governor Bramlette, Frankfort, Kentucky.

Yours of yesterday received. Nothing is known here about General Foster's order, of which you complain, beyond the fair presumption that it comes from General Grant, and that it has an object which, if you understood, you would be loath to frustrate. True, these troops are, in strict law, only to be removed by my order; but General Grant's judgment would be the highest incentive to me to make such order. Nor can I understand how doing so is bad faith and dishonor, nor yet how it so exposes Kentucky

to ruin. Military men here do not perceive how it exposes Kentucky, and I am sure Grant would not permit it if it so appeared to him.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, January 17, 1864.

Governor Bramlette, Frankfort, Kentucky.

Your letter of the eighth is just received. To your question, "May I not add *q. e. d.?*" I answer "No," because you omit the "premise" in the law, that the President may in his discretion send these troops out of Kentucky; and I take it that if he shall do so, on the judgment of General Grant as to its propriety, it will be neither cruelty, bad faith, nor dishonor. When I telegraphed you I knew, though I did not say so to you, that General Grant was about that time with General Foster at Knoxville, and could not be ignorant of, or averse to, the order which alarmed you. I see he has since passed through Kentucky, and I hope you have had a conference with him.

A. Lincoln.

Washington, D. C., November 10, 1864.

Governor Bramlette, Frankfort, Kentucky.

Yours of yesterday received. I can scarcely believe that General John B. Houston has been arrested "for no other offense than opposition to my reëlection"; for, if that had been deemed sufficient cause of arrest, I should have heard of more than one arrest in Kentucky on election day. If, however, General Houston has been arrested for no other cause than opposition to my reëlection, General Burbridge will discharge

him at once, I sending him a copy of this as an order to that effect. A. Lincoln.

On November 22, 1864, the President sent a telegram to Governor Bramlette informing him that "the Secretary of War and myself are trying to devise means of pacification and harmony for Kentucky, which we hope to effect soon, now that the passion-exciting subject of the election is past."

On February 5, 1865, the President telegraphed in answer to a query of Governor Bramlette concerning the Thirteenth Amendment: "Precedents justify the legislature to act on *ex-officio* notice of Congress having passed the proposed amendment; nevertheless, I will send you the authenticated copy."

——— Andrews.

[*Indorsement.*]

The case of Andrews is really a very bad one, as appears by the record already before me. Yet . . . I . . . ordered his punishment commuted to imprisonment for during the war at hard labor. . . . I did this, not on any merit in the case, but because I am trying to evade the butchering business lately. A. Lincoln.

Quincy A. Gillmore.

See letter to Gideon Welles of December 20, 1863.

Executive Mansion, January 13, 1864.
Major-General Gillmore.

I understand an effort is being made by some worthy gentlemen to reconstruct a loyal State government in Florida. Florida is in your department, and it is not unlikely that you may be there in person. I have given Mr. Hay a com-

mission of major, and sent him to you, with some blank-books and other blanks, to aid in the reconstruction. He will explain as to the manner of using the blanks, and also my general views on the subject. It is desirable for all to coöperate, but if irreconcilable differences of opinion shall arise, you are master. I wish the thing done in the most speedy way possible, so that when done, it lie within the range of the late proclamation on the subject. The detail labor, of course, will have to be done by others; but I shall be greatly obliged if you will give it such general supervision as you can find consistent with your more strictly military duties.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

The North American Review.

Executive Mansion, January 16, 1864.

Messrs. Crosby and Nichols.

Gentlemen: The number for this month and year of the *North American Review* was duly received, and for which please accept my thanks. Of course, I am not the most impartial judge; yet, with due allowance for this, I venture to hope that the article entitled "The President's Policy" will be of value to the country. I fear I am not quite worthy of all which is therein kindly said of me personally.

The sentence of twelve lines, commencing at the top of page 252, I could wish to be not exactly as it is. In what is there expressed, the writer has not correctly understood me. I have never had a theory that secession could absolve States or people from their obligations. Precisely the contrary is asserted in the inaugural

address; and it was because of my belief in the continuation of these *obligations* that I was puzzled, for a time, as to denying the legal *rights* of those citizens who remained individually innocent of treason or rebellion. But I mean no more now than to merely call attention to this point. Yours respectfully, A. Lincoln.

J. J. Reynolds.

Executive Mansion, January 20, 1864.

Major-General Reynolds. . . .

The true rule for the military is to seize such property as is needed for military uses and reasons, and let the rest alone. Cotton and other staple articles of commerce are seizable for military reasons. Dwelling-houses and furniture are seldom so. If Mrs. Morton is playing traitor to the extent of practical injury, seize her, but leave her house to the courts. Please revise and adjust this case upon these principles.

Yours, etc., A. Lincoln.

Alpheus Lewis.

Executive Mansion, January 23, 1864.

Alpheus Lewis, Esq.

My dear Sir: You have inquired how the government would regard and treat cases wherein the owners of plantations, in Arkansas, for instance, might fully recognize the freedom of those formerly slaves, and by fair contracts of hire with them, recommence the cultivation of their plantations. I answer, I should regard such cases with great favor, and should as a principle treat them precisely as I would treat

the same number of free white people in the same relation and condition. Whether white or black, reasonable effort should be made to give government protection. In neither case should the giving of aid and comfort to the rebellion, or other practices injurious to the Government, be allowed on such plantations; and in either, the Government would claim the right to take, if necessary, those of proper ages and conditions into the military service. Such plan must not be used to break up existing leases or arrangements of abandoned plantations which the Government may have made to give employment and sustenance to the idle and destitute people. With the foregoing qualifications, and explanations, and in view of its tendency to advance freedom, and restore peace and prosperity, such hiring and employment of the freed people, would be regarded by me with rather especial favor.

To be more specific, I add that all the military, and others acting by authority of the United States, are to favor and facilitate the introduction and carrying forward, in good faith, the free-labor system as above indicated, by allowing the necessary supplies therefor to be procured and taken to the proper points, and by doing and forbearing whatever will advance it, providing that existing military and trade regulations be not transcended thereby. I shall be glad to learn that planters adopting this system shall have employed one so zealous and active as yourself to act as an agent in relation thereto.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

FREDERICK STEELE.

Washington, January 27, 1864.

Major-General Steele.

I have addressed a letter to you, and put it in the hands of Mr. Gantt and other Arkansas gentlemen, containing a program for an election in that State. . . . Be sure to retain the free-State constitutional provision in some unquestionable form, and you and he can fix the rest. The points I have made in the program have been well considered. Take hold with an honest heart and a strong hand. Do not let any questionable man control or influence you.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, January 30, 1864.

Major-General Steele.

Since writing mine of the 27th, seeing still further accounts of the action of the convention in Arkansas, induces me to write you yet again. They seem to be doing so well, that possibly the best you can do would be to help them on their own plan; but of this you must confer with them and be the judge. Of all things, avoid, if possible, a dividing into cliques among the friends of the common object. Be firm and resolute against such as you can perceive would make confusion and division.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, June 29, 1864.

Major-General Steele.

I understand that Congress declines to admit to seats the persons sent as senators and representatives from Arkansas. These persons appre-

hend that, in consequence, you may not support the new State government there as you otherwise would. My wish is that you give that government and the people there the same support and protection that you would if the members had been admitted, because in no event, nor in any view of the case, can this do any harm, while it will be the best you can do toward suppressing the rebellion. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

James Wadsworth.

[*Extract from Letter to General Wadsworth Given by F. B. Carpenter.*]

(Late January or early February, 1864.)

You desire to know, in the event of our complete success in the field, the same being followed by a loyal and cheerful submission on the part of the South, if universal amnesty should not be accompanied with universal suffrage.

Now, since you know my private inclinations as to what terms should be granted to the South in the contingency mentioned, I will here add, that if our success should thus be realized, followed by such desired results, I cannot see, if universal amnesty is granted, how, under the circumstances, I can avoid exacting in return universal suffrage or at least suffrage on the basis of intelligence and military service.

How to better the condition of the colored race has long been a study which has attracted my serious and careful attention; hence I think I am clear and decided as to what course I shall pursue in the premises, regarding it as a religious duty, as the nation's guardian of these people who have so heroically vindicated their

manhood on the battle-field, where, in assisting to save the life of the Republic, they have demonstrated in blood their right to the ballot, which is but the humane protection of the flag they have so fearlessly defended.

In an article in *Scribner's Magazine* for January, 1893, by the Marquis de Chambrun, the above letter contains this paragraph:

The restoration of the Rebel States to the Union must rest upon the principle of civil and political equality of both races; and it must be sealed by general amnesty.

HORACE MAYNARD.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, February 13, 1864.

Hon. Horace Maynard, Nashville, Tennessee.

Your letter of [*the*] second received. Of course Governor Johnson will proceed with reorganization as the exigencies of the case appear to him to require. I do not apprehend he will think it necessary to deviate from my views to any ruinous extent. On one hasty reading I see no such deviation in his program, which you send. A. Lincoln.

J. M. THAYER.

[*Telegram.*]

War Department, February 15, 1864.

General Thayer, Fort Smith, Arkansas.

Yours received. Whatever of conflict there is between the convention and me is accidental, not designed, I having acted in ignorance that the

convention would act. I yield to the convention, and have so notified General Steele, who is master, and is to cut any knots which cannot be untied. Correspond with him. A. Lincoln.

Daniel E. Sickles.

Executive Mansion, February 15, 1864.

Major-General Sickles.

I wish you to make a tour for me (principally for observation and information) by way of Cairo and New Orleans, and returning by the gulf and ocean. . . .

Please ascertain at each place what is being done, if anything, for reconstruction; how the amnesty proclamation works—if at all; what practical hitches, if any, there are about it; whether deserters come in from the enemy, what number has come in at each point since the amnesty, and whether the ratio of their arrival is any greater since than before the amnesty; what deserters report generally, and particularly whether, and to what extent, the amnesty is known within the rebel lines. Also learn what you can as to the colored people; how they get along as soldiers, as laborers in our service, on leased plantations, and as hired laborers with their old masters, if there be such cases. Also learn what you can as to the colored people within the rebel lines. Also get any other information you may consider interesting, and from time to time, send me what you may deem important to be known here at once, and be ready to make a general report on your return.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

W. M. Fishback.

War Department, February 17, 1864.

William M. Fishback, Little Rock, Arkansas.

When I fixed a plan for an election in Arkansas I did it in ignorance that your convention was doing the same work. Since I learned the latter fact I have been constantly trying to yield my plan to them. I have sent two letters to General Steele, and three or four despatches to you and others, saying that he, General Steele, must be master, but that it will probably be best for him to merely help the convention on its own plan. Some single mind must be master, else there will be no agreement in anything, and General Steele, commanding the military and being on the ground, is the best man to be that master. Even now citizens are telegraphing me to postpone the election to a later date than either that fixed by the convention or by me. This discord must be silenced. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., March 12, 1864.

William Fishback, Fort Smith, Arkansas.

I know not that any change of departmental lines is likely to be made in Arkansas; but if done, it will be for purely military reasons, to which the good people there can have no just cause of objection. Get out the largest vote you can, and the largest part of it on the right side that is possible. A. Lincoln.

William Jayne.

Executive Mansion, February 26, 1864.

Hon. W. Jayne.

Dear Sir: I dislike to make changes in office so long as they can be avoided. It multiplies my embarrassments immensely. I dislike two appointments when one will do. Send me the name of some man not the present marshal, and I will nominate him to be Provost Marshal for Dakota. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

E. H. East.

Washington, February 27, 1864.

Hon. E. H. East, Secretary of State, Nashville, Tennessee. . . .

No person who has taken the oath of amnesty of eighth December, 1863, and obtained a pardon thereby, and who intends to observe the same in good faith, should have any objection to taking that prescribed by Governor Johnson as a test of loyalty. I have seen and examined Governor Johnson's proclamation, and am entirely satisfied with his plan, which is to restore the State government and place it under the control of citizens truly loyal to the Government of the United States. A. Lincoln.

Please send above to Governor Johnson.

A. L.

J. A. J. Creswell.

Executive Mansion, March 7, 1864.

Hon. John A. J. Creswell.

My dear Sir: I am very anxious for emancipation to be effected in Maryland in some substantial form. I think it probable that my

expressions of a preference for gradual over immediate emancipation, are misunderstood. I had thought the gradual would produce less confusion and destitution, and therefore would be more satisfactory; but if those who are better acquainted with the subject, and are more deeply interested in it, prefer the immediate, most certainly I have no objection to their judgment prevailing. My wish is that all who are for emancipation in any form, shall coöperate, all treating all respectfully, and all adopting and acting upon the major opinion when fairly ascertained. What I have dreaded is the danger that by jealousies, rivalries, and consequent ill-blood—driving one another out of meetings and conventions—perchance from the polls—the friends of emancipation themselves may divide, and lose the measure altogether. I wish this letter to not be made public; but no man representing me as I herein represent myself will be in any danger of contradiction by me.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, March 17, 1864.

Hon. John A. J. Creswell.

My dear Sir: It needs not to be a secret that I wish success to emancipation in Maryland. It would aid much to end the rebellion. Hence it is a matter of national consequence, in which every national man may rightfully feel a deep interest. I sincerely hope the friends of the measure will allow no minor considerations to divide and distract them.[1]

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[1] Slavery was abolished by the Constitutional Convention on June 24, 1864.

Meredith P. Gentry.

Executive Mansion, March 13, 1864.

Hon. M. P. Gentry.

My dear Sir: Yours by the hand of General Grant is received. Of course I have not forgotten you. General Grant is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to send you South; and it is rather my wish that he may find it not inconsistent with his view of the public interest to oblige you. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Michael Hahn.

See letters to Nathaniel P. Banks of August 5, 1863, and of November 5, 1863.

[*Private.*]

Executive Mansion, March 13, 1864.

Hon. Michael Hahn.

My dear Sir: I congratulate you on having fixed your name in history as the first free-State governor of Louisiana. Now you are about to have a convention, which, among other things, will probably define the elective franchise. I barely suggest for your private consideration, whether some of the colored people may not be let in—as, for instance, the very intelligent, and especially those who have fought gallantly in our ranks. They would probably help, in some trying time to come, to keep the jewel of liberty within the family of freedom. But this is only a suggestion, not to the public, but to you alone.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

B. B. French.

[*Private.*]

Executive Mansion, March 25, 1864.

Hon. B. B. French.

My dear Sir: I understand a bill is before Congress by your instigation, for taking your office from the control of the Department of the Interior, and considerably enlarging the powers and patronage of your office. The proposed change may be right for aught I know, and it certainly is right for Congress to do as it thinks proper in the case. What I wish to say is, that if the change is made, I do not think I can allow you to retain the office; because that would be encouraging officers to be constantly intriguing, to the detriment of the public interest, in order to profit themselves.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

A. G. Hodges.

Executive Mansion, April 4, 1864.

A. G. Hodges, Esq., Frankfort, Kentucky.

My dear Sir: You ask me to put in writing the substance of what I verbally said the other day in your presence, to Governor Bramlette and Senator Dixon. It was about as follows:

"I am naturally anti-slavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing it wrong. I cannot remember when I did not so think and feel, and yet I have never understood that the presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right to act officially upon this judgment and feeling. It was in the oath I took that I would to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of

the United States. I could not take the office without taking the oath. Nor was it my view that I might take an oath to get power, and break the oath in using the power. I understand, too, that in ordinary civil administration this oath even forbade me to practically indulge my primary abstract judgment on the moral question of slavery. I had publicly declared this many times, and in many ways. And I aver that, to this day, I have done no official act in mere deference to my abstract judgment and feeling on slavery. I did understand, however, that my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of my ability imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that Government—that nation, of which that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law, life and limb must be protected, yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures otherwise unconstitutional might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground, and now avow it. I could not feel that, to the best of my ability, I had even tried to preserve the Constitution, if, to save slavery or any minor matter, I should permit the wreck of Government, country, and Constitution all together. When, early in the war, General Frémont attempted military emancipation, I forbade it, because I did not then think it an indispensable necessity. When, a little later, General Cameron, then Secretary of War, suggested the arming of the blacks, I objected

because I did not yet think it an indispensable necessity. When, still later, General Hunter attempted military emancipation, I again forbade it, because I did not yet think the indispensable necessity had come. When in March and May and July, 1862, I made earnest and successive appeals to the border States to favor compensated emancipation, I believed the indispensable necessity for military emancipation and arming the blacks would come unless averted by that measure. They declined the proposition, and I was, in my best judgment, driven to the alternative of either surrendering the Union, and with it the Constitution, or of laying strong hand upon the colored element. I chose the latter. In choosing it, I hoped for greater gain than loss; but of this, I was not entirely confident. More than a year of trial now shows no loss by it in our foreign relations, none in our home popular sentiment, none in our white military force—no loss by it anyhow or anywhere. On the contrary it shows a gain of quite a hundred and thirty thousand soldiers, seamen, and laborers. These are palpable facts, about which, as facts, there can be no caviling. We have the men; and we could not have had them without the measure.

"And now let any Union man who complains of the measure test himself by writing down in one line that he is for subduing the rebellion by force of arms; and in the next, that he is for taking these hundred and thirty thousand men from the Union side, and placing them where they would be but for the measure he condemns. If he cannot face his case so stated, it is only because he cannot face the truth."

I add a word which was not in the verbal conversation. In telling this tale I attempt no compliment to my own sagacity. I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me. Now, at the end of three years' struggle, the nation's condition is not what either party, or any man, devised or expected. God alone can claim it. Whither it is tending seems plain. If God now wills the removal of a great wrong, and wills also that we of the North, as well as you of the South, shall pay fairly for our complicity in that wrong, impartial history will find therein new cause to attest and revere the justice and goodness of God.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Mrs. Horace Mann.

Executive Mansion, April 5, 1864.

Mrs. Horace Mann.

Madam: The petition of persons under eighteen, praying that I would free all slave children, and the heading of which petition it appears you wrote, was handed me a few days since by Senator Sumner. Please tell these little people I am very glad their young hearts are so full of just and generous sympathy, and that, while I have not the power to grant all they ask, I trust they will remember that God has, and that, as it seems, He wills to do it.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

William Dennison.

On April 7, 1864, in answer to a request to give a cotton-trader a letter of recommendation to military and naval authorities, etc., the President telegraphed

Governor Dennison, of Ohio, through John G. Nicolay, his private secretary, that "the President thinks he cannot safely write that class of letters."

Executive Mansion, June 27, 1864.

Hon. William Dennison and Others, a Committee of the National Union Convention.

Gentlemen: Your letter of the 14th instant formally notifying me that I have been nominated by the convention you represent for the Presidency of the United States for four years from the fourth of March next has been received. The nomination is gratefully accepted, as the resolutions of the convention, called the platform, are heartily approved. While the resolution in regard to the supplanting of republican government upon the western continent is fully concurred in, there might be misunderstanding were I not to say that the position of the Government in relation to the action of France in Mexico, as assumed through the State Department and approved and indorsed by the convention among the measures and acts of the executive, will be faithfully maintained so long as the state of facts shall leave that position pertinent and applicable. I am especially gratified that the soldier and the seaman were not forgotten by the convention, as they forever must and will be remembered by the grateful country for whose salvation they devote their lives.

Thanking you for the kind and complimentary terms in which you have communicated the nomination and other proceedings of the convention, I subscribe myself,

Your obedient servant, Abraham Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., September 24, 1864.
Governor William Dennison, Columbus, Ohio.

Mr. Blair has resigned and I appoint you Postmaster-General. Come on immediately.

A. Lincoln.

ISAAC MURPHY.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., April 27, 1864.
Governor Murphy, Little Rock, Arkansas.

I am much gratified to learn that you got out so large a vote, so nearly all the right way, at the late election; and not less so that your State government, including the legislature, is organized and in good working order. Whatever I can I will do to protect you; meanwhile you must do your utmost to protect yourselves. Present my greetings to all. A. Lincoln.

WILLIAM T. SHERMAN.[1]

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., May 4, 1864.
Major-General Sherman, Chattanooga, Tennessee.

I have an imploring appeal in behalf of the citizens, who say your Order No. 8 will compel them to go north of Nashville. This is in no

[1] General Sherman was one of the few generals who at the outbreak of the war realized its magnitude. He was called "Crazy Billy" because of his forebodings. He was a favorite of Grant, who made him his successor in the West when he became Lieutenant-General, and was greatly trusted by Lincoln.

sense an order, nor is it even a request that you will do anything which in the least shall be a drawback upon your military operations, but anything you can do consistently with those operations for those suffering people I shall be glad of. A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, July 18, 1864.

Major-General Sherman, Chattahoochee River, Georgia.

I have seen your despatches, objecting to agents of Northern States opening recruiting stations [1] near your camps.

An act of Congress authorizes this, giving the appointment of agents to the States, and not to the executive government. It is not for the War Department or myself to restrain or modify the law in its execution further than actual necessity may require.

To be candid, I was for the passage of the law, not apprehending at the time that it would produce such inconvenience to the armies in the field, as you now cause me to fear. Many of the States were very anxious for it, and I hoped that, with their State bounties, and active exertions, they would get out substantial additions to our colored forces, which, unlike white recruits, help us where they come from, as well as where they go to. I still hope advantage from the law; and, being a law, it must be treated as such by all of us.

We here will do what we consistently can to save you from difficulties arising out of it.

May I ask therefore that you will give your hearty coöperation? A. Lincoln.

[1] For negroes.

Washington, D. C., July 26, 1864.

Major-General Sherman, near Atlanta.

I have just seen yours complaining of the appointment of Hovey and Osterhaus. The point you make is unquestionably a good one, and yet, please hear a word from us. My recollection is that both General Grant and yourself recommended both Hovey and Osterhaus for promotion, and these, with other strong recommendations, drew committals from us which we could neither honorably nor safely disregard. We blamed Hovey for coming away in the manner in which he did, but we knew he had apparent reason to feel disappointed and mortified, and we felt that it was not best to crush one who certainly had been a good soldier. As to Osterhaus, we did not know of his leaving, at the time we made the appointment, and do not now know the terms on which he left. Not to have appointed him, as the case appeared to us at the time, would have been almost, if not quite, a violation of our word. The word was given on what we thought was high merit, and somewhat on his nationality. I beg you to believe we do not act in a spirit of disregarding merit; we expect to await your program for further changes and promotions in your army. My profoundest thanks to you and your whole army for the present campaign so far.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., September 17, 1864. 10 a. m.

Major-General Sherman, Atlanta, Georgia.

I feel great interest in the subjects of your de-

spatch mentioning corn and sorghum, and the contemplated visit to you. A. Lincoln,
President of the United States.

Executive Mansion, September 19, 1864.
Major-General Sherman.

The State election of Indiana occurs on the 11th of October, and the loss of it, to the friends of the Government, would go far toward losing the whole Union cause. The bad effect upon the November election, and especially the giving the State government to those who will oppose the war in every possible way, are too much to risk, if it can possibly be avoided. The draft proceeds, notwithstanding its strong tendency to lose us the State. Indiana is the only important State, voting in October, whose soldiers cannot vote in the field. Anything you can safely do to let her soldiers, or any part of them, go home and vote at the State election will be greatly in point. They need not remain for the presidential election, but may return to you at once. This is in no sense an order, but is merely intended to impress you with the importance, to the army itself, of your doing all you safely can, yourself being the judge of what you can safely do. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., September 27, 1864.
Major-General Sherman, Atlanta, Georgia.

You say Jefferson Davis is on a visit to Hood. I judge that Brown and Stephens are the objects of his visit. A. Lincoln.

Executive Mansion, December 26, 1864.

My dear General Sherman: Many, many thanks for your Christmas gift, the capture of Savannah.

When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic coast, I was anxious, if not fearful; but feeling that you were the better judge, and remembering that "nothing risked, nothing gained," I did not interfere. Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours; for I believe none of us went further than to acquiesce.

And taking the work of General Thomas into the count, as it should be taken, it is indeed a great success. Not only does it afford the obvious and immediate military advantages; but in showing to the world that your army could be divided, putting the stronger part to an important new service, and yet leaving enough to vanquish the old opposing force of the whole—Hood's army—it brings those who sat in darkness to see a great light. But what next?

I suppose it will be safe if I leave General Grant and yourself to decide.

Please make my grateful acknowledgments to your whole army—officers and men.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

Mrs. Sarah B. Meconkey.

Executive Mansion, May 9, 1864.

Mrs. Sarah B. Meconkey, West Chester, Pa.

Madam: Our mutual friend, Judge Lewis, tells me you do me the honor to inquire for my personal welfare. I have been very anxious for some days in regard to our armies in the field,

but am considerably cheered, just now, by favorable news from them. I am sure that you will join me in the hope for their further success; while yourself, and other good mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters, do all you and they can to relieve and comfort the gallant soldiers who compose them. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Samuel C. Pomeroy.[1]

Executive Mansion, May 12, 1864.

Hon. Senator Pomeroy.

Sir: I did not doubt yesterday that you desired to see me about the appointment of assessor in Kansas. I wish you and Lane would make a sincere effort to get out of the mood you are in. It does neither of you any good. It gives you the means of tormenting my life out of me, and nothing else.

Yours, etc., A. Lincoln.

Alfred Mackay.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, May 20, 1864.

Alfred Mackay,

Secretary of Fair, St. Louis, Missouri.

Your despatch received. Thanks for your greeting, and congratulations for the successful opening of your fair. Our soldiers are doing well, and must and will be done well by.

A. Lincoln.

[1] Mr. Pomeroy and James H. Lane were senators from Kansas. Pomeroy was an opponent of Lincoln's renomination.

I. N. Arnold.[1]

Executive Mansion, May 25, 1864.

Hon. I. N. Arnold.

My dear Sir: In regard to the order of General Burnside suspending the Chicago *Times*, now nearly a year ago, I can only say I was embarrassed with the question between what was due to the military service on the one hand, and the liberty of the press on the other, and I believe it was the despatch of Senator Trumbull and yourself, added to the proceedings of the meeting which it brought me, that turned the scale in favor of my revoking the order.

I am far from certain to-day that the revocation was not right; and I am very sure the small part you took in it is no just ground to disparage your judgment, much less to impugn your motives. I take it that your devotion to the Union and the Administration cannot be questioned by any sincere man.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

For Lincoln's opinion of Arnold, see his letter to Robert Boal of December 25, 1856.

Baptist Home Mission Society.

Executive Mansion, May 30, 1864.

Rev. Dr. Ide, Hon. J. R. Doolittle, and Hon. A. Hubbell, Committee.

In response to the preamble and resolutions of the American Baptist Home Mission Society, which you did me the honor to present, I can

[1] Arnold was a lawyer on the circuit with Lincoln, and a member of Congress during the war. He wrote an excellent biography of Lincoln.

only thank you for thus adding to the effective and almost unanimous support which the Christian communities are so zealously giving to the country and to liberty. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive how it could be otherwise with any one professing Christianity, or even having ordinary perceptions of right and wrong. To read in the Bible, as the word of God himself, that "In the sweat of *thy* face shalt thou eat bread," and to preach therefrom that, "In the sweat of *other men's* faces shalt thou eat bread," to my mind can scarcely be reconciled with honest sincerity. When brought to my final reckoning, may I have to answer for robbing no man of his goods; yet more tolerable even this, than for robbing one of himself and all that was his. When, a year or two ago, those professedly holy men of the South met in the semblance of prayer and devotion, and, in the name of him who said, "As ye would all men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them," appealed to the Christian world to aid them in doing to a whole race of men as they would have no man do unto themselves, to my thinking they contemned and insulted God and his church far more than did Satan when he tempted the Saviour with the kingdoms of the earth. The devil's attempt was no more false, and far less hypocritical. But let me forbear, remembering it is also written, "Judge not lest ye be judged." A. Lincoln.

J. H. Bryant.

Executive Mansion, May 30, 1864.

Hon. John H. Bryant.

My dear Sir: Yours of the 14th instant inclosing a card of invitation to a preliminary meeting contemplating the erection of a monument to the memory of Hon. Owen Lovejoy was duly received. As you anticipate, it will be out of my power to attend. Many of you have known Mr. Lovejoy longer than I have, and are better able than I to do his memory complete justice. My personal acquaintance with him commenced only about ten years ago, since when it has been quite intimate, and every step in it has been one of increasing respect and esteem, ending, with his life, in no less than affection on my part. It can truly be said of him that while he was personally ambitious he bravely endured the obscurity which the unpopularity of his principles imposed, and never accepted official honors until those honors were ready to admit his principles with him. Throughout very heavy and perplexing responsibilities here to the day of his death, it would scarcely wrong any other to say he was my most generous friend.

Let him have the marble monument along with the well-assured and more enduring one in the hearts of those who love liberty unselfishly for all men. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

New York Mass-Meeting.

Executive Mansion, June 3, 1864.

Hon. F. A. Conkling and Others.

Gentlemen: Your letter inviting me to be

present at a mass-meeting[1] of loyal citizens to be held at New York on the fourth instant, for the purpose of expressing gratitude to Lieutenant-General Grant for his signal services, was received yesterday. It is impossible for me to attend.

I approve, nevertheless, whatever may tend to strengthen and sustain General Grant and the noble armies now under his direction. My previous high estimate of General Grant has been maintained and heightened by what has occurred in the remarkable campaign he is now conducting, while the magnitude and difficulty of the task before him do not prove less than I expected. He and his brave soldiers are now in the midst of their great trial, and I trust that at your meeting you will so shape your good words that they may turn to men and guns, moving to his and their support.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

John Hay.

On June 5, 1864, J. G. Nicolay, the President's private secretary, wrote from Baltimore, where he was attending the National Union [Republican] convention, to Major John Hay, assistant private secretary to the President, a letter relating to a conversation he had had with B. C. Cook, the head of the Illinois delegates. Cook was "suspicious that Swett[2] may be untrue to Lincoln." One of the straws which led him to this belief was that Swett had telegraphed urging the Illinois delegation to go for Joseph Holt for Vice-Presi-

[1] This meeting was intended by certain Radicals opposed to Lincoln's renomination to launch a boom for General Grant's nomination for the presidency. By this letter Lincoln diverted it into a meeting for the support of the Union.

[2] Leonard Swett, really the only one in the President's confidence.

dent. "I told Cook," says Nicolay, "that I thought Lincoln would not wish even to indicate a preference for Vice-President, as the rival candidates were all friendly to him. . . . Cook wants to know confidentially whether Swett is all right; whether in urging Holt for Vice-President he reflects the President's wishes; whether the President has any preference, either personally or on the score of policy, or whether he wishes not even to interfere by a confidential indication."

Upon this letter the President wrote the following indorsement:

Swett is unquestionably all right. Mr. Holt is a good man, but I had not heard or thought of him for Vice-President. Wish not to interfere about Vice-President. Cannot interfere about platform. Convention must judge for itself.

WILLIAM D. KELLEY.

[*Memorandum of an Interview with the Postmaster of Philadelphia.*]

What I said to Postmaster of Philadelphia on this day—June 20, 1864:

Complaint is made to me that you are using your official power to defeat Judge Kelley's renomination to Congress.

I am well satisfied with Judge Kelley as a member of Congress, and I do not know that the man who might supplant him would be as satisfactory; but the correct principle, I think, is that all our friends should have absolute freedom of choice among our friends. My wish, therefore, is that you will do just as you think fit with your own suffrage in the case, and not constrain any of your subordinates to do other than as he thinks fit with his.

This is precisely the rule I inculcated and adhered to on my part when a certain other nomination now recently made was being canvassed for.

See letter of August 5, 1864, to Morton McMichael.

Clement C. Clay and Others.

On July 13, 1864, Mr. Greeley, editor of the *New York Tribune*, wrote Lincoln: "I have now information, on which I can rely, that two persons, duly commissioned and empowered to negotiate for peace, are . . . not far from Niagara Falls in Canada, and are desirous of conferring with yourself." The following pass was given in reply:

[*Safe-Conduct.*]

Executive Mansion, July 16, 1864.

The President of the United States directs that the four persons whose names follow, to wit: Hon. Clement C. Clay, Hon. Jacob Thompson, Prof. James B. Holcombe, George N. Sanders, shall have safe conduct to the city of Washington in company with the Hon. Horace Greeley, and shall be exempt from arrest or annoyance of any kind from any officer of the United States during their journey to the said city of Washington.

By order of the President.

John Hay, Major and A. A. G.

Abram Wakeman.

[*Private.*]

Executive Mansion, July 25, 1864.

Abram Wakeman, Esq.

My dear Sir: I feel that the subject which you pressed upon my attention in our recent

conversation is an important one. The men of the South recently (and perhaps still) at Niagara Falls tell us distinctly that they *are* in the confidential employment of the rebellion; and they tell us as distinctly that they are *not* empowered to offer terms of peace. Does any one doubt that what they *are* empowered to do is to assist in selecting and arranging a candidate and a platform for the Chicago convention? Who could have given them this confidential employment but he [1] who, only a week since, declared to Jaquess and Gilmore, that he had no terms of peace but the independence of the South—the dissolution of the Union? Thus, the present presidential contest will almost certainly be no other than a contest between a union [2] and a disunion [3] candidate, disunion certainly following the success of the latter. The issue is a mighty one, for all people, and all times; and whoever aids the right will be appreciated and remembered.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

J. C. Welling.

Executive Mansion, July 25, 1864.

J. C. Welling, Esq.

Sir: According to the request contained in your note, I have placed Mr. Gibson's letter of resignation in the hands of the President. He has read the letter, and says he accepts the resignation, as he will be glad to do with any other, which may be tendered, as this is, for the purpose of taking an attitude of hostility against him.

[1] Jefferson Davis. [2] Abraham Lincoln.
[3] George B. McClellan.

He says he was not aware that he was so much indebted to Mr. Gibson for having accepted the office at first, not remembering that he ever pressed him to do so, or that he gave it otherwise than as was usual, upon request made on behalf of Mr. Gibson.

He thanks Mr. Gibson for his acknowledgment that he has been treated with personal kindness and consideration, and he says he knows of but two small drawbacks upon Mr. Gibson's right to still receive such treatment, one of which is that he never could learn of his giving much attention to the duties of his office, and the other is this studied attempt of Mr. Gibson's to stab him. I am, very truly,

Your obedient servant, John Hay.

Morton McMichael.

[*Private.*]

Executive Mansion, August 5, 1864.

Hon. Morton McMichael. . . .

I am now told that, of the two or three hundred employees in the Post-office, not one of them is openly for Judge Kelley. This, if true, is not accidental. Left to their free choice, there can be no doubt that a large number of them, probably as much or more than half, would be for Kelley. And if they are for him, and are not restrained, they can put it beyond question by publicly saying so. Please tell the postmaster he must find a way to relieve me from the suspicion that he is not keeping his promise to me in good faith. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

S. G. Burbridge.

Washington, D. C., August 8, 1864.

Major-General Burbridge, Lexington, Kentucky.

Last December Mrs. Emily T. Helm, half-sister of Mrs. Lincoln, and widow of the rebel general, Ben Hardin Helm, stopped here on her way from Georgia to Kentucky, and I gave her a paper as I remember, to protect her against the mere fact of her being General Helm's widow. I hear a rumor to-day that you recently sought to arrest her, but were prevented by her presenting the paper from me. I do not intend to protect her from the consequences of disloyal words or acts, spoken or done by her since her return to Kentucky, and if the paper given her by me can be construed to give her protection for such words or acts, it is hereby revoked *pro tanto*. Deal with her for current conduct just as you would with any other.

A. Lincoln.

[*Indorsement of Application for Employment.*]

August 15, 1864.

I am always for the man who wishes to work; and I shall be glad for this man to get suitable employment at Cavalry Depot, or elsewhere.

A. Lincoln.

W. Hunt.

Executive Mansion, August 16, 1864.

Hon. Ward Hunt. . . .

My dear Sir: I am for the regular nominee in all cases, and no one could be more satisfactory to me as the nominee in that district than

Mr. [*Roscoe*] Conkling. I do not mean to say there [*are*] not others as good as he in the district; but I think I know him to be at least good enough. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

D. S. D. Baldwin.

On August 19, 1864, through his secretary, John G. Nicolay, the President returned an application for military promotion from one D. S. D. Baldwin, saying that he "never interfered with the details of army organization," and recommending Baldwin to apply to General M. R. Patrick.

Abraham Lincoln.

[*Memorandum.*]

Executive Mansion, August 23, 1864.

This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be reëlected. Then it will be my duty to so coöperate with the President elect as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterward. A. Lincoln.

I. M. Schermerhorn.

[*Private.*]

Executive Mansion, September 12, 1864.

Isaac M. Schermerhorn, Buffalo, New York.

My dear Sir: Your letter, mentioned in your two telegrams, has not yet reached me, so that I am without knowledge of its particulars. I beg you to pardon me for having concluded that it is not best for me now to write a general letter to a political meeting.

First, I believe it is not customary for one holding the office, and being a candidate for re-election, to do so; and, secondly, a public letter must be written with some care, and at some expense of time, so that having begun with your meeting, I could not well refuse others, and yet could not get through with all having equal claims.

Please tender to those you represent, my sincere thanks for the invitation, and my appeal to their indulgence for having declined their request. Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

See letter of December 10, 1862, to S. R. Curtis.

Philip H. Sheridan.[1]

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, September 20, 1864.

Major-General Sheridan, Winchester, Virginia.

Have just heard of your great victory. God bless you all, officers and men. Strongly inclined to come up and see you. A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, October 22, 1864.

Major-General Sheridan.

With great pleasure I tender to you and your brave army the thanks of the nation, and my own personal admiration and gratitude, for the month's operations in the Shenandoah Valley; and especially for the splendid work of October 19, 1864. Your obedient servant,

Abraham Lincoln.

[1] General Sheridan, the greatest cavalry general of the war, won the battle of Winchester on September 19, 1864. On October 19 he turned defeat into victory at Cedar Creek by his famous ride.

H. W. Hoffman.

Executive Mansion, October 10, 1864.

Hon. Henry W. Hoffman.

My dear Sir: A convention of Maryland has framed a new constitution for the State; a public meeting is called for this evening at Baltimore to aid in securing its ratification by the people, and you ask a word from me for the occasion. I presume the only feature of the instrument about which there is serious controversy is that which provides for the extinction of slavery. It needs not to be a secret, and I presume it is no secret, that I wish success to this provision. I desire it on every consideration. I wish all men to be free. I wish the material prosperity of the already free, which I feel sure the extinction of slavery would bring. I wish to see in process of disappearing that only thing which ever could bring this nation to civil war. I attempt no argument. Argument upon the question is already exhausted by the abler, better informed, and more immediately interested sons of Maryland herself. I only add that I shall be gratified exceedingly if the good people of the State shall, by their votes, ratify the new constitution.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Wm. B. Campbell and Others.

Executive Mansion, October 22, 1864.

Messrs. Wm. B. Campbell [and others].

Gentlemen: . . .

The movement set on foot by the [*Union*] convention and Governor Johnson does not, as seems to be assumed by you, emanate from the

national Executive. In no proper sense can it be considered other than as an independent movement of at least a portion of the loyal people of Tennessee.

I do not perceive in the plan any menace of violence or coercion toward any one. Governor Johnson, like any other loyal citizen of Tennessee, has the right to favor any political plan he chooses, and, as military governor, it is his duty to keep the peace among and for the loyal people of the State. I cannot discern that by this plan he purposes any more.

But you object to the plan. Leaving it alone will be your perfect security against it. Do as you please on your own account, peacefully and loyally, and Governor Johnson will not molest you, but will protect you against violence so far as in his power.

I presume that the conducting of a presidential election in Tennessee in strict accordance with the old code of the State is not now a possibility.

It is scarcely necessary to add that if any election shall be held, and any votes shall be cast in the State of Tennessee for President and Vice-President of the United States, it will belong, not to the military agents, nor yet to the Executive Department, but exclusively to another department of the Government, to determine whether they are entitled to be counted in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Except it be to give protection against violence, I decline to interfere in any way with any presidential election. Abraham Lincoln.

Sailors' Fair at Boston.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., November 8, 1864.

To the Managing Committee of the Sailors' Fair, Boston, Massachusetts.

Allow me to wish you a great success. With the old fame of the navy made brighter in the present war you cannot fail. I name none lest I wrong others by omission. To all, from rear-admiral to honest Jack, I tender the nation's admiration and gratitude. A. Lincoln.

Mrs. Bixby.

Executive Mansion, November 21, 1864.

Mrs. Bixby, Boston, Massachusetts.

Dear Madam: I have been shown in the files of the War Department a statement of the Adjutant-General of Massachusetts that you are the mother of five sons who have died gloriously on the field of battle. I feel how weak and fruitless must be any words of mine which should attempt to beguile you from the grief of a loss so overwhelming. But I cannot refrain from tendering to you the consolation that may be found in the thanks of the Republic they died to save. I pray that our heavenly Father may assuage the anguish of your bereavement, and leave you only the cherished memory of the loved and lost, and the solemn pride that must be yours to have laid so costly a sacrifice upon the altar of freedom.

Yours very sincerely and respectfully,

Abraham Lincoln.

John Phillips.[1]

Executive Mansion, November 21, 1864.

Deacon John Phillips.

My dear Sir: I have heard of the incident at the polls in your town, in which you acted so honorable a part, and I take the liberty of writing to you to express my personal gratitude for the compliment paid me by the suffrage of a citizen so venerable.

The example of such devotion to civic duties in one whose days have already been extended an average lifetime beyond the Psalmist's limit, cannot but be valuable and fruitful. It is not for myself only, but for the country which you have in your sphere served so long and so well, that I thank you. Your friend and servant,

Abraham Lincoln.

James Speed.[2]

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, December 1, 1864.

Hon. James Speed, Louisville, Kentucky.

I appoint you to be Attorney-General. Please come on at once. A. Lincoln.

[1] Deacon John Phillips, of Sturbridge, Mass., aged one hundred and four years, having voted at every presidential election from the adoption of the Constitution, tottered to the polls to vote for Lincoln.

[2] James Speed was the brother of the closest friend Lincoln ever had, Joshua F. Speed, through whom Lincoln met James, and acquired a high opinion of his legal ability.

William B. Cushing.

[*Message to Congress.*]

To the Senate and House of Representatives. In conformity to the law of [*the*] 16th of July, 1862, I most cordially recommend that Lieutenant William B. Cushing, United States Navy, receive a vote of thanks from Congress for his important, gallant, and perilous achievement in destroying the rebel iron-clad steamer *Albemarle*, on the night of the 27th of October, 1864, at Plymouth, North Carolina. The destruction of so formidable a vessel, which had resisted the continued attacks of a number of our vessels on former occasions, is an important event touching our future naval and military operations, and would reflect honor on any officer, and redounds to the credit of this young officer and the few brave comrades who assisted in this successful and daring undertaking.

Abraham Lincoln.

Washington, December 5, 1864.

John A. Winslow.

[*Message to Congress.*]

To the Senate and House of Representatives. In conformity to the law of July 16, 1862, I most cordially recommend that Captain John A. Winslow, United States Navy, receive a vote of thanks from Congress for the skill and gallantry exhibited by him in the brilliant action whilst in command of the United States steamer *Kearsarge*, which led to the total destruction of the piratical craft *Alabama*, on the 19th of June,

1864, a vessel superior in tonnage, superior in number of guns, and superior in number of crew. . . . Abraham Lincoln.

Washington, December 5, 1864.

Edward R. S. Canby.

Executive Mansion, December 12, 1864.

Major-General Canby.

I think it is probable that you are laboring under some misapprehension as to the purpose, or rather the motive, of the Government on two points—cotton, and the new Louisiana State government.

It is conceded that the military operations are the first in importance; and as to what is indispensable to these operations, the department commander must be judge and master.

But the other matters mentioned I suppose to be of public importance also; and what I have attempted in regard to them is not merely a concession to private interest and pecuniary greed.

As to cotton. By the external blockade, the price is made certainly six times as great as it was. And yet the enemy gets through at least one-sixth part as much in a given period, say a year, as if there were no blockade, and receives as much for it as he would for a full crop in time of peace. The effect in substance is, that we give him six ordinary crops without the trouble of producing any but the first; and at the same time leave his fields and his laborers free to produce provisions. You know how this keeps up his armies at home and procures supplies from abroad. For other reasons we cannot give up the blockade, and hence it becomes immensely

important to us to get the cotton away from him. Better give him guns for it than let him, as now, get both guns and ammunition for it. But even this only presents part of the public interest to get out cotton. Our finances are greatly involved in the matter. The way cotton goes now carries so much gold out of the country as to leave us paper currency only, and that so far depreciated as that for every hard dollar's worth of supplies we obtain, we contract to pay two and a half hard dollars hereafter. This is much to be regretted; and, while I believe we can live through it, at all events it demands an earnest effort on the part of all to correct it. And if pecuniary greed can be made to aid us in such effort, let us be thankful that so much good can be got out of pecuniary greed.

As to the new State government of Louisiana. Most certainly there is no worthy object in getting up a piece of machinery merely to pay salaries and give political consideration to certain men. But it is a worthy object to again get Louisiana into proper practical relations with the nation, and we can never finish this if we never begin it. Much good work is already done, and surely nothing can be gained by throwing it away.

I do not wish either cotton or the new State government to take precedence of the military while the necessity for the military remains; but there is a strong public reason for treating each with so much favor as may not be substantially detrimental to the military.

Allow me a word of explanation in regard to the telegram which you kindly forwarded to Admiral Farragut for me.

That telegram was prompted by a piece of secret information inducing me to suspect that the use of a forged paper might be attempted on the admiral, in order to base a claim that we had raised our own blockade.

I am happy in the hope that you are almost well of your late and severe wound.[1]

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln.

George H. Thomas.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C.,
December 16, 1864. 11.30 a. m.

Major-General Thomas, Nashville, Tennessee.

Please accept for yourself, officers, and men, the nation's thanks for your good work of yesterday.[2] You made a magnificent beginning; a grand consummation is within your easy reach. Do not let it slip. A. Lincoln.

Joseph H. Choate.

Executive Mansion, December 19, 1864.

Joseph H. Choate, Esq.

My dear Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the reception of your kind invitation to be present at the annual festival of the New England Society to commemorate the landing of the Pilgrims, on Thursday, the 22d of this month.

[1] While on a tour of inspection on White River, Ark., General Canby was severely wounded by guerrillas. Later, on April 12, 1865, with the assistance of Admiral Farragut, he captured Mobile. After the war he became noted as an Indian fighter. He was treacherously killed, April 11, 1873, by Modoc Indians.

[2] Defeat of General John B. Hood.

My duties will not allow me to avail myself of your kindness.

I cannot but congratulate you and the country, however, upon the spectacle of devoted unanimity presented by the people at home, the citizens that form our marching columns, and the citizens that fill our squadrons on the sea, all animated by the same determination to complete the work our fathers began and transmitted.

The work of the Plymouth emigrants was the glory of their age. While we reverence their memory, let us not forget how vastly greater is our opportunity. I am, very truly,

Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln.

John Maclean.

On December 20, 1864, the College of New Jersey at Princeton conferred on President Lincoln the degree of Doctor of Laws. On December 27, 1864, he acknowledged the compliment to President Maclean:

The assurance conveyed by this high compliment, that the course of the Government which I represent has received the approval of a body of gentlemen of such character and intelligence, in this time of public trial is most grateful to me.

Thoughtful men must feel that the fate of civilization upon this continent is involved in the issue of our contest. Among the most gratifying proofs of this conviction is the hearty devotion everywhere exhibited by our schools and colleges to the national cause.

I am most thankful if my labors have seemed to conduce to the preservation of those institutions under which alone we can expect good

government—and in its train, sound learning and the progress of the liberal arts.

I am, sir, very truly, your obedient servant,

A. Lincoln.

Lyman Trumbull.[1]

Executive Mansion, January 9, 1865.

Hon. Lyman Trumbull. . . .

If I shall neither take sides nor argue, will it be out of place for me to make what I think is the true statement of your question as to the proposed Louisiana senators?

"Can Louisiana be brought into proper practical relations with the Union sooner by admitting or by rejecting the proposed senators?"

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

G. M. Dodge.

[*Telegram.*]

Executive Mansion, January 15, 1865.

Major-General Dodge, St. Louis, Missouri.

It is represented to me that there is so much irregular violence in northern Missouri as to be driving away the people and almost depopulating it. Please gather information, and consider whether an appeal to the people there to go to their homes and let one another alone—recognizing as a full right of protection for each that he lets others alone, and banning only him who refuses to let others alone—may not enable you to withdraw the troops, their presence itself

[1] Mr. Trumbull, an Illinois Republican, had been elected to the Senate at a time when Lincoln expected to receive the Republican nomination.

[*being*] a cause of irritation and constant apprehension, and thus restore peace and quiet, and returning prosperity. Please consider this and telegraph or write me. A. Lincoln.

William Lloyd Garrison.

Washington, January 24, 1865.

My dear Mr. Garrison: I have your kind letter of the 21st of January, and can only beg that you will pardon the seeming neglect occasioned by my constant engagements. When I received the spirited and admirable painting, "Waiting for the Hour," I directed my secretary not to acknowledge its arrival at once, preferring to make my personal acknowledgments of the thoughtful kindness of the donors; and waiting for some leisure hour, I have committed the discourtesy of not replying at all. I hope you will believe that my thanks, though late, are most cordial, and request that you will convey them to those associated with you in this flattering and generous gift. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Thomas T. Eckert.

[*Instructions.*]

Executive Mansion, January 30, 1865.

Major T. T. Eckert.

Sir: You will proceed with the documents placed in your hands, and on reaching General Ord will deliver him the letter addressed to him by the Secretary of War. Then, by General Ord's assistance, procure an interview with

Messrs. Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell,[1] or any of them, deliver to him or them the paper on which your own letter is written. Note on the copy which you retain the time of delivery and to whom delivered. Receive their answer in writing, waiting a reasonable time for it, and which, if it contain their decision to come through without further condition, will be your warrant to ask General Ord to pass them through as directed in the letter of the Secretary of War to him. If by their answer they decline to come, or propose other terms, do not have them pass through. And this being your whole duty, return and report to me.

Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

Lieutenant-Colonel Glenn.

Executive Mansion, February 7, 1865.

Lieutenant-Colonel Glenn, Commanding Post at Henderson, Kentucky.

Complaint is made to me that you are forcing negroes into the military service, and even torturing them—riding them on rails and the like—to extort their consent. I hope this may be a mistake. The like must not be done by you, or any one under you. You must not force negroes any more than white men. Answer me on this.

A. Lincoln.

Alexander H. Stephens.

Executive Mansion, February 10, 1865.

Hon. A. H. Stephens.

According to our agreement, your nephew, Lieutenant Stephens, goes to you bearing this

[1] The Confederate Peace Commissioners.

note. Please, in return, to select and send to me that officer of the same rank imprisoned at Richmond, whose physical condition most urgently requires his release.

Respectfully, A. Lincoln.

Thomas C. Fletcher.

Executive Mansion, February 20, 1865.

His Excellency Governor Fletcher.

It seems that there is now no organized military force of the enemy in Missouri, and yet that destruction of property and life is rampant everywhere. Is not the cure for this within easy reach of the people themselves? It cannot but be that every man not naturally a robber or cutthroat would gladly put an end to this state of things. A large majority in every locality must feel alike upon this subject; and if so, they only need to reach an understanding, one with another. Each leaving all others alone solves the problem; and surely each would do this but for his apprehension that others will not leave him alone. Cannot this mischievous distrust be removed? Let neighborhood meetings be everywhere called and held, of all entertaining a sincere purpose for mutual security in the future, whatever they may heretofore have thought, said or done about the war, or about anything else. Let all such meet, and, waiving all else, pledge each to cease harassing others, and to make common cause against whoever persists in making, aiding, or encouraging further disturbance. The practical means they will best know how to adopt and apply. At such meetings old friend-

ships will cross the memory, and honor and Christian charity will come in to help.

Please consider whether it may not be well to suggest this to the now afflicted people of Missouri. Yours truly, A. Lincoln.

James Gordon Bennett.

Executive Mansion, February 20, 1865.

James G. Bennett, Esq.

Dear Sir: I propose, at some convenient and not distant day, to nominate you to the United States Senate as Minister to France.

Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln.

Benjamin G. Smith and Franklin W. Smith.

[*Order Annulling Sentence.*]

I am unwilling for the sentence to stand, and be executed, to any extent in this case. In the absence of a more adequate motive than the evidence discloses, I am wholly unable to believe in the existence of criminal or fraudulent intent on the part of men of such well established good character. If the evidence went as far to establish a guilty profit of one or two hundred thousand dollars, as it does of one or two hundred dollars, the case would, on the question of guilt, bear a far different aspect. That on this contract, involving some twelve hundred thousand dollars, the contractors would plan, and attempt to execute a fraud, which, at the most, could profit them only one or two hundred, or even one thousand dollars, is to my mind beyond the

power of rational belief. That they did not, in such a case, make far greater gains, proves that they did not, with guilty or fraudulent intent, make [*any*] at all. The judgment and sentence are disapproved and declared null, and the defendants fully discharged. A. Lincoln.

March 18, 1865.

GODFREY WEITZEL.

[*Telegram.*]

Headquarters Armies of the United States,
City Point, April 6, 1865.

Major-General Weitzel, Richmond, Virginia.

It has been intimated to me that the gentlemen who have acted as the legislature of Virginia in support of the rebellion may now desire to assemble at Richmond and take measures to withdraw the Virginia troops and other support from resistance to the General Government. If they attempt it, give them permission and protection, until, if at all, they attempt some action hostile to the United States, in which case you will notify them, give them reasonable time to leave, and at the end of which time arrest any who remain. Allow Judge Campbell to see this, but do not make it public. A. Lincoln.

See letter to U. S. Grant of April 6, 1865.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., April 12, 1865.

Major-General Weitzel, Richmond, Virginia.

I have seen your despatch to Colonel Hardie about the matter of prayers. I do not remember hearing prayers spoken of while I was in Rich-

mond; but I have no doubt you have acted in what appeared to you to be the spirit and temper manifested by me while there.[1] Is there any sign of the rebel legislature coming together on the understanding of my letter to you? If there is any such sign, inform me what it is; if there is no such sign, you may withdraw the offer.

A. Lincoln.

[*Telegram.*]

Washington, D. C., April 12, 1865.

Major-General Weitzel, Richmond, Virginia.

I have just seen Judge Campbell's letter to you of the 7th. He assumes, as appears to me, that I have called the insurgent legislature of Virginia together, as the rightful legislature of the State, to settle all differences with the United States. I have done no such thing. I spoke of them, not as a legislature, but as "the gentlemen who have acted as the legislature of Virginia in support of the rebellion." I did this on purpose to exclude the assumption that I was recognizing them as a rightful body. I dealt with them as men having power *de facto* to do a specific thing, to wit: "To withdraw the Virginia troops and other support from resistance to the General Government," for which, in the paper handed Judge Campbell, I promised a specific equivalent, to wit: a remission to the people of the State, except in certain cases, of the confiscation of their property. I meant this, and no more. Inasmuch, however, as Judge Campbell misconstrues this, and is still pressing for an armistice,

[1] Secretary Stanton had rebuked General Weitzel for neglect to require the pastors of Richmond churches to pray for President Lincoln, as they had done for President Davis before the city's capture.

contrary to the explicit statement of the paper I gave him, and particularly as General Grant has since captured the Virginia troops, so that giving a consideration for their withdrawal is no longer applicable, let my letter to you and the paper to Judge Campbell both be withdrawn, or countermanded, and he be notified of it. Do not now allow them to assemble, but if any have come, allow them safe return to their homes.

A. Lincoln.

GEORGE ASHMUN.

Washington, D. C., April 14, 1865.

Allow Mr. Ashmun and his friends to come in at 9 a. m. to-morrow. A. Lincoln.

These were the last words written by Abraham Lincoln. He wrote this direction on a card just before leaving the White House for Ford's Theatre, where he was assassinated.

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